Whatley v. State
Decision Date | 08 October 2014 |
Docket Number | No. PD–1627–13.,PD–1627–13. |
Citation | 445 S.W.3d 159 |
Parties | Jerry Don WHATLEY, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Steven R. Green, Athens, TX, for Appellant.
John R. Messinger, Assistant State Prosecuting Attorney, Austin, TX, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for the State.
A Van Zandt County jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child by touching and sentenced him to fifty years' imprisonment. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction because the state did not offer evidence disputing his claim that he was asleep at the time and that his actions were therefore involuntary. The court of appeals agreed, and it reversed the judgment of the trial court and entered a judgment acquitting appellant. Whatley v. State, 415 S.W.3d 530, 548 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013). We granted the state's petition for discretionary review,1 and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand for consideration of appellant's final point of error.
Appellant's stepdaughter accused him of touching her inappropriately on three separate occasions when she was ten or eleven years old.2 The first episode occurred while the family was on vacation at a lake in Arkansas. Appellant, the complainant, and her mother were sharing a bedroom in a rented cabin, and the abuse occurred while appellant and the complainant were alone in the bed. All three family members slept together in the bed that night. The second incident was during the same vacation in a reclining chair, and the third happened in the complainant's bedroom at the family home in Canton, Texas.
This case requires us to decide what the jury could have reasonably inferred from trial testimony. In order to accurately represent the evidence that was available to the jury with regard to appellant's consciousness, we sample generously from the trial transcript.
The complainant's mother testified as an outcry witness. She explained that, after the complainant informed her of the abuse, she (the mother) confronted appellant. The complainant was also present, at her own request, because she was concerned that appellant would lie to her mother.
III R.R. 130.
The complainant testified as well. She was eighteen years old at the time of trial. Portions of her testimony appear below.
III R.R. 179–89.
On cross-examination, the defense emphasized the defendant's statement to the Children's Advocacy Center (CAC) interviewer, in which Melany appeared confident that appellant was asleep when he touched her.
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