Wheat v. State

• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Citation: 527 A.2d 269
• Parties: Willie E. WHEAT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 269

527 A.2d 269

56 USLW 2055

Willie E. WHEAT, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Jan. 27, 1987.

Decided: June 11, 1987.

David M. Lukoff, Asst. Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.

Richard E. Fairbanks, Chief of Appeals, Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.

Before MOORE, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.

WALSH, Justice.

The appellant, Willie E. Wheat, was convicted after a bench trial in the Superior Court of first degree rape of his stepdaughter. His appeal raises an important issue of first impression in this jurisdiction: To what extent may the State use expert testimony to assist the trier of fact in evaluating the testimony of child sexual abuse victims? While we approve the use of such expert testimony within the limits set forth in this opinion, we find its use in this case to be reversible error.

I

On the morning of March 28, 1985, the complainant, Wheat's ten year old stepdaughter, informed her mother, Wheat's second wife, that Wheat had sexually molested her. The complainant's mother related the child's claim to the police. As a result Wheat was arrested and incarcerated.

During Wheat's incarceration, his first wife visited the trailer where the complainant lived with her mother, a stepbrother, and, until his incarceration, Wheat. At a time when the complainant and Wheat's first wife were alone together in the trailer, the complainant recanted her allegations of sexual abuse. There was no indication that Wheat's former wife physically mistreated the complainant or threatened to do so. Subsequently, the complainant repeated her recantation to her mother. In the company of the complainant, Wheat's first wife, and another person, the complainant's mother traveled to the investigating police agency and informed the police of the complainant's recantation.

Shortly thereafter, Wheat's first wife returned to Louisiana. Several days later, the complainant reversed her recantation, informing her mother that Wheat had in fact sexually abused her.

At Wheat's trial, seven months after his arrest, the complainant testified consistently with her original allegations of abuse and the reversal of her recantation. She also testified that after Wheat abused her, he told her that if she told her mother, her mother would tell the State, and that when Wheat "went to jail, he was going to break out and kill me and my mother."

The State and defense counsel offered opposing explanations for the complainant's recantation and reversal. The complainant explained her recantation by stating that Wheat's first wife had scared her by telling her, at a time when no one else was around to protect her, that she (the complainant) was "playing," and that if she "didn't have [Wheat] out for Easter ... the [other] kids were going to get really mad at me." The complainant's mother corroborated this testimony, stating that the complainant told her the recantation occurred because Wheat's first wife "kept telling her it wouldn't be fair for her daddy to be ... not here for Easter at home." Defense counsel, however, sought to establish that the complainant's mother had prompted the complainant's original allegations of abuse and that the complainant recanted those allegations because she was "tired of lying."

The State sought to introduce expert testimony through Margaret Jackson, a clinical worker in the Intrafamily Sexual Abuse Treatment Program for the Childrens' Bureau of Delaware. Jackson had worked at the Bureau since August, 1984. In 1980 she had obtained a master's degree in clinical work from Louisiana State University. From then until July, 1983, she had been director of a child abuse program in Louisiana and later worked for the United States Congress as a "child abuse expert specialist in research," in which capacity she had testified for the Select Committee for Children in the Family.

Jackson had treated or counseled approximately seventy-five victims of sexual abuse under the age of eighteen, and had been involved in the treatment of the complainant in this case. She had attended national conferences on sexual abuse, at one of which there had been three separate workshops concerning recantation, and had kept abreast of literature in the field by reading professional journals dealing with clinical social work and books dealing with "child sexual assault."

Jackson had previously testified in Delaware Family Court on custody matters, and in Louisiana on custody matters and abuse of adult women. However, she had never before testified in Delaware Superior Court or testified specifically concerning recantation by child molestation victims.

Over defense objection, the trial judge allowed Jackson to testify as an expert in the field of intrafamily sexual abuse, ruling, however, that she could not opine whether the complainant was being truthful or not. Jackson testified that in general, between thirty percent and forty percent of children recant, alter, or otherwise minimize their original allegations of sexual abuse, but that fewer than five percent recant and maintain the altered statement. She stated that of the seventy-five to eighty children whom she had treated or counseled, "about thirty" had recanted at some point, but only three had recanted and maintained their recantations. Basing her testimony on literature in the field, experiences from her own practice and interviews with the complainant, her mother, and others, she described factors that cause such recantations in general, ¹ and opined that each of those factors was present in the complainant's case, listing behavior she believed she had observed in the complainant which supported her conclusion. ² She added that it is "very uncommon" for a victim's initial report to include all instances of abuse or be fully detailed. Finally, in response to a question whether she had learned from the complainant "what actually happened," she related that the complainant had told her of two instances involving oral sex with Wheat and "two or three occasions" on which Wheat had tried to fondle the complainant.

II

Appellant's attack on the admissibility of Jackson's testimony is two-pronged. He argues that (a) Jackson's qualifications were insufficient to establish her as an expert, and (b) her qualifications apart, Jackson's testimony impermissibily invaded the credibility province of the trier of fact, especially insofar as it concerned consistency between the complainant's behavior and behavior indicative of what we will term the "child sexual abuse syndrome." For its part, the State maintains that Jackson's qualifications were sufficient and her testimony admissible under the broad standard imparted by section 702 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. ³

We find no merit in the claim of lack of expertise. Although the subject of expert analysis and testimony in child sexual abuse cases is essentially that of psychological or behavioral dynamics, specialized knowledge in those areas is not the sole preserve of psychologists or psychiatrists. Professionals in the field of social work who possess satisfactory educational and occupational experience in the area of child behavior may also qualify as experts. Com. v. Baldwin, Pa.Super., 348 Pa.Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253 (1985); State v. Middleton, Or.Supr., 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1217-1221 (1983). In each case the expert must demonstrate sufficient knowledge of, and contact with, victims of child abuse to be able to explain the behavioral and psychological characteristics which are material to the issues in a particular case.

Given the broad reach of D.R.E. 702, we conclude that Jackson's qualifications sufficed to establish her as an expert in the field of child molestation. Her formal education, her treatment and counseling of numerous victims, and her continued exposure to conferences and literature in the field of child abuse demonstrated sufficient knowledge of, and contact with, victims of child abuse to be able to explain the behavioral and psychological characteristics which were material to the issues in this case. Middleton, 657 P.2d at 1220-1221.

The scope of admissibility of expert testimony regarding the psychological dynamics and behavioral patterns of complainants in sexual abuse prosecutions has been the focus of abundant recent litigation and comment. See Annot, Admissibility, At Criminal Prosecution, Of Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome, 42 A.L.R. 4th 879 (1985); Comment, Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility And Effective Use In Criminal Rape Prosecutions, 33 American U.L.Rev. 417 (Winter, 1984); National Legal Resource Center For Child Advocacy And Protection, A.B.A., Papers From A National Policy Conference On Legal Reforms In Child Sexual Abuse Cases, pp. 287-306 (1985). Because this area of the law has received attention only recently, however, the principles governing the admission of such testimony are still evolving. See State v. Moran, Ariz.Supr., 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248, 250 n. 2 (1986).

Under D.R.E. 702, testimony by a qualified expert is admissible if it involves "scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge" which will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." The initial question posed here is thus whether expert testimony concerning intrafamily child sexual abuse involves specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.

Knowledge is specialized only when not possessed by the average trier of fact who lacks the expert's skill, training, or education. Consequently, expert testimony impermissibly invades the province of the jury if it embraces matters in which "the jury is just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions," i.e....