Wheatland Cold Storage and Meat Processing, Inc. v. Wilkins, 85-24

• Decision Date: 21 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 85-24,85-24
• Parties: WHEATLAND COLD STORAGE AND MEAT PROCESSING, INC., Les C. Leal, and Antonia Leal, Appellants (Defendants), v. Edgar WILKINS, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 316

705 P.2d 316

WHEATLAND COLD STORAGE AND MEAT PROCESSING, INC., Les C. Leal, and Antonia Leal, Appellants (Defendants), v. Edgar WILKINS, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 85-24.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Aug. 21, 1985.

George Santini and Charles E. Graves of Charles E. Graves & Associates, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Eric M. Alden, Wheatland, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

This appeal asks whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside an execution sale wherein a judgment was sold for $250 and later turned out to have a value of $80,000. Appellants claim the trial court had equitable power to set aside the execution sale and raise the following issue:

"Whether the district court has the power to oversee execution upon judgments issued under its auspices to prevent inequity."

We will affirm.

The facts and procedural history of the case are long and complex. Appellants Wheatland Cold Storage and Meat Processing, Inc. (hereinafter Wheatland Cold Storage), and Les C. Leal and Antonia Leal (hereinafter the Leals), were sued upon a $15,000 note and for fraudulent misrepresentation by appellee Edgar Wilkins on October 22, 1980. Pursuant to a confession of judgment, appellee obtained a judgment filed August 7, 1981, for $21,419.84 on the $15,000 note including interest and attorney fees. The fraudulent misrepresentation allegation was dismissed.

Appellee was unable to execute on the judgment and, therefore, an examination of debtor was held which disclosed two equitable assets held by appellants subject to execution: one, a judgment rendered in a separate proceeding in federal district court in favor of appellants in the principal amount of $110,055.81, together with accrued interest dated June 27, 1980; and two, the interest of Wheatland Cold Storage in a lease agreement with option to purchase real property upon which the business was located. Appellee subsequently received an oral order from the district court authorizing him to execute upon appellants' equitable assets.

On March 2, 1982, appellee noticed that appellants' federal judgment of $110,055.81 was to be sold at an execution sale on April 7, 1982. Appellee subsequently purchased the judgment at the sale for the sum of $250. Appellants then petitioned the court to have the execution sale set aside on the grounds that the price paid for the judgment was disproportionate to its value. Such petition was denied by the district court since the court found there was no evidence that the price was inadequate or that the sale was otherwise improperly conducted:

"There is no contention by the Defendants that the sale was not properly conducted or that there was improper notice or that the Plaintiff in any way failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid sale. At the time of the hearing on the Petition, the petitioners' only contention was that there was a gross inadequacy of the price so as to shock the conscience of the Court, but Defendants did not introduce any evidence as to what a fair price would have been. Defense counsel was present at the sale but did not raise the bid of the Plaintiff. Defendants did not offer to obtain a higher price at a resale, either by their own bid or that of another, nor did they offer to pay the costs and expenses of a resale."

On June 4, 1982, appellee noticed the execution sale of appellants' second equitable asset, namely, the equitable interest of Wheatland Cold Storage in the lease agreement with option to purchase real property upon which the business was situate. This sale was to be held on July 7, 1982, but was postponed when appellants filed a petition for bankruptcy in federal court. The bankruptcy petition was eventually dismissed and appellee again sought to execute upon the lease agreement. Such sale was eventually held and appellee purchased the interest in the lease agreement for the amount remaining due on its judgment plus interest and costs accrued.

In the interim, appellee settled the federal court judgment for $80,000 (this was the judgment purchased earlier at the execution sale for $250). Thereafter appellants again sought to have the execution sale set aside.

The matter was heard on December 14, 1984, and the district court concluded it would not interfere with the execution sale of the federal judgment or the leasehold interest. At the close of the hearing, Judge Langdon stated:

"THE COURT: It is incumbent upon the Court that the property seized for sale can be sold. I hear you, Mr. Santini, I hear every word you say, but what goes through my mind in this particular case is supposing that, that the plaintiff had sold this to somebody else for $250, or $500, and it turned into--I use the word 'windfall' because that's a common name for it, of $80,000. Would it be--Would it be equitable to say that the plaintiff gave this away, more or less to some third person and therefore he missed a good deal?

"I look at it as Mr. Alden looked at it. This is an increase in value of something that they had no idea was worth that much and it turned out to be a good deal. And I don't think that I have any authority to keep them from executing on this thing.

"I can assure you that if I thought I did, I would. But I don't think I do.

"This sale was sold, it was sold on the front steps of the Platte County Courthouse, 2:00 on the 7th day of April, 1982, and it was sold for $200--Well, a net of $240, less, of course, the cost of publication and anything like that. And as far as I'm concerned, that's what the value of the thing was at that time, and subsequent changes I don't believe are something the Court can get into."

The court subsequently entered its order, finding:

"1. That the Plaintiff had seized and levied upon the interests of Defendant Wheatland Cold Storage and Meat Processing, Inc., as early as June of 1982.

"2. That at that time the value of the federal judgment previously sold in execution was unknown beyond that amount realized at the execution sale and that the eventual settlement amount received under that federal judgment was the result of an increase in value after its execution sale hereunder.

"3. That the Plaintiff has made continuing efforts to sell the leasehold interest levied upon up to and including the execution sale set for September 5, 1984, and postponed pending the determination of this motion.

"4. That after the Plaintiff's judgment lien attached to the leasehold interest said interest was sold and assigned by the Defendants to CRT, Ltd., a Colorado corporation, and that the Defendants herein have no further interest in that leasehold and therefore would be neither benefitted nor harmed by the execution sale of that asset.

"5. That the Defendants' motion should be denied in so far as it relates to the leasehold interest and that the Plaintiff should be allowed to continue with the execution sale of that leasehold interest.

"NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion to Enter Satisfaction of the judgment be and it hereby is denied in so far as the Plaintiff's execution sale of the leasehold interest is concerned and that this Court's earlier order postponing that sale be lifted and the Plaintiff be allowed to pursue the execution sale of that asset. This order shall not prejudice the parties hereto in raising similar arguments in so far as they may relate to other assets of the Defendants at some time in the future."

Appellants contend Judge Langdon erred when he stated he believed he was without power to set aside the execution sale of the federal judgment. Appellants then cite authority for the general proposition that courts have the equitable power to restrain execution upon a judgment which is otherwise final where execution would result in injustice. Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria v. Hodgson, 3 U.S. (7 Cranch 332) 557, 3 L.Ed. 362 (1813); and 33 C.J.S. Executions § 151 (1942).

It is true that the district courts of this state "* * *...