Wheeler v. Merriman

• Decision Date: 01 May 1883
• Parties: RUSH B. WHEELER <I>vs.</I> ORLANDO C. MERRIMAN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

30 Minn. 372

RUSH B. WHEELER vs. ORLANDO C. MERRIMAN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 1, 1883.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Mower county, to recover possession of the E. ½ of the N. W. ¼ of section 22, township 101, range 18, in that county. The answer put in issue plaintiff's title, averred generally title in fee and right of possession in defendant, and that "he took possession of said premises in good faith, without notice of any defects in his said title, and has made improvements thereon, of the value of $500, and has paid taxes amounting to $300." The reply consisted of a general denial of the new matter in the answer and a denial that defendant's improvements were worth more than $30.

At the trial before Farmer, J., and a jury, it appeared that on October 2, 1857, one Jarvis White located a military-bounty land-warrant upon the premises in question, at the land-office at Chat-field in Fillmore county. This warrant was originally issued to one Hider Neville, and upon the back of it was an assignment purporting to be signed by Neville. On August 22, 1857, Neville and one Vandiver, claiming to be owner of the warrant, had filed a caveat against it in the general land-office, and thereupon the issue of a patent upon the location was suspended. In November, 1864, the warrant was cancelled by the commissioner of pensions, and declared void as against the United States, on account of forgery in the assignment, and in the same month notice was given to the register at the local land-office, and to White, the locator, who was also informed that, to secure a patent on his location, he would be allowed to file another warrant or pay $100 in cash. In July, 1880, this option was renewed, and on the 11th of that month he paid the $100, and on November 11, 1880, a patent issued to him. In 1880, and again in 1882, White conveyed to plaintiff.

The land had been sold from time to time for the unpaid taxes of each year from 1856 to 1872, inclusive, and tax deeds issued to one J. C. Easton. On March 11, 1879, Easton quitclaimed to one Harris, his heirs and assigns, "all my interest in and to" the land in dispute, "intending hereby to convey only my title to said land acquired by the purchase of the same for taxes for the year 1864 and previous years, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870, 1871, 1872." In May, 1881, Harris quitclaimed to the defendant all his right, title and interest in and to the land. Harris and defendant each testified, without contradiction, that he purchased in good faith, without knowledge of any defects in the title, but knowing that it rested on Easton's tax deeds. Harris also testified that he entered into possession in 1874, (some five years before his deed from Easton,) and at once broke 65 acres of the land, and made other improvements, of the value, in all, of $365, and in 1880, (after receiving his deed from Easton,) built a granary, at a cost of $150.

The court held all the tax deeds void, and directed the jury to find for the plaintiff on the issue of title, and also instructed them that defendant's entry under the deed from Harris was under color of title in fee, and that if he received the deed without knowing of any defect in the title, and paid a valuable consideration, and entered peaceably and in good faith, he was entitled to recover the value of the improvements made by himself and his grantor. The plaintiff excepted to the instruction as to recovery for improvements made by defendant's grantor. The jury found generally for the plaintiff, and found also that defendant took possession in good faith and under color of title, without notice of any defect in his title, and they assessed the value of the improvements at $500. Judgment was accordingly entered that plaintiff have and recover possession, provided he first, within one year from the rendition of the verdict, pay into court for the defendant the sum of $500, so found by the jury as the value of the improvements. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

Rush B. Wheeler and L. A. Pierce, for appellant.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Geo. W. Hall, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

Gen. St. 1878, c. 75, § 15, provides: "Where any person, under color of title in fee, and in good faith, has peacefully taken possession of any land for which he has given a valuable consideration, * * * neither such person, nor his heirs, representatives, or assigns, shall be ejected from such land, except as hereinafter provided, until compensation is tendered him or them for all improvements which he or they may have made upon said land previous to actual notice of the claim upon which the action is founded."

At common law there was no liability on the part of the owner of real estate for improvements made by an occupant, even in good faith, under color of title. The right to recover for them is based upon this statute, and the claimant must bring himself within its provisions. The statute was designed for the benefit of those who have gone into possession in good faith, under color of title in fee, for which they have paid a valuable consideration, and, while thus in possession, believing themselves the owners, have made valuable improvements. Two things are essential to the right to recover for improvements: First, the party must have, under color of title in fee and in good faith, peaceably taken possession of land for which he has paid a valuable consideration; second, he must, while thus in possession, have made the improvements, previous to actual notice of the claim upon which the action against him is founded. The words of the statute refer to the time of making the improvements, and mean that, at the time of making them, he must be in possession under color of title in fee, and be without notice of the claim under which the plaintiff in the action against him seeks to recover. Hence, where the claim for the improvements is made by the grantee of the party who made them, the material inquiry is, not the standing of the grantee when he purchased the land, but of the grantor at the time of making the improvements. A grantee does not occupy a better position in regard to the improvements made by his grantor than the latter himself occupied. Any other construction of the statute would compel the owner of land to pay for unauthorized improvements made by a mere trespasser without color of title, provided the latter had...