Wheeler v. State

• Decision Date: 27 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 00337,00337
• Citation: 864 A.2d 210,160 Md. App. 363
• Parties: Vyron WHEELER v. STATE of Maryland t/u/o Nedia Barrett.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

864 A.2d 210

160 Md. App. 363

Vyron WHEELER v. STATE of Maryland t/u/o Nedia Barrett.

No. 00337, September Term, 2003.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

December 27, 2004.

Vyron Wheeler, appellant, pro se.

Joseph B. Spillman (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Panel: HOLLANDER, SHARER, CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR., (Retired, specially assigned) JJ.

HOLLANDER, Judge.

Vyron Wheeler, appellant, who is pro se, is currently incarcerated in federal prison in Atlanta. On December 20, 2002, Wheeler filed a motion to modify his child support obligation because of his lengthy prison sentence. We are advised that appellant is serving a sentence of twenty years to life, and will not be eligible for parole until 2016.

On appeal, Wheeler challenges an Order issued by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on January 29, 2003, and docketed on March 7, 2003, pertaining to his motion to modify. In particular, appellant takes issue with the language of the Order, which suspends his child support obligation during his imprisonment but reinstates it upon his release from incarceration. Appellant perceives the reinstatement as "[u]nreachable and [in] conflict with his reasonable success at parole."

Appellant presents the following four questions, which we quote:

I. Is the Order of March 12, 2002[sic] — by Judge Krauser [sic],¹ for appellant to begin $350.00/mo. child support payments within three days of release from prison, unreasonable to a newly released prisoner?

II. Does the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland have proper jurisdiction over a newly released federal prisoner under the control of the United States Department of Justice and the United States Parole Commission?

III. Does the United States Parole Commission already have provisions for ensuring that a newly released parolee will meet his/her financial obligations, especially court-ordered child support payments?

IV. In the interest of justice and the welfare of the child, can an equitable decision be rendered by the Maryland Circuit Court that a parolee under the direct supervision of the United States Parole Commission can live with?

(Emphasis in original).

The State of Maryland, t/u/o Nedia Barrett, appellee, distills appellant's contentions to the following question:

Did the Circuit Court correctly apply Maryland law when it suspended [a]ppellant's child support obligation during the entire period of his incarceration and granted him the right to a hearing on his motion for modification, when he is released, to establish his ability to pay at that time so long as he notifies the child support agency of his release and provides the agency with information identifying the location of his home and any employer?

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 13, 1985, Nedia Barrett gave birth to Damien Von Wheeler. On February 27, 1992, Ms. Barrett filed a "Complaint to Establish Paternity" in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, seeking to establish appellant as Damien's father and to obtain child support. By a "Waiver of Constitutional and Statutory Rights and Admission of Paternity," entered April 15, 1992, appellant admitted paternity. Thereafter, by Order dated April 29, 1992, and entered May 5, 1992, the court ordered appellant to pay $280 per month in child support.²

Through the Office of Child Support Enforcement for Prince George's County, Barrett moved on May 7, 1993, to cite appellant for contempt for failure to comply with his support obligation. Thereafter, a hearing was held and culminated in an Order of Court dated July 9, 1993 (docketed July 13, 1993). The court assessed arrears against appellant in the amount of $3,080 as of July 1, 1993; ordered appellant "to pay ongoing support of $280.00 per month"; and imposed payment of "an additional $50.00 per month toward the arrears until the arrears are paid in full, commencing July 15, 1993[.]"

Barrett filed another contempt motion against appellant on February 2, 1994. Following a hearing on that motion, the Master recommended, inter alia, that, commencing January 15, 1995, appellant be required to "make the ongoing payment of $280.00 per month plus pay $70.00 per month" toward arrears of $8047.25. Thereafter, by "Order of Court" dated January 3, 1995, the court "ratified" the Master's recommendations and "incorporated [them] by reference" into its Order.

On December 10, 2002, appellant filed a "Motion for Modification of Child Support," claiming a "substantial change in circumstances." Appellant asserted: "I am incarcerated and unable to pay child support Ordered, because I do not make enough to pay child support." Appellant requested that his "current support order be reduced or terminated as appropriate...." He also submitted a copy of an order issued by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, dated October 7, 2002, granting appellant's motion to terminate his child support obligation with respect to another child whom he fathered.

In an "Order" dated January 29, 2003, and docketed March 7, 2003, the court, inter alia, suspended appellant's child support obligation, retroactive to December 10, 2002, i.e., the date he filed his motion for modification, through the period of his incarceration. In addition, the court directed appellant to notify the court and the Office of Child Support Enforcement of his release from incarceration within three days of release; provided for reinstatement of appellant's child support obligation upon his release; directed appellant to notify the court and the Office of Child Support Enforcement of his residential and work addresses within thirty days of his release; ordered a hearing on appellant's Motion for Modification of Child Support within ninety days of his release from incarceration and notification to court of his residential address; and directed that the court dismiss appellant's modification motion if he failed to comply with the notification requirements.

Specifically, the Order at issue provides:

ORDER

Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Modification of Child Support, Notice of Defendant's Incarceration, and verification of Defendant's present incarceration, it is this 29th day of January, 2003, by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland,

ORDERED that this Court's Order of April 29, 1992, requiring Defendant to pay continuing support of $280.00 per month and this Court's Order of January 3, 1995 ordering an additional $70.00 per month toward arrearages, be and hereby is SUSPENDED from the date of filing of Defendant's motion on December 10, 2002, until Defendant is released from his present term of incarceration; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall notify the Court and the Office of Child Support Enforcement of the date of his release from incarceration, not more than three (3) days after that date; and it is further

ORDERED that the Orders of April 29, 1992 and January 3, 1995, establishing Defendant's obligation to pay child support, shall be automatically reinstated by the Court upon Defendant's release from incarceration; and it is further

ORDERED that the Defendant shall file a change of address notice with the Court and the Office of Child Support within thirty (30) days after his release from incarceration, providing his social security number, and home and work addresses and telephone numbers; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Modification of Child Support shall be scheduled for hearing within ninety (90) days of Defendant's Notice to the Court of his release from incarceration and current residence address [sic]; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Modification of Child Support shall be dismissed if Defendant fails to comply with the terms of this Order or fails to appear at a hearing scheduled on this Motion; and it is further

ORDERED, that this case be and is hereby closed for statistical purposes only.

On April 2, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. Then, on June 13, 2003, he filed a Motion to Vacate the Order dated January 29, 2003, and docketed March 7, 2003. In the motion, appellant argued that the court's Order was "extreme and [that] termination of child support is appropriate due to the defendants [sic] change in circumstances." Appellant further noted that the court failed to make a finding of change in circumstances, "ruling instead to just suspend defendant's child support until he is released from prison." He asserted: "Defendant has not had a ruling on his motion[,] which he is entitled to by right.... A judgement [sic] must be made at this time as to the fact's [sic] as stated."

By Order dated June 5, 2003, and entered June 11, 2003, the circuit court (Krauser, J.) denied appellant's motion to vacate. Appellant filed a second appeal on July 11, 2003.

We shall include additional facts in our discussion.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant challenges the court's Order dated January 29, 2003. Acknowledging that the court "modified" his child support obligation, he nonetheless complains because the court reinstated his support obligation, effective three days after his release from incarceration. Appellant states: "The [m]ain argument presented by Appellant is directed to the language of the Order ... which states that Appellant must start paying child support (3) days after his release from prision [sic]." He adds that he "solely contest[s] (3) days to comply with the provisions of the Order ...", explaining that "the demands of the court are [u]nreachable and conflict with his reasonable success at parole." According to appellant, "after serving twenty-years (20) of imprisonment", there is "no reasonable way" that he can comply with what he refers to as "`the three-day begin payment order.'" He adds: "All appellant seeks is reasonableness in establishing a payment schedule he can live with to assert his responsibility as a...