Wheeler v. Wheeler

• Decision Date: 24 April 1880
• Citation: 5 N.W. 689,53 Iowa 511
• Parties: WHEELER v. WHEELER.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

53 Iowa 511

5 N.W. 689

WHEELER

v.WHEELER.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed April 24, 1880.

Appeal from Polk circuit court.

Action for a divorce on the grounds that the defendant since the marriage had become addicted to “habitual drunkenness,” and that he was guilty of such “inhuman treatment as to endanger the life of his wife.” The prayer of the petition was granted, and the defendant appeals.Wishard & Reed, for appellant.

L. G. Bannister, for appellee.

SEEVERS, J.

At the time of the marriage, in 1859, the plaintiff was 16 and the defendant about 31 years of age. They resided for a time thereafter in Wisconsin, but for several years they have resided in Polk county, Iowa. The defendant testifies that he was addicted to an excessive use of intoxicating liquors before his marriage; that on one or more occasions he was drunk, and that the plaintiff so knew; but we find, as a matter of fact, that he was not an habitual drunkard at the time of his marriage. No permanent reformation of the admitted habit has taken place. We are warranted in saying, from the evidence, that the defendant, for several years before the commencement of this action, has been a steady drinker of intoxicating liquors, and has been frequently intoxicated, so that his condition could be observed in his walk and conversation. The defendant denies that he has been drunk during business hours, and in this is corroborated by several witnesses. The evidence of the latter is of a negative character. Other witnesses testify to the contrary. Conceding it to be, however, as stated by the defendant, the denial of the evidence of the plaintiff, in substance, is confined to the business hours of the day. We are, therefore, forced to conclude that at other hours of the day and night the defendant has indulged in drinking liquor to excess.

What constitutes an habitual drunkard sufficient to warranta divorce has not, to our knowledge, been defined in this state. It is said to have been done in Mahone v. Mahone, 19 Cal. 627. In that case the jury were instructed the habit of intoxication must be such as to “completely disqualify the party from attending to his business avocations.” This rule was said to be too stringent, and that if there is a “fixed habit of drinking to excess, to such a degree as to disqualify a person from attending to his business during the principal portion of the time usually devoted to business, it is habitual intemperance.” This definition was sufficient for the case in hand, but we do not understand it to have been held that nothing short of the standard fixed in that case would be. It is not regarded as necessary to affirmatively define what constitutes “habitual drunkenness.” We are not prepared to say, however, if a person has a fixed habit of drinking intoxicating liquors to excess, is frequently drunk, and that such is his nominal condition during the night and in hours not devoted to business, that his wife would not be entitled to a divorce.

We have said this much as to the defendant's unfortunate habit because we think it was the primary cause of the difficulties between these parties which has culminated in an appeal to the law for relief.

The ill-treatment contemplated by the statute is any course of “conduct that endangers, either apparently or in fact, the physical safety or health of the other to a degree rendering it physically or mentally impracticable for the endangered party to discharge properly the duties imposed by the marriage.” 1 Bishop M. & D. §§ 717, 718.

No two cases being alike, the real difficulty lies in the application of this rule. The plaintiff and her two daughters testify that the defendant time and time again called her foul and vulgar names, and accused her in coarse terms of a want of chastity, and on one or more occasions he came into her bed-room, looked under the bed, and inquired what man was going to stay there that night, or whether the plaintiff had got through with that tramp yet. At one time he said: “Damn you, I'll show you what I want,” and choked the plaintiff. At another he told the plaintiff to keep away from him, so that he could not get his hands on her, or he would do something he would be sorry for all the days of his life.

Burt Lane was courting their daughter Ella, and afterwards married her, and he was at the house of these parties on one occasion when the defendant came and locked the front door, and when he was ready to leave the plaintiff asked defendant for the key. He refused to give it to her. He was then outside the house and she raised the window, and he said if she climbed out of the window he would “smash her head with a brick.” He told the plaintiff on that or another occasion, in the presence of Ella, to “straddle” Lane. He wrote notes and left them about the house, in which he spoke of the plaintiff as Mrs. Lane and Mrs. Brewer, and intimating she was unchaste. In a cross petition he charged her with adultery with one Underhill, his nephew, committed when the parties lived in Wisconsin. This charge was withdrawn, and we have doubts whether it was made in good faith, under the belief it was true. On one or more occasions he “jammed” the plaintiff against the door or side of the house.

If the plaintiff and her witnesses are...