Wheelhouse v. Parr
| Decision Date | 08 May 1886 |
| Citation | 141 Mass. 593,6 N.E. 787 |
| Parties | WHEELHOUSE v. PARR. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Wm. H. Anderson, for defendant.
Qua & Marble, for plaintiff.
Where goods ordered and contracted for are not delivered directly to the purchaser, but were to be sent to him by the vendor and the vendor delivers them to the carrier, to be transported in the mode agreed on by the parties, or directed by the purchaser; or where no agreement be made, or directions given, to be transported in the usual mode; or where the purchaser, being informed of the mode of transportation, assents to it; or where there have been previous sales of other goods to the transportation of which in a similar manner, the purchaser has not objected,--the goods, when delivered to the carrier, are at the risk of the purchaser, and the property is deemed to be vested in him subject to the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu. This proposition assumes that proper directions and information are given the carrier as to forwarding the goods. Whiting v. Farrand, 1 Conn. 60; Quimby v. Carr, 7 Allen, 417; Finn v. Clark, 10 Allen, 484; Finn v. Clark, 12 Allen, 522; Downer v. Thompson, 2 Hill, 137; Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. 170; Odell v. Boston & M.R.R., 109 Mass. 50; Wigton v. Bowley, 130 Mass. 252.
The defendant had made a purchase of leather in November, previous to the purchase of that the price of which is in controversy, under a direction to plaintiff to "ship to care of D. and C. McIver, shipping merchants, Liverpool, as soon as possible, for their next steamer to Boston, direct." This shipment was made as ordered, and on December 3, 1884, the defendant sent a further order saying: --adding some directions as to marking the packages, not here important.
The directions by which the plaintiff was to be controlled must be interposed as requiring him to forward the goods to McIver & Co., to be transported by them by the Cunard line, of which they were managers and agents. The words "their next steamer" could not have meant any steamer which would accept freight from McIver & Co. Cases may be readily imagined where these words would be of the highest importance; as if the defendant had an open policy of insurance protecting his goods, which might be sent by the Cunard line. It might also be true that defendant would not deem a policy of insurance necessary where goods were sent by a well-established passenger line, where greater precautions might probably be taken for safety, which he would deem necessary when they were sent by a purely freighting steamer. The goods were actually forwarded to McIver & Co., with instructions in conformity with the directions of the defendant; and, had the matter ended there, so far as any direction to McIver & Co. is concerned, the plaintiff would be entitled to treat them as delivered to the defendant, and to require him to pay the purchase money. If, on the other hand, while the goods were yet in the hands of the carrier, and before transportation of them had commenced, the plaintiff changed the directions as given to him by defendant, or authorized the carrier to transport them in a different mode from that directed by defendant, and loss has thereby occurred, he cannot claim that they were delivered to defendant by him. By continuing to exercise dominion over them, and by giving a new direction, impliedly withdrawing the directions previously given, he cannot be allowed to assert that he had made a complete delivery by his original act, if a loss has occurred by reason of that which he has subsequently done...
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