Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal

• Decision Date: 10 June 1930
• Docket Number: No. 2991.,2991.
• Parties: WHEELING CORRUGATING CO. v. McMANIGAL, Deputy Com'r of U. S. Employees' Compensation Commission (GRIER, Intervener).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

41 F.2d 593 (1930)

WHEELING CORRUGATING CO. v. McMANIGAL, Deputy Com'r of U. S. Employees' Compensation Commission (GRIER, Intervener).

No. 2991.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

June 10, 1930.

Wright Hugus, of Wheeling, W. Va., and Gordon D. Kinder, of Martins Ferry, Ohio (J. E. Bruce, of Wheeling, W. Va., on the brief), for appellant.

Arthur Arnold, U. S. Atty., of Piedmont, W. Va., and William C. Howard, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Wheeling, W. Va., for appellee McManigal.

David H. James, of Bridgeport, Ohio, for appellee Grier.

Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and SOPER, District Judge.

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This was a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an award made to Anna Grier, widow of Charles W. Grier, under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (33 USCA § 901 et seq.). From an order refusing to hear additional testimony, denying the injunction, and dismissing the suit, the complainant, the Wheeling Corrugating Company, has appealed. Complainant makes three contentions: (1) That the award of the Deputy Compensation Commissioner was not supported by any evidence or was at least contrary to the weight of the evidence, and must therefore be deemed contrary to law within the meaning of the Compensation Act; (2) that the court should have heard additional evidence and passed upon the liability of the complainant de novo; and (3) that, if the act be so construed as to make the findings of the commissioner on questions of fact binding upon the court, the act violates the Constitution of the United States, in that it vests judicial power in an official of the executive department of the government.

The decedent Grier, on May 20, 1928, was employed as a carpenter foreman on a barge in the Ohio river. He was working at night and when last seen was going to get a lantern suspended from a timber head at the end of the barge. He did not return and his body was found next day in the river near the barge. Compensation was sought by his widow under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act on the theory that, while in the performance of his duty, he had accidentally fallen from the barge and been drowned. Complainant, a self-insurer under the act, resisted the award of compensation on the theory that decedent had not been drowned, but had suffered a heart attack, or had come to his death from some other natural cause.

The matter was heard at length before a Deputy Compensation Commissioner. On the part of the claimant, it was shown that the body of decedent, when recovered, had the appearance of having been drowned, and that water came from his mouth and nose in sufficient quantities to indicate that this was what had happened. Complainant, on the other hand, showed that, upon the recovery of the body, the mouth was found to be closed with the teeth set and the stump of a cheroot clinched between them, and that very little water came from the mouth and nose. From this it was argued that death could not have been due to drowning but must have resulted from natural causes. There was no evidence, however, that decedent had heart trouble or other disease likely to result in sudden death. On the contrary, the evidence was that he was in good health, but was unable to swim.

The Deputy Commissioner found as a fact that decedent was drowned while engaged in the performance of his duties and awarded compensation to claimant in accordance with the provisions of the act. Complainant thereupon instituted this suit alleging that the compensation order was not in accordance with law and asking that same be reviewed and set aside by the court. Upon the hearing the request was made that the case be reopened and additional evidence be heard. This was denied, and the case being heard upon the evidence taken before the Deputy Commissioner, the District Judge found for defendant and dismissed the bill.

We think that the court below was correct in not reopening the case for the hearing of additional testimony; and, after a careful examination of the record, we are satisfied that the findings of the Deputy Commissioner were supported by substantial evidence and that the suit was properly dismissed.

The section of the statute, section 21(b), under which it was instituted, 44 Stat. 1436, 33 USCA § 921 (b), is as follows:

"If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order, and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred."

The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit depends upon this statute; and if we look merely to its language, it is clear that it does not contemplate a hearing de novo in the District Court or authorize that court to weigh the evidence taken before the Deputy Commissioner or review the facts as found by him. The compensation order may be set aside only if it is found to be "not in accordance with law," i. e. if it is based upon error of law, or is not supported by any substantial evidence, or is so manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable as to transcend the authority vested in the Deputy Commissioner. His findings of fact, however, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. This is the rule uniformly applied to the findings of officials or boards in the executive department, charged with the duty of finding facts, and subjected to review by the courts when their orders are "not in accordance with law." See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com'r, 279 U. S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918, and Ox Fibre Brush Co. v. Blair (C. C. A. 4th) 32 F.(2d) 42, as to findings of fact by the Board of Tax Appeals; Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. U. S., 277 U. S. 551, 48 S. Ct. 587, 72 L. Ed. 985, as to determination of "special assessment" by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; Virginian Ry. Co. v. U. S., 272 U. S. 658, 47 S. Ct. 222, 71 L. Ed. 463, and Anchor Coal Co. v. U. S. (D. C.) 25 F.(2d) 462, 471, and cases there cited, as to findings by the Interstate Commerce Commission; Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619, 623, 47 S. Ct. 688, 71 L. Ed. 1238, as to findings by the Federal Trade Commission; and Passavant v. U. S., 148 U. S. 214, 217, 13 S. Ct. 572, 37 L. Ed. 426, as to findings by the Board of Customs Appraisers. We see no reason why the rule laid down in these cases as to findings of facts by officials of the executive department is not...