Whipple v. Brown Bros. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1919
• Citation: 225 N.Y. 237,121 N.E. 748
• Parties: WHIPPLE v. BROWN BROS. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

225 N.Y. 237

121 N.E. 748

WHIPPLE

v.BROWN BROS. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 7, 1919.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Action by Watson H. Whipple against the Brown Bros. Company. Judgment for plaintiff and order denying motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial were affirmed by the Appellate Division (170 App. Div. 531,156 N. Y. Supp. 63), and defendant appeals. Plaintiff having died, Ellen M. Whipple, his executrix, was substituted as appellee. Affirmed.

Hiscock, C. J., and McLaughlin and Chase, JJ., dissenting.P. Chamberlain, of Rochester, for appellant.

L. M. Sherwood, of Medina, for respondent.

COLLIN, J.

[1] The action was to recover the damages sustained by Watson H. Whipple, the plaintiff's testator, through the breach by the defendant of a contract between them. The complaint alleged the contract, its making and breach, and the damages of the plaintiff, in amount $1,600. It did not disclose whether the contract was oral or written. The answer denied the contract and alleged another contract and performance of it by the defendant. It is, of course, true that the allegations in the answer of new matter are to be deemed controverted by the plaintiff. Code of Civil Procedure, § 522. The issue thus created was: Did the parties make the contract set forth in the complaint or did they make that set forth in the answer?

The testimony of Whipple (who was living at the time of the trial) proved the oral contract set forth in the complaint. The defendant, while Whipple was testifying as a witness in his own behalf, proved the signature of Whipple to a writing in form the contract set forth in the answer. Whipple testified: After the oral contract had been completely made, the representative of the defendant ‘took out his order book and I handed him my list and he wrote down the varieties (of trees), calling them out as he wrote them,’ and handed the order over to Whipple to sign; Whipple, because he had not his glasses, could read nothing of the writing and so stated to the representative, who stated that it contained nothing but a statement of the varieties and the sizes and prices and time of delivery. Whipple thereupon signed it. Such statement was not the entire of either the oral contract or of the writing. This testimony was taken under the objection of the defendant that it was incompetent, the writing was the best evidence of the contract, no fraud being alleged in the complaint, and under an exception to the adverse ruling. Under the writing the plaintiff could not maintain the action.

The issue tried was: Was the oral agreement or the contents of the writing the real contract? The court, in effect, submitted to the jury the questions: (2) Was Whipple bound by the written order, notwithstanding that he did not read it, or did the conditions justify him in signing it without reading it; (b) did the writing or the oral agreements constitute the contract-and charged that if the writing constituted the contract the plaintiff could not recover; if the oral agreements constituted the contract the plaintiff could recover the damages resulting to the testator from its breach. It is manifest, therefore, that the recovery was because of the breach of the oral contract and not because of the defendant's fraud. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff.

The appellant asserts and argues here that, the cause of action being founded on an express contract, fraud could not be proven without being alleged in the complaint.

Fraud was not a constituent of plaintiff's alleged or proven or submitted cause of action. The question was: Did the stipulations of the written order constitute the contract? The jury were instructed that if the oral agreements were the contract the plaintiff could recover, if the evidence exonerated Whipple from negligence in signing the writing; if the writing constituted the contract the plaintiff could not recover. I think there was not error in this or in receiving the evidence of plaintiff that his signature to the writing was obtained, without negligence on his part, through deceit.

Under the evidence of Whipple the writing did not express the agreement of the parties. Whipple did not execute and deliver it with a contracting mind, and at the common law it was subject to the plea of non est factum. There is a material and manifest distinction between a meeting of the minds of parties through deceit on the part of one of them, and a writing excusably and justifiably executed by the one which, through the deceit of the other, does not express the agreement of the parties. The distinction has been expressed thus:

‘Fraud in the factum renders the writing void at law, whereas fraud in the treaty renders it voidable merely.’

In Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y. 307, 311, 33 N. E. 311, 312 (21 L. R. A. 409, 33 Am. St. Rep. 731), the action was upon a guaranty signed by the defendant. The court said:

‘In determiningthe legal effect of this paper, and the obligation thereby created against the defendant, we must assume that he signed it when intoxicated, that he was unable to read it, that he was ignorant of its contents, and that he fixed his signature to it upon the false representation that it was an application for a license. There can be no doubt that, as between the parties to this transaction, the instrument was void. It was also invalid in the hands of any person who received it with knowledge or notice of the circumstances under which the defendant's signature was obtained.’

In Trambly v. Ricard, 130 Mass. 259, the action was for the conversion of furniture. Plaintiff alleged and proved the acts of conversion. The defendants, in justification of their acts, relied upon an alleged breach by the plaintiff of a conditional bill of sale. Plaintiff thereupon gave proof that the sale was absolute and that immediately after the oral agreement of absolute sale was made the defendants requested him to sign the written contract, which he did, supposing the same to contain the terms and stipulations of the oral agreement. The court said:

‘In the absence of fraud or imposition, it is presumed that the terms of a written contract were known and assented to by the parties who signed it; that they either read it, or were informed of its contents, or were willing to assent to its terms without reading it. This presumption is not defeated by showing that the contract signed was different from that which one or the other supposed he was signing. It is not permitted to show that another contract was the real contract, because the parties have chosen to put their agreement in writing, as the better way to preserve its terms, and parol evidence cannot be admitted to vary it. But this familiar rule does not exclude evidence which tends to show that the written contract was by some fraud or imposition never in fact freely and intelligently signed by the party sought to be charged. It may always be shown that he was not possessed of the requisite capacity, or that his signature was obtained by fraud. * * * A party who is ignorant of the contents of a written instrument, from inability to read, who signs it without intending to, and who is chargeable with no negligence in not ascertaining the character of it, is no more bound than if it were a forgery. There has been no intelligent assent to its terms, and it is a fraud in one who with knowledge of the fact attempts to enforce it.’

This case is cited with approval in O'Donnell v. Clinton, 145 Mass. 461, 14 N. E. 747;Freedley v. French, 154 Mass. 339, 28 N. E. 272;Bliss v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 447, 36 N. E. 65,39 Am. St. Rep. 504;Larsson v. Metropolitan Stock Exchange, 200 Mass. 367, 86 N. E. 940.

In Jewelry Co. v. Darnell, 135 Iowa, 555, 113 N. W. 344,124 Am. St. Rep. 309, the defendant signed an order for the purchase of certain jewelry and upon this was sued for the price. When he signed the order he was without glasses, which had been broken, and could not read the order. He supposed that it was merely a contract under which he was to receive the goods as the property of plaintiff and dispose of them on commission with the obligation only to remit a percentage of the proceeds. The court said:

‘It is conceded that, if the order was voidable merely, as when procured by fraud, defendant had his election to rescind and refuse to receive the goods, or accept them and recoup in damages; but if, under the finding of the jury, the order was void, rescission was unnecessary to defeat plaintiff's claim. To render the order void, it must have been singed by mistake; that is, under the supposition that it was an instrument of another or different character. This would be no less a mistake because induced by fraud. The distinction should be kept in mind, for an agreement procured by fraud is voidable merely, while one signed by mistake is no agreement at all. * * * As said, the jury might have found that the defendant in signing the order was not negligent, as he was a man of advanced years, without his glasses, which had been broken, and could not read the instrument signed, which was long and in small type. The jury might also have found that he signed the same under a mistaken supposition that it was merely a contract under which he was to receive the goods as the property of plaintiffs, and dispose of them on commission, with the obligation to remit a percentage of the proceeds only. If so, executing the order was by a mistake, and the instrument utterly void. This must be so, for in such a case the minds of the parties have never met.’

[2] In Cummings v. Ross, 90 Cal. 68, 27 Pac. 62, the facts, so far as the point under consideration is concerned, were the parallel of the facts in the case at bar, as will appear from the following quotation from the opinion:

‘It is further contended that the court below erred in allowing the plaintiff to show that a certain written contract...