Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith, Pew Co.

Decision Date08 June 1943
Docket Number29936.
Citation26 S.E.2d 545,69 Ga.App. 711
PartiesWHITAKER v. JONES, McDOUGALD, SMITH, PEW CO.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Rehearing Denied July 22, 1943.

Syllabus by the Court.

The petition averred that the defendant was in control of and operated a project, constructing and erecting for the United States Government what is now known as Camp Gordon, in a certain cantonment area. The project was the changing of several thousand acres of wooded lands, fields, streams, and valleys in Richmond County and adjacent counties into a modern military camp and post. The defendant employed between seven and nine thousand employees at said project, and it was being done for the United States Government under an order for quick construction of said camp, and on account of the size of said work and the demand for quick construction, it was charged that the defendant knew that it would have to employ continuously several thousand workmen who were personally unknown to it, and from various walks of life, and there would be several thousand vehicles and automobiles carrying persons and goods across this area of ground, and that thousands of people would be in and upon this area of construction; that the defendant in the progress of the construction of said project graded and laid out various streets and avenues over an area of approximately 5,000 acres, which said streets were used by vehicles and by persons entering or leaving said project. The streets ran north and south and the avenues ran east and west and they were at all times under the complete control, supervision and management of the defendant, as well as were the vehicles and persons who were allowed on said project, as the defendant permitted only those persons and vehicles to whom it had granted permission to enter said cantonment area, and that the defendant allowed no one and no vehicle upon said project area without its express permission, and with the said person and the said vehicle to be under the defendant's supervision and control, and before any vehicle or person could enter said area the driver of such vehicle or such person was approved by the defendant; that the defendant conducted and supervised all travel of automobiles and persons upon said area, and that the defendant further knew, by reason of the fact that said area was ten miles from Augusta, and ten miles from Harlem Georgia, and five miles from Grovetown, Georgia--which were the closest residential areas--that its employees and such other persons entering said project would necessarily have to use automobiles in entering said project and in doing business on said cantonment area, and that said employees and such other persons coming to said area would come in the morning and from time to time during the day and would depart in the afternoon, at "knocking off time," and that thousands of vehicles so entered and left said project daily that 25th Street, one of said streets, was one of the busiest streets and most heavily laden with traffic, and was used daily and at the time that the plaintiff was injured; that in order to handle the enormous number of persons and heavy traffic in said area the defendant took control and supervision of said vehicles and persons and directed said persons and vehicles as to the manner of the use of said streets and avenues, as to the speed and the direction in which said traffic was to flow; that the defendant knew that when said several thousand persons and motor vehicles were seeking to leave said project at "knocking-off time," that many of the said vehicles were overcrowded and were operated at a high and dangerous rate of speed, and would be so operated if not controlled and that the defendant, for several weeks before the plaintiff in error was injured, had posted on said streets and at many places on said area various signs restricting vehicles from traveling on said streets and avenues in excess of twenty-five miles an hour, and had specifically ordered no greater speed, such order being given over its loud speaker system and by signs posted; that the plaintiff in error was on said area by reason of his then present business relation with the defendant, which was for the mutual benefit and aid to both defendant and plaintiff, and was in connection with the construction of said project, in that the plaintiff was a carpenter and was seeking to be put to work as a carpenter; that he had previously worked, and was assigned by the defendant badge No. 7107, and was issued a card to report to Mr. Hanna, foreman, in the area field, as a carpenter, which was accepted by Mr. Hanna, and the plaintiff had used said card and identification badge for the purpose of entering and leaving said area while at work or while seeking work as a carpenter; that on October 27, 1941, the plaintiff returned to said area to secure work under another foreman, and sought out a carpenter foreman personally known to him, and was told that as soon as he had an opening he would put him to work; that it was the custom of the defendant's employees, in making arrangements with a particular foreman over the various jobs going on in said area, to keep in touch with that particular foreman, which custom was known to the defendant, and that was the purpose for issuing the badge and identification card to the plaintiff; that on the right side of 25th Street travel was completely obstructed to vehicle traffic; in that across said right side there had been for many hours before plaintiff's injuries, a deep and wide ditch across it, which was left open for the purpose of receiving a sewer, which the plaintiff knew existed several hours...

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  • Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, s. 44523
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 5, 1969
    ...the probable result of an act of alleged negligence, such act is either a remote cause or no cause.' Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith, Pew Co., 69 Ga.App. 711, 715, 26 S.E.2d 545, 548. We held in Bolden v. Barnes, 117 Ga.App. 862, 162 S.E. 307, supra, that it was the act of Barnes which ......
  • Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 5, 1979
    ...was remote and furnished only the condition or occasion of the injury, it was not the proximate cause thereof." Whitaker v. Jones, etc., Co., 69 Ga.App. 711(1), 26 S.E.2d 545; see also Code Ann. §§ 105-2008, 105-2009 (Code §§ 105-2008, 105-2009). There may be more than one proximate cause o......
  • Bennett v. Haley
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 18, 1974
    ...court erred in refusing to charge his request No. 16. The language of this request was taken substantially from Whitaker v. Jones etc. Co., 69 Ga.App. 711, 716, 26 S.E.2d 545 with a substitution of the word 'motorist' for wrongdoer. It dealt with the principle that a person is not required ......
  • Benson v. Action Elec. Co., Inc.
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    ...Home v. Hines, 124 Ga.App. 47, 50, 183 S.E.2d 7; Shockley v. Zayre of Atlanta, 118 Ga.App. 672, 165 S.E.2d 179; Whitaker v. Jones, McDougald, Smith, Pew Co., 69 Ga.App. 711(1, 2), 26 S.E.2d 545; Deco Leasing Corp. v. Harvey, 114 Ga.App. 217, 150 S.E.2d 699; Daneker v. Megrue, 114 Ga.App. 31......
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