Whitaker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 10 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 62670,62670 |
Citation | 13 Kan.App.2d 279,768 P.2d 320 |
Parties | Michael L. WHITAKER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. This court will construe the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act (the "No-Fault Act") liberally in order to accomplish the legislature's declared purpose of compensating injured insureds.
2. Kansas does not recognize a distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results" in policies of accident insurance. When a loss occurs in such a way that ordinary people would call it an accident, it occurs as a result of an accident.
3. An accident is simply an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.
4. The presence of a genuine issue raised in good faith bars an award of attorney fees under either K.S.A. 40-256 or K.S.A. 40-3111(b).
Douglas M. Greenwald and William P. Coates, Jr., of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., of Kansas City, for appellant/cross-appellee.
George W. Earnshaw, of Merriam, and Joseph W. Amick, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before LARSON, P.J., DAVIS, J., and FLOYD H. COFFMAN, District Judge Retired, Assigned.
The plaintiff, Michael L. Whitaker, brought this action against his insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, to recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for an injury he sustained while unloading an ice chest from his van. The trial court granted summary judgment in plaintiff's favor but denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees. State Farm appeals, contending that the trial court erred by failing to recognize a distinction between accidental means and accidental results and by finding coverage for the accidental injury when only the result, and not the means, was accidental. We hold that this distinction is not recognized in Kansas and affirm. Plaintiff cross-appeals the denial of attorney fees. We affirm the trial court's denial of fees.
The facts are undisputed and were submitted by stipulation:
The applicable statutes are contained in the Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act, which is commonly known as the "No-Fault Act." K.S.A. 40-3101 et seq. The declared purpose of this Act is "to provide a means of compensating persons promptly for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles in lieu of liability for damages to the extent provided herein." K.S.A. 40-3102. The legislature chose to achieve that purpose by requiring every owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state to obtain liability insurance, K.S.A.1988 Supp. 40-3104(a), and by requiring every such policy to "include personal injury protection benefits to the named insured ... for loss sustained ... as a result of injury." K.S.A. 40-3107(f). The legislature defined the term "injury" to mean "bodily harm, sickness, disease or death resulting from an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." K.S.A.1988 Supp. 40-3103(i). The legislature did not define the word "accident."
This court will construe the No-Fault Act liberally in order to achieve the legislature's purpose. DiBassie v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 8 Kan.App.2d 515, 521, 661 P.2d 812 (1983); Bradley v. AID Insurance Co., 6 Kan.App.2d 367, 382, 629 P.2d 720, rev. denied 230 Kan. 817 (1981).
Plaintiff and State Farm each moved for summary judgment based on the uncontroverted facts. State Farm argued that there was no coverage because there was nothing accidental about plaintiff's injury except the result. It sought to draw a distinction between policies insuring against "accidental results" and those insuring against the results of "accidental means," and argued that the legislature intended to require coverage only for those injuries resulting from accidental means. Plaintiff's injury, although "unforeseen and unintended," was not such an injury, State Farm concluded, because it "occurred during the wholly voluntary and intended acts of lifting and moving" by plaintiff. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that coverage did exist because the injury was accidental in the sense that it was "unforeseen, unexpected and unusual."
The trial court held that plaintiff's injury was the result of an accident since it was unexpected, unintended, and unforeseen; that unloading was a use of the vehicle; and that plaintiff was occupying the vehicle when the injury occurred. State Farm's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in not recognizing a distinction between policies insuring against "accidental results" and those insuring against the results of accidental means.
The proposed distinction between accidental results and accidental means was recognized by many courts after the United States Supreme Court approved a jury instruction making such a distinction in Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 9 S.Ct. 755, 33 L.Ed. 60 (1889). Our Supreme Court, however, has never recognized the distinction and has expressly rejected it on several occasions.
The distinction was first rejected by the Supreme Court in Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 P. 793 (1919), a workers' compensation case. The Kansas Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits, without regard to fault, if "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to an employee." K.S.A.1988 Supp. 44-501. In Gilliland, the first case construing the words "by accident," the employer argued that the cause, not merely the result, had to be accidental. The court rejected the employer's contention, holding in an opinion by Justice Burch that the proposed distinction was contrary to the beneficial and remedial purpose of the Act. 104 Kan. at 773-77, 180 P. 793. The court stated:
The court also approved the observation that although the word "accident" usually refers to an unintended and unexpected occurrence which causes loss or injury, it may often refer to the loss or injury itself when the loss or injury is an unintended and unexpected consequence of its cause or when the cause is not known. 104 Kan. at 775, 180 P. 793.
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