White Const. Co., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., 88-1101
| Decision Date | 09 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1101,88-1101 |
| Citation | 526 So.2d 998,13 Fla. L. Weekly 1390 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1390 WHITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
White Construction Company, Inc., has appealed an order issued by the Department of Transportation pursuant to Section 337.16(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), which suspended for four days White's certificate of qualification to bid. Appellant seeks to stay that order, relying on section 120.68(3) which provides that when an order has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, a stay may be granted as a matter of right. White argues that the agency has announced its intention to find it delinquent on another project and such a finding would cause an automatic three-month suspension pursuant to section 337.16(1)(c).
Appellee has responded in opposition to the stay. First, appellee points out that section 337.167(1) expressly states that a certificate such as is involved in this case is not a license for purposes of Florida's Administrative Procedure Act. Second, appellee argues that the potential three-month suspension for a "second offense" is speculative at this point and not adequate grounds for issuance of a stay.
We deny the motion to stay. Section 337.167(1) is somewhat ambiguous because in its first sentence it clearly states a certificate is not a license as defined in chapter 120. It then goes on in the second sentence, however, to state that "the denial or revocation, of a certificate is not subject to the provisions of ... § 120.68(3)" (the stay as a matter of right provision). In the instant case, the order on appeal is a suspension, not a denial or revocation. Whether the omission of "suspension" from the second sentence of section 337.167(1) was deliberate or inadvertent cannot be determined and we have found no case authority construing this statutory provision. Nevertheless, based on the first sentence of that subsection, it appears the "automatic" stay provisions of § 120.68(3) are inapplicable in this case and therefore appellant must otherwise show proper grounds for issuance of the stay. The motion is facially insufficient in that regard as there is no showing of appellant's likelihood of prevailing on appeal,...
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...to movant if the motion is not granted, or a showing that a stay would be in the public interest. See White Const. Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 526 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Appellant has failed to meet this standard. In her motion, appellant argues that the trial court erred in find......
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