White Eagle v. Storie

Decision Date15 August 1978
Docket NumberCiv. No. 77-L-245.
Citation456 F. Supp. 302
PartiesMoses WHITE EAGLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Clyde M. STORIE et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

Walter R. Echo Hawk, Kurt V. Blue Dog, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo., Lawrence Hammerling, Michael J. Schilling, Inter-Tribal Legal Services, Winnebago, Neb., Robert V. Broom, Samuel J. Zeleski, Omaha Legal Aid Society, Omaha, Neb., for plaintiffs.

James P. Fitzgerald of McGrath, North, O'Malley, Kratz, Dwyer, O'Leary & Martin, P. C., Omaha, Neb., Albert Maul, Thurston County Atty., Pender, Neb., for defendants Clyde Storie and the County Board of Supervisors, Thurston County, Nebraska.

Paul Douglas, Atty. Gen. for Nebraska, J. Kirk Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen. for Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., for defendant Walter G. Huber.

MEMORANDUM

DENNEY, District Judge.

This is a class action, which was filed on December 2, 1977. The plaintiff class consists of all persons, male or female, who are presently or in the future will be incarcerated at the Thurston County Jail, Thurston County Courthouse, Pender, Nebraska. The class includes both pretrial detainees and those persons who have been convicted of criminal charges and who are confined in the above institution pending or serving sentences, excluding those who at the time of confinement are or were minors. The defendants are the Sheriff, the Commissioners of Thurston County, Nebraska, and the District Court Judge for the Sixth Judicial District of Nebraska, sued in their official capacities.

This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4), providing for jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy in cases seeking redress from infringements of civil rights; under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, providing for jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States; under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, providing for declaratory and injunctive relief, and under the Court's pendent jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the laws of the State of Nebraska.

By virtue of this lawsuit, the plaintiffs seek to improve the conditions at the Thurston County Jail. In this attempt, the plaintiffs have presented various claims regarding the conditions at the jail. In this opinion, the Court will address itself to four of these claims: defendants' failure to provide adequate facilities and procedures for non-legal visitation; defendants' failure to provide adequate facilities and procedures for legal visitation; defendants' failure to provide an adequate law library; and defendants' failure to afford minimal due process safeguards.1 The plaintiffs have requested summary judgment on all four claims. The defendants have requested summary judgment on only the law library and legal visitation issues.

General Principles

It is the policy of federal courts to avoid interference with the administration of state prisons as federal courts are illequipped to handle the day-to-day problems of state penal systems. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 127-28, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). This needed restraint is cogently described by Justice Powell in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, where he wrote:

Traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration. In part this policy is the product of various limitations on the scope of federal review of conditions in state penal institutions. More fundamentally, this attitude springs from complementary perceptions about the nature of the problems and the efficacy of judicial intervention. Prison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources allow, the inmates placed in their custody. The Herculean obstacles to effective discharge of these duties are too apparent to warrant explication. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved, federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison authorities. (Footnotes omitted).

Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 404-05, 94 S.Ct. at 1807.

However, when the conditions existing in our prisons rise to the level of constitutional deprivation, the traditional "hands off" policy has yielded to increasing judicial scrutiny to protect incarcerated citizens from wholesale infringements of their constitutional rights. See O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Michigan, 437 F.Supp. 582, 594 (E.D.Mich.1977); Barnes v. Government of Virgin Islands, 415 F.Supp. 1218 (D.V.I. 1976); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F.Supp. 318, 328 (M.D.Ala.1976); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y.1974). This more active role was again articulated by Justice Powell in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, wherein he wrote:

But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights. (Citations omitted).

Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 405-06, 94 S.Ct. at 1807. Thus the Court must search for minimal standards below which prison administrations may not act.

In ascertaining these minimal standards, the Court must balance the legitimate penal objectives against the prisoners' challenge to prison regulations based on asserted constitutional rights. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1973). In Pell v. Procunier, the Supreme Court identified three legitimate functions of a correctional institution: deterrence; rehabilitation; and institutional security. Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S. at 822-23, 94 S.Ct. 2800. "Therefore, when a prison policy advances one of these valid goals, the Court is required to weigh the competing interests of the prisoner and of the state in pursuing that goal." Pugh v. Locke, supra, 406 F.Supp. at 328.

In undertaking this balancing process, the Court recognizes a well-established principle that an inmate, whether already convicted or merely detained pending trial, "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968), quoting Coffin v. Richard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Miller v. Carson, 401 F.Supp. 835, 865 (M.D.Fla.1975), aff'd and remanded, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977). In Bell v. Wolff, CV 72-L-227 (D.Neb. 1973), Chief Judge Warren Urbom of this Court articulated those principles which are applicable to pretrial detainees against which the restrictive conditions of their confinement are to be tested.

It must be stressed that the determinative principle against which all treatment of a pretrial detainee is to be assessed is that he is not to be subjected to any hardship, except those necessary to ensure his secure confinement and, hence, his appearance at trial. Considerations of necessary security aside, pretrial detainees have all rights of ordinary citizens because, not having been adjudged guilty of anything, they are ordinary citizens. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1971); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (U.S.D.C.N.D.Calif.1972); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.Supp. 93 (U.S. D.C.N.D.Ohio 1971). See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951). Id. at 2-3.

Thus, since pretrial detainees are presumed innocent until proven guilty, the imposition of punishment without conviction deprives the detainee of due process. Miller v. Carson, supra, 401 F.Supp. at 867; Rhem v. Malscolm, supra, 371 F.Supp. at 622-623. "As the restraints imposed on pretrial detainees must be circumscribed to include only those which are absolutely necessary, the state bears the burden of justification in curtailing personal liberties." O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Michigan, supra, 437 F.Supp. at 595.

In the present case, plaintiffs' class consists of both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners; the latter are comingled with the detainees Filings # 6, 39.

Where pretrial detainees and convicted persons are co-mingled in their cell assignments, the Constitutional common denominator must be the rights of the presumed innocent. Accordingly, a showing of a total picture of confinement which constitutes a deprivation of due process for the pretrial detainees and which cannot be remedied except by changes which will affect the convicted and detainees alike will necessitate relief for both groups.

O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Michigan, supra, 437 F.Supp. at 596; see also Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.Supp. 1368, 1374 (W.D.Pa.1978). Therefore, this opinion will be applied equally to the members of plaintiffs' class, both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.

Constitutional Guidelines

In the recent opinion of Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567 (D.Neb.1976), this Court faced similar constitutional challenges asserted on behalf of pretrial detainees...

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5 cases
  • Lock v. Jenkins
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • December 27, 1978
    ...privilege of visitation with family, friends or attorneys of record. A careful analysis of this problem is found in White Eagle v. Storie, 456 F.Supp. 302 (D.Neb.1978). C. The telephone procedure for pre-trial detainees is analogous to the visitation procedure. Prior to August 1, 1975 colle......
  • Lareau v. Manson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • December 29, 1980
    ...of confinement of convicted prisoners to the extent that the latter are integrated or mixed with the former. See White Eagle v. Storie, 456 F.Supp. 302, 304-05 (D.Neb.1978); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.Supp. 1368, 1374 (W.D.Pa. 1978); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F.Supp. 582, 596 (E.D.......
  • Cannon v. Bowers
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • October 13, 2020
    ...example.) Plaintiff's allegation has due process implications. See Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976); White Eagle v. Storie, 456 F. Supp. 302 (D. Neb. 1978). But Plaintiff has not alleged he was disciplined—that he received sanctions or the denial of privilege—without notice.......
  • Shaddy v. Gunter, CV87-L-323.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • August 8, 1988
    ...are tempered by cases such as Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2561, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) and White Eagle v. Storie, 456 F.Supp. 302, 307 (D.Neb.1978). The plaintiff in Parker was an officer in the armed services who was convicted of conduct "unbecoming an officer and a ge......
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