White's Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, Opinion No. 3923 (SC 1/18/2005)
| Decision Date | 18 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 3923. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | White's Mill Colony, Inc., Appellant/Respondent, v. Arthur Williams, Leonard Boseman, Jr., and Jerry Rouse, Respondents, and Leodel Mitchell, Jimmie Johnson, Leon Kelly, Lillian Davis and Richard Weeks, Respondents/Appellants. |
Kenneth R. Young, Jr., of Sumter, for Appellant/Respondent.
Arthur Williams and Jerry Rouse, both of Sumter, and Leonard Boseman, of Prince George, for Respondents.
A.P. Weissenstein, Jr., and James David Weeks, both of Sumter, for Respondents/Appellants.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether an owner of subaqueous land is entitled to exclusive use of a non-navigable body of water created by the owner's predecessor in title as against other, abutting property owners. Addressing this and other questions below, the special referee enjoined abutting landowners from making any use of the privately owned body of water. We affirm this ruling to the extent White's Mill Colony, Inc. (the "Colony") owns the subaqueous land, but vacate that portion of the judgment related to damages and remand the matter for determination of the precise property boundaries and, concomitantly, reconsideration of the damage awards.
The parties are neighboring property owners whose land surrounds a pond. The core issue in this case is the question of who among these landowners has the right to access and use the pond. On one side of the pond is the Colony, which claims its members have the right to exclusive use of the pond. On the other side of the pond are several individual property owners whose land abuts the pond (the "abutting landowners"). They claim they too have a right to access and use the pond. Briefly outlined below are the relevant facts concerning the pond, how the parties came into ownership of the land surrounding the pond and the pond bed, and the order of the special referee from which the present appeal arises.
At the center of this dispute is an eighty-eight acre body of water in Sumter County known as "White's Mill Pond." The pond is man made—created sometime in the late nineteenth century when a dam was constructed at the point where two streams converged, forming a third, larger stream. Neither the pond nor any of the incoming or outgoing streams are listed on maps of navigable waters prepared by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. Testimony was presented from various witnesses describing the pond and the character of the surrounding area. From this evidence, it appears the pond is an essentially isolated body of water.
Prior to 1950, title to the pond, including the pond bed, had been vested in the predecessors in title to the parties in this case. In 1955, the Colony obtained title to the land located to the north and east of the pond. The Colony also obtained title to the entirety of, or at least a substantial portion of, the bed of the pond itself. Land along the south and west sides of the pond subsequently came into the possession of the defendants in this case: Arthur Williams, Leonard Boseman, Jr., Jerry Rouse, Leodel Mitchell, Jimmie Johnson, Leon Kelly, Lillian Davis, and Richard Weeks. None of the deeds to these landowners granted any right of access to the pond. However, there is testimony suggesting some of the abutting landowners also have title to parts of the pond bed.
The Colony filed suit against the abutting landowners alleging some of them used White's Mill Pond in a variety of ways, including fishing, boating, dredging soil, removing trees from along the side of the pond, and building docks into the pond. The abutting landowners counterclaimed, alleging their use and enjoyment of their property had been disturbed by the Colony. The matter was referred to a special referee for a determination of the parties' respective rights.
In his order, the special referee determined the case turned on two key issues: first, whether White's Mill Pond is a navigable watercourse under South Carolina law giving rise to a public right of access to the pond; and, second, whether the abutting landowners held any private right to access and use the pond arising from their putative status as riparian or littoral owners. The special referee found neither right existed.1 The abutting landowners were therefore enjoined from boating or fishing on White's Mill Pond, dredging or interfering with the pond's bed, cutting any timber from the bed of the pond, or building any structures on the bed of the pond, unless the structures were over property owned by the abutting landowners. Additionally, the special referee awarded damages against the various landowners in amounts ranging from $500 to $5,500.
It is important to note, however, that the referee did not make a determination as to the property lines. Despite contradictory evidence regarding the precise location of the line between the pond bed and the abutting landowners' property, the referee found that such determination was not necessary to address the questions presented.
The abutting landowners now appeal the special referee's findings that the pond is not a publicly accessible navigable waterway and that they have no right to access the pond as riparian or littoral owners. The Colony and several of the abutting property owners also appeal the special referee's award of damages.
"When legal and equitable actions are maintained in one suit, each retains its own identity as legal or equitable for purposes of the applicable standard of review on appeal." Key Corporate Capital, Inc. v. County of Beaufort, 360 S.C. 513, 516, 602 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 338 S.C. 572, 580, 527 S.E.2d 371, 375 (Ct. App. 2000)). In actions at equity, this court can find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence. Id.; West v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., 357 S.C. 537, 542, 593 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ct. App. 2004). In an action at law, tried without a jury, the appellate court standard of review extends only to the correction of errors of law. Id.; Okatie River, L.L.C. v. Southeastern Site Prep, L.L.C., 353 S.C. 327, 334, 577 S.E.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 2003).
In the discussion below, we address separately the three issues that determine this appeal: (I) whether White's Mill Pond is a navigable watercourse under South Carolina law; (II) whether the abutting landowners possess any riparian or littoral rights to access and use the pond; and (III) whether the special referee's award of damages was proper.
The right of public access to navigable waters is guaranteed by our state constitution: "All navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens of the State. . . ." S.C. Const. art. XIV, § 4. South Carolina Code section 49-1-10 (1986) similarly provides that "[a]ll streams which have been rendered or can be rendered capable of being navigated by rafts of lumber or timber by the removal of accidental obstructions and all navigable watercourses and cuts are hereby declared navigable streams and such streams shall be common highways and forever free. . . ." In upholding this constitutional and statutory mandate, our courts look to whether the waterway in question has the capacity to support "valuable floatage." If the waterway can support such use, it is deemed navigable and thus open to the public.
"Valuable floatage" is not determined by resort to generic guidelines as to what specific size or class of vessel or object can achieve buoyancy in the waterway. Rather, the term is defined broadly to include any "legitimate and beneficial public use." Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 450, 346 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1986). Such public use includes all varieties of commercial traffic, ranging from passage of the largest freighter to the floating of raw timber downstream to mill. See id. at 449, 346 S.E.2d at 719. Recreational uses are no less important—boating, hunting, and fishing have been found to fall within the ambit of valuable floatage. See Hughes v. Nelson, 303 S.C. 102, 105, 399 S.E.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1990). In this vein, considerations such as whether the waterway is natural or man-made or whether it is impassable by any vessel at certain times of year have been found to have no bearing on the question of navigability. See State v. Head, 330 S.C. 79, 90-91, 498 S.E.2d 389, 394-95 (Ct. App. 1997). The focus remains strictly on capacity, irrespective of actual use.
Of course, not every body of water is "navigable." The concept of navigability encompasses more than the capacity to support valuable floatage in a single, secluded spot. Rather, to be properly categorized as navigable, the watercourse in question must also be connected to other navigable bodies of water such that it forms a means of transportation or conveyance beyond an isolated locality. This requirement of a navigable connection to a broader system of waterways has been at the heart of the navigability concept since its earliest application in this jurisdiction and others.
Beginning with the early cases addressing the public right to navigable waters in our state's jurisprudence, the express policy underlying that right was to protect, above all, the free flow of commerce. See, e.g., State v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 186, 63 S.E. 884, 887 (1909) (). Rivers and streams were essential means for conveying goods and raw materials from place to place. If...
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