White v. AutoZone Inv. Corp.
Decision Date | 07 September 2022 |
Docket Number | 3D21-598 |
Citation | 345 So.3d 284 (Table) |
Parties | Andre WHITE, Appellant, v. AUTOZONE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a AutoZone Auto Parts, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
We deny AutoZone Investment Corporation d/b/a AutoZone Auto Parts’ motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc or for certification of a question of great public importance, but withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.
Andre White appeals a trial court's order granting AutoZone Investment Corporation d/b/a AutoZone Auto Parts’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Because we find that section 11A-28(10) of the Miami-Dade County Code establishes a private cause of action, we reverse.
Andre White began working for AutoZone in 2015. While he was an employee, he alleges he was subjected to ongoing verbal abuse due to his sexual orientation. White made a complaint to the corporate office in May 2019 and was placed on leave pending an investigation. White was terminated on June 4, 2019.
White subsequently filed a complaint of discrimination with the Miami-Dade Commission on Human Rights. In August 2020, White received a notice of right-to-sue from the Commission indicating the investigation was being terminated for his failure to cooperate with the agency and that he could pursue his charge further pursuant to Chapter 11A, section 11A-28(10) of the Miami-Dade County Code within ninety days of receipt of the notice.
On September 9, 2020, White filed a complaint against AutoZone for sexual orientation discrimination and retaliation in violation of Chapter 11A of the Miami-Dade County Code. In January 2021, AutoZone filed a motion to dismiss White's complaint, arguing Chapter 11A does not provide a private cause of action for employment discrimination. White filed a response to the motion which asserted the plain language of section 11A-28(10) established a private cause of action. AutoZone filed a reply asserting section 11A-28(10) does not create a private cause of action. The trial court heard argument on the motion and, on January 28, 2021, granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice finding section 11A-28(10) does not establish a private cause of action. This appeal followed.
This Court reviews a trial court's determination on a motion to dismiss de novo. Grove Isle Ass'n, Inc. v. Grove Isle Assocs., LLLP, 137 So. 3d 1081, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). "The construction of a statute is an issue of law subject to de novo review." Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 2005).
White contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because the plain and unambiguous language of section 11A-28(10)(b) establishes a private cause of action for employment discrimination. We agree.1
In 1997, the Miami-Dade County Commission enacted Chapter 11A to prevent discrimination in housing, credit and financing practices, public accommodations, employment, family leave and employment in Dade County service.2 Article IV of the Chapter deals with employment discrimination.3
Section 11A-28 provides procedures for employment discrimination complaints. Per the terms of the section, after a complaint is filed the director of the Dade County Equal Opportunity Board or his or her designee shall conduct an investigation and "prepare a finding related to probable cause consisting of a final investigative report and recommended order." See § 11A-28(7)(b). The report would become final ten days after issuance, unless a hearing was requested pursuant to section 11A-28(9), which provides:
(emphasis added). Unlike other provisions in Chapter 11A, this employment discrimination article did not provide any procedures for enforcement by private persons.
In 2006, the Miami-Dade County Commission amended section 11A-28 to include:
Section 11A-28(10) (emphasis added).
"In construing a statute we must begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself." U. S. v. Steele, 147 F. 3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.1998) ; Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) () . "The same logic applies to a local ordinance." Vaughn v. Segal, 707 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). When the words of a statute are unambiguous, "judicial inquiry is complete." Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).
AutoZone argues nothing in section 11A-28(10) specifically states a complainant may pursue an employment discrimination claim under Chapter 11A. "In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole." K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ; see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 6, at 167 (2012) ( ).
The plain language of the statute clearly creates a private cause of action. Section 11A-28(10)(a) provides an individual the right to obtain a "notice of right-to-sue" and once such notice has been obtained that individual may "commence a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction." Section 11A-28(10)(b) explicitly states a court may issue orders or provide affirmative relief "in a private enforcement proceeding under this Article." Read together, this expressly creates a guideline for private enforcement of the employment discrimination chapter of the ordinance.4
AutoZone compares section 11A-28(10) to the administrative scheme of section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which provides that if the Commission on Human Rights determines there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred "in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: (a) Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or (b) Request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57."
Section 760.11(4), however, is not analogous because section 11A-28(10)(a) provides enforcement by a private person may commence "[i]f ... the Director has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the provisions of this Article" and receipt of a right to sue, not after the Commission on Human Rights "determines there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred." § 760.11(4), Fla. Stat. There is no prerequisite for an employee to obtain a probable cause determination prior to commencing a civil action and the plain language clearly authorizes employees to litigate their claims pursuant to Chapter 11A.
Section 11A-28(10) follows an outline of the procedures to be conducted by the Commission on Human Rights after a complaint is filed. Based on this structure, and the fact the section specifically provides it applies where "the Director has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the provisions of this Article," this section is not meant as an administrative relief scheme. Rather, the section is meant as a guideline for a private individual to seek to enforce the employment discrimination article of Chapter 11A after the Commission on Human Rights has failed to provide relief.
AutoZone also argues the trial court's finding that section 11A-28(10) does not create a private right of action should be affirmed because other courts, including this Court, have found this section only allows an employee...
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