White v. Ballou

• Decision Date: 03 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 755 S.W.2d 246
• Parties: 109 Lab.Cas. P 10,505 Dennis G. WHITE, as Representative of Communications Workers of America, Local 6327, Appellant, v. Mary P. BALLOU, Respondent. 39697.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 246

755 S.W.2d 246

109 Lab.Cas. P 10,505

Dennis G. WHITE, as Representative of Communications Workers of America, Local 6327, Appellant, v. Mary P. BALLOU, Respondent.

No. WD 39697.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

May 3, 1988.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

June 28, 1988.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 13, 1988.

Joseph W. Moreland, Robert L. Dameron, Michael T. Manley, Blake & Uhlig, James R. Anderson, Kansas City, for appellant.

Law Offices of Gwen G. Garanchini, Gwen G. Caranchini, Carroll E. McCue, Kansas City, for respondent.

Before MANFORD and TURNAGE and COVINGTON, JJ.

COVINGTON, Judge.

Plaintiff Dennis G. White, as representative of Communication Workers of America, Local 6327, AFL-CIO (the Union), appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $15,000.00 actual and $7,000.00 punitive damages in favor of defendant Mary P. Ballou on her prima facie tort counterclaim in the Union's action to collect disciplinary fines imposed on her for strikebreaking. The cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss.

Mary P. Ballou, an employee of Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, was a member of the Union when the Union called a strike against Southwestern Bell in the summer of 1983. Subsequently, in August, 1983, Ms. Ballou notified Southwestern Bell that she was revoking her union dues check-off authorization. Believing that she had thereby resigned from the Union, Ms. Ballou returned to work at Bell during the strike.

The Union maintained that Ms. Ballou had not effectively resigned from the Union and imposed fines upon her for crossing the Union's picket lines during the strike. In June, 1985, the Union filed suit against Ms. Ballou in the Circuit Court of Jackson County to collect the fines. Ms. Ballou filed an answer and a four count counterclaim against the Union seeking damages for: 1) negligence; 2) willful and wanton conduct (punitive damages); 3) prima facie tort; and 4) conspiracy.

The Union filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of Ms. Ballou's counterclaim. Upon hearing, Counts I, II, and IV of the counterclaim were dismissed. The Union's motion for summary judgment was denied. On the eve of trial, the Union dismissed its petition without prejudice. The case was tried on Ms. Ballou's prima facie tort claim. The jury returned a verdict awarding her $15,000.00 actual damages and $7,000.00 in punitive damages.

On appeal the Union asserts four points of error. The Union's assertion that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case is correct and dispositive. The authority to regulate the controversy between the Union and Ms. Ballou rests exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

The principles of the preemption doctrine as the doctrine relates to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the NLRB are set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the nation to a centralized administrative agency with its own procedures and specialized knowledge. The Court reasoned that to permit the states to control activities which are potentially subject to federal regulation would pose "too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy." Id., 359 U.S. at 246, 79 S.Ct. at 780.

Using this rationale, the Court in Garmon provided the standard for determining when state jurisdiction is preempted by the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the NLRB:

When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act [29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.... If the board decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction.

359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780.

The U.S. Supreme Court has twice held that a union's initiation of suits to collect funds from former members who lawfully resigned from the Union constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act. Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 93 S.Ct. 1961, 36 L.Ed.2d 764 (1973); NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 385, 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972). The Union conduct which Ms. Ballou asserts as the basis for her counterclaim in prima facie tort is the Union's initiation of litigation to enforce its fine against her despite her alleged resignation. Whether or not Ms. Ballou effectively resigned from the Union as she alleges, her claim against the Union is cognizable as an unfair labor practice claim under § 8(b)(1)(A) of...