White v. Boston & A.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1887
• Citation: 11 N.E. 552,144 Mass. 404
• Parties: WHITE, per Pro Ami v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

144 Mass. 404

11 N.E. 552

WHITE, per Pro Ami v. BOSTON & A.R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 7, 1887

COUNSEL

Samuel Hoar, for defendant.

"A presumption of negligence from the simple occurrence of an accident seldom arises, except" (1) "where the accident proceeds from an act of such a character that, when due care is taken in its performance, no injury ordinarily ensues from it in similar cases;" or (2) "where it is caused by the mismanagement or misconstruction of a thing over which the defendant has immediate control, and for the management or construction of which he is responsible." Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129 at 134. See Curtis v. Rochester & S.R. Co., 18 N.Y. 534 536, 537; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1. It is submitted by the defendant that the foregoing is a complete and precise statement of the principle underlying the cases, in which it is sometimes loosely stated that a presumption of negligence arises from the mere proof that an accident had occurred. Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398; Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106; Carpue v. London & B.R. Co., 5 Adol. & E. (N.S.) 747; Welfare v. London & B.R. Co L.R. 4 Q.B. 693; Smith v. Boston Gas-Light Co., 129 Mass. 318; Curtis v. Rochester & S.R. Co., ubi supra, and cases cited. See Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen, 316; Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129.

There is nothing in the case that will justify an inference that the accident could have been prevented by the exercise of the utmost care, skill, and diligence on the part of the defendant that human foresight could have dictated, for there is nothing from which we can infer that the accident happened through any act or omission of the defendant or its servants. "When the evidence tends equally to sustain either of two inconsistent propositions, neither of them can be said to have been established by legitimate proof." Smith v First Nat. Bank at Westfield, 99 Mass. 605, 612; Crafts v. Boston, 109 Mass. 519. It is therefore submitted that all the evidence in the case will not justify a presumption that the accident resulted from the negligence of the defendant. Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234; Blanchette v. Border City Manuf'g Co., 143 Mass. 21, 8 N.E. 430; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129; Welfare v. London & B.R. Co., L.R. 4 Q.B. 693.

Gaston & Whitney and Fred. E. snow, for plaintiff.

The sole question in this case is whether there are any facts stated in the bill of exceptions from which a jury would be authorized to find that the defendant failed to exercise that care and diligence which the law requires of it. It is well established that in certain cases the proof of an accident, without evidence directly connecting the accident with negligence of the defendant, affords a presumption of negligence against the defendant. Res ipsa loquitur. In such cases, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by proof of the accident. Ware v. Gay, 11 Pick. 106; Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Mass. 156; Feital v. Middlesex R.R., 199 Mass. 398; Kearney v. Railway Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, and L.R. 6 Q.B. 759; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181. See, also, collection of cases in Patterson's Railway Accident Law, 438-441. This presumption arises where the nature of the accident is such that it would not be likely to happen without negligence on the part of some one, and the causes of the accident are within the control of the defendant. See Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722; Scott v. London Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 596; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567; Feital v. Middlesex R. Co., 109 Mass. 398. The decision in the case of Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234, was put on the ground that the defendant did not appear to have any exclusive control of the place where the bust which fell was situated. In the present case, the plaintiff, while a passenger in a train of the defendant, which was bound to exercise the greatest degree of care in respect of its carriages, was injured by the fall of a piece of a lamp-shade. It is submitted that upon the facts there arose a presumption of negligence against the defendant. See Gee v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L.R. 8 Q.B. 161, 179, 180. The present case is not distinguishable, except that it is a stronger case for the plaintiff, from Railroad Co. v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St. 461, where a passenger was injured by the fall of a berth from overhead. In the present case, the presumption that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant is stronger by reason of the fact that it alone possessed the means of explaining the cause of the accident, and did not, in fact, offer any explanation. See Le Barron v. East Boston Ferry Co., 11 Allen, 312; remarks of CHANNELL, B., in Bridges v. Railway Co., L.R. 6 Q.B. 377, 391; instructions to jury of DENMAN, C.J., in Carpue v. London, etc., Ry. Co., 5 Q.B. 747, 751.

OPINION

W. ALLEN, J.

If the shade was defective and unsafe, the question whether it was in that condition through the negligence of the defendant would be for the jury; and the fact that it broke and fell from the use for which it was intended would be evidence that it was...