White v. Harkrider
| Decision Date | 12 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-1992 |
| Parties | GERI L. WHITE, Appellant, v. MICHAEL HARKRIDER, CITY OF IOWA CITY, CHRIS WISMAN, and JOHNSON COUNTY, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Submitted December 15, 2022
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Chad Kepros Judge.
Interlocutory appeal and cross-appeal challenging a ruling on a motion to dismiss state constitutional tort claims and common law claims arising out of a warrantless arrest of the plaintiff's spouse.
Martin A. Diaz (argued), Swisher, for appellant.
Elizabeth J. Craig (argued) and Jennifer L. Schwickerath Assistant City Attorneys, Iowa City, Wilford H. Stone and Daniel M. Morgan of Lynch Dallas, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Jessica A. Zupp of Zupp and Zupp Law Firm, P.C., Denison, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice.
Aaron W. Ahrendson, Assistant County Attorney, Carroll, for amici curiae Iowa County Attorney's Association and Iowa State Association of Counties.
Jason C. Palmer and Benjamin J. Kenkel of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa League of Cities.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Samuel P. Langholz, Assistant Solicitor General, and Tessa M. Register, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae State of Iowa.
Geri White filed this civil suit against certain law enforcement officials and their employers arising out of the warrantless arrest of her spouse at their residence. She asserted state constitutional tort claims as well as common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and assault. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the state constitutional tort claims but denied their motion to dismiss the common law claims. We granted the plaintiff's application and the defendants' cross-application for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction of legal error. Meade v. Christie, 974 N.W.2d 770, 774-75 (Iowa 2022). "A motion to dismiss challenges a petition's legal sufficiency." Id. at 775. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we "accept[] the facts alleged in the petition as true and view[] the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. (citations omitted). Generally, "[m]otions to dismiss are disfavored." Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Iowa 2020). A party is entitled to dismissal only if the petition shows the claim or claims are legally deficient and the plaintiff has no right of recovery as a matter of law. Meade, 974 N.W.2d at 775.
On the evening of June 1, 2019, Deputy Sheriff Chris Wisman, of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office, and Officer Michael Harkrider, of the Iowa City Police Department, were involved in the investigation of a single-car accident in which the driver drove away from the scene. At the scene of the accident, Officer Wisman noted a beer can on the road and unused rifle ammunition in the ditch. Officer Wisman suspected the driver of the vehicle had lost control of the vehicle due to intoxication and had left the scene to avoid detection. It was reported to law enforcement that a male driving a Toyota FJ Cruiser left the scene at an excessive rate of speed. It was also reported that the FJ Cruiser was substantially damaged and missing a tire.
Law enforcement officials tracked the FJ Cruiser to the residence of Geri White (White) and Daniel White (Daniel). "Deputy Wisman and many other Johnson County Deputies" along with Officer "Harkrider and many other Iowa City Police Officers converged" on the Whites' home. Law enforcement officials surrounded the house with their firearms (handguns, rifles, and shotguns) at the ready and deployed a canine unit. They did not knock on the door to see if Daniel was inside. Officer Harkrider, using a loudspeaker, announced,
White, who was in the home at the time, exited the front door as commanded and was "met by numerous law enforcement officers crouched behind vehicles, trees, and other objects, with their weapons trained" on her. Officer Harkrider and Deputy Wisman ordered White to leave the front stoop and approach the law enforcement vehicle parked in the driveway. White initially refused to leave the stoop and asked "for an explanation for the army in front of her home," but Officer Harkrider demanded she comply and gave her an order to do so. White left the front stoop of her home, walked to the marked patrol car, and spoke with Deputy Wisman. She answered his questions. After she answered his questions, "law enforcement disbanded its perimeter and overwhelming show of force." White was not arrested.
Daniel, who was also in the home, was then arrested. He was charged with operating while intoxicated. In the subsequent criminal case for that charge, Daniel filed a motion to suppress evidence, contending his arrest was unlawful. The motion to suppress was denied. He later entered into a plea agreement in which the charge of operating while intoxicated was dismissed.
White filed this civil suit against Deputy Wisman, Johnson County, Officer Harkrider, and the City of Iowa City based on law enforcement's entry onto her property and subsequent show of force. In her amended petition, White asserted state constitutional tort claims pursuant to Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled by Burnett v. Smith, N.W.2d (Iowa 2023). Specifically, she asserted claims for: (1) violation of her right to freedom of movement under article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) violation of her right to liberty and property under article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution; and (3) violation of her right to be free from unreasonable seizure and to be free of excessive force under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. She also asserted common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and assault.
The defendants moved to dismiss White's claims.[1] The district court granted the defendants' motions with respect to White's state constitutional tort claims. The district court held that article I, sections 1 and 8 were not self-executing and could not support claims for monetary relief. In addition, the district court held that even if these provisions were self-executing, state constitutional tort claims were available only against the state and its employees and not against municipalities and their employees. The district court further held there was no reason to create additional state constitutional tort claims in this case because common law causes of action could provide White relief. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss White's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and assault. The district court reasoned that the plaintiff "ha[d] met notice pleading standards" and that the court could not say there was no set of facts under which the plaintiff might be entitled to relief.
We first address White's interlocutory appeal of the district court's dismissal of her state constitutional tort claims. Six years ago in Godfrey, this court held that a plaintiff could pursue a direct constitutional tort claim for alleged violations of the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution.
898 N.W.2d at 871-72. Further research, reflection, and litigation have shown that decision to be demonstrably erroneous and unworkable in practice. For the reasons set forth in Burnett, ___ N.W.2d ___, Godfrey has been overruled. White's constitutional tort claims thus cannot proceed. We affirm the district court's dismissal of these claims.
We now address the defendants' cross-interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss White's common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and assault.
White's amended petition avers the defendants' conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress. A claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the defendants intentionally caused, or recklessly disregarded the likelihood of causing, severe or extreme emotional distress to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff in fact suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the defendants' extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe or extreme emotional distress. Lennette v. State, 975 N.W.2d 380, 391-92 (Iowa 2022); Hedlund v. State, 930 N.W.2d 707, 723-24 (Iowa 2019). To be actionable, the allegedly tortious conduct must be "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Fuller v. Loc. Union No. 106 of the United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 567 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984)).
"[I]t is for the court to determine in the first instance, as a matter of law, whether the conduct complained of may reasonably be regarded as outrageous." Hedlund 930 N.W.2d at 724 (quoting Cutler v. Klass, Whicher & Mishne, 473 N.W.2d 178, 183 (Iowa 1991)); see also Lennette, 975 N.W.2d at 391-92. Because the determination of whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to permit recovery is a legal question, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress can be resolved...
To continue reading
Request your trial