White v. Jansen

• Decision Date: 15 September 1914
• Docket Number: 11958.
• Citation: 81 Wash. 435,142 P. 1140
• Parties: WHITE v. JANSEN, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

142 P. 1140

81 Wash. 435

WHITE v. JANSEN, Sheriff, et al.

No. 11958.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 15, 1914

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Bruce Blake Judge.

Action by L. H. White against A. C. Jansen, as sheriff of Adams county, Wash., and others. From a judgment for plaintiff defendants appeal. Affirmed.

John Truax and W. O. Miller, both of Ritzville, and Fred'k W Dewart, of Spokane, for appellants.

McWilliams, Weller & McWilliams, of Spokane, for respondent.

MOUNT J.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages against the sheriff of Adams county, and the surety upon his official bond, on account of alleged false arrest and imprisonment. The defendants have appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

It appears that in the year 1910 some horses were stolen in Adams county. An information was filed by the prosecuting attorney accusing 'John Doe' of the theft. A warrant was issued upon this information and placed in the hands of the sheriff to apprehend the accused. The sheriff thereafter discovered one of the stolen horses in the city of Spokane. He also found a man there who answered the description of the accused. At the time of the arrest in Spokane county, the sheriff was accompanied by a police officer who knew the plaintiff. This police officer informed the sheriff that he had known the plaintiff for a period of about 14 years; that he had resided in Spokane during that time; and that the sheriff had better get some other identification of the man than he then had before making the arrest. The sheriff, however, made the arrest and took the plaintiff to Ritzville, in Adams county, where the plaintiff was kept over night in jail. The next morning, after consultation between the sheriff, the plaintiff, and the prosecuting attorney of that county, the plaintiff was released, and the sheriff paid his fare back to the city of Spokane. Thereafter the plaintiff brought this action.

At the trial the court instructed the jury as follows:

'The arrest was made on what is known as a John Doe warrant, upon which kind of a warrant an officer is authorized to arrest the person guilty of the offense charged in the information upon which such warrant is issued. If, however, by virtue of such warrant, he arrests a person who did not commit the felony, he will be liable to the person so arrested in damages, unless he had reasonable grounds for believing, and does believe, that the person whom he arrests is the person who committed the felony. It is admitted in this case that the plaintiff did not commit the felony charged in the information, upon which the warrant in question was issued. Therefore the sole question for you to determine is whether or not, in arresting the plaintiff, the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, that the plaintiff had committed the felony charged in the information. If he did have such reasonable grounds for so believing that the plaintiff committed the felony charged in the information upon which the warrant was issued, and did so believe, he is not liable in this action. If on the other hand, he did not have reasonable grounds for believing that the plaintiff was the man who committed the felony charged in the information upon which the warrant was issued, or if he did not believe the plaintiff was such man, then he is liable in damage to plaintiff. What would be reasonable grounds for believing that plaintiff was the man who committed the felony charged in the information in question is to the determined by you, and in determining that question you should determine whether or not the defendant exercised reasonable care and prudence in ascertaining whether the plaintiff had committed the crime charged or not, and whether he used such methods of investigating the same as a reasonably prudent officer would use under the same circumstances in ascertaining that fact, and whether, under the facts so ascertained, a reasonably prudent officer would make the arrest; and if you find from the evidence that a reasonably prudent officer, having the knowledge at hand and the means of knowledge at hand that the defendant had, would not, before making such arrest, have made any further investigation to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff committed the crime charged, and would have arrested the plaintiff under the same circumstances as did the defendant, then your verdict should be for the defendant. On the other hand, if you find that a reasonably prudent officer would not have arrested the plaintiff under the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence, without making further investigation as to whether or not the plaintiff was the individual who committed the crime charged, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.'

It is argued by the appellants that these instructions are erroneous in several particulars which will be noticed. The appellants contend that the decided weight of authority is to the effect that the existence of probable cause is a justification when the wrong person has been arrested by a sheriff. And then argue that it was the duty of the court to give a requested instruction which defines 'probable cause.' We think there can be no doubt about the rule, as stated, that, where the arresting officer has probable cause, he is justified in making the arrest, even of the wrong person. It is clear to us that the instruction given correctly defines 'probable cause.' The definition, as contended for by the appellant, is stated in Rich v. McInerny, 103 Ala. 345, 15 So. 663, 49 Am. St. Rep. 32, as follows:

'A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances, sufficiently strong in themselves, to

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