White v. King

• Decision Date: 11 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 450,450
• Citation: 223 A.2d 763,244 Md. 348
• Parties: Robert B. WHITE and Catherine M. White v. Horace L. KING, Sr.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 348

244 Md. 348

223 A.2d 763

Robert B. WHITE and Catherine M. White v. Horace L. KING, Sr.

No. 450.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 11, 1966.

Joseph F. McBride (Bill L. Yoho, Robert S. Hoyert, Roy W. Hooten and Hoyert & Yoho, College Park, on the brief), for appellants.

Martin H. Freeman, Upper Marlboro (Jerrold V. Powers and Sasscer, Clagett, Powers & Channing, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES and mCWILLIAMS, JJ.

OPPENHEIMER, Judge.

The appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Robert B. White, a husband and wife residing in Prince George's County, Maryland, sued the appellee, a resident of the same county, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, for injuries sustained in Michigan, when the appellee, who was driving the automobile in which the appellants were riding, apparently fell asleep at the wheel. The trial court, at the close of the appellants' case, granted a directed verdict for the appellee, on the grounds that the law of Michigan governed, that the appellants were guests of the appellee, as a matter of law, within the meaning of the Michigan Guest Statute, and that, under that statute, there was not sufficient evidence of the appellee's gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct to go to the jury.

The Michigan Guest Statute provides in part as follows:

'That no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.' Mich.Stat.Ann. § 9.2101 (1960) (Pub.Acts Mich.1957, No. 281).

On this appeal the appellants contend, first, that this Court has not directly held that the lex loci delicti is controlling and that, in a case such as this, the law of Maryland should apply; second, that if the Michigan law does apply, the question of whether the appellants were passengers for hire rather than guests should have been submitted to the jury; and third, on the same assumption, that the lower court erred in not submitting to the jury the issue of whether the accident was caused by the appellee's gross negligence.

I

This Court has consistently followed the rule that when an accident occurs in another state substantive rights of the parties, even though they are domiciled in Maryland, are to be determined by the law of the state in which the alleged tort took place. Mroz v. Vasold, Jr., 228 Md. 81, 178 A.2d 403 (1962); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959). See also Tobin v. Hoffman, 202 Md. 382, 96 A.2d 597 (1953) and Wilson v. Dailey, 191 Md. 472, 62 A.2d 284 (1948). In Mroz and Doughty, both of which involved guest statutes of other states, the rationale of the rule was not questioned, but the decisions turned on its application. The rule was, and still is, followed by the great majority of other states. Annot., 'Choice of law in application of automobile guest statutes,' 95 A.L.R.2d 12 (1964); Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 378, 384.

Lex loci delicti has been criticized by eminent authorities on the conflict of laws. A new rule has been proposed in Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964), and the suggested new rule or modifications thereof have been adopted by highly respected courts in several state jurisdictions. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). See also Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). The new approach is that the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.

The gravamen of the new rule is set forth in Babcock, at 12 N.Y.2d 481-482, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749, 191 N.E.2d 283, as follows:

'The 'center of gravity' or 'grouping of contacts' doctrine adopted by this court in conflicts cases involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-State contacts.

Justice, fairness and 'the best practical result' * * * may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. The merit of such a rule is that 'it gives to the place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context' and thereby allows the forum to apply 'the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the outcome of (the) particular litigation."'

In Wilcox, at 26 Wis.2d 629-630, 133 N.W.2d 414, the reason for the change is given in these words:

'All of the commentators and all of the cases that end up in disagreement with the unbending application of lex loci have a common thread that runs through the skein of rationale, and that thread is that the place of the occurrence of an unintentional tort is fortuitous, and it is by mere happenstance that the lex loci state is concerned at all. The most dramatic instance of this type of fortuitousness is the case where an airplane is forced off its course and crashes in a state or country that was not on its route.

'They are also dismayed that in this day of rapid transportation, whether by land or air, that the rights and liabilities of the parties as to each other should vary from hour to hour, or indeed minute to minute, as state boundaries are crossed. In the case before us the parties, husband and wife, passed through a number of states on their vacation. There appears to be no reason why the duty of the host to the guest should vary on the basis of factors that are not in any wise related to the public policy of the state most intimately concerned or associated with a changed relationship between the parties.'

The reasons for the retention of the old rule, absent a change by the Legislature, are set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court, in Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del.1965), as follows:

'The new test requires a court to determine which state has the more significant relationship with the tort and the parties, and to apply the substantive law of that state. In making this decision the important contacts to determine the question are the place of injury, the place of negligence, the domicile of the parties, and the place where the relationship of the parties is centered. The result is to substitute for a rule which was easy of application one where all manner of gradations of important contacts may be present.

'We think we may not depart by judicial fiat from a rule settled in this state to adopt a 'flexible approach' which must be made certain by future litigation * * * We suppose this is not the function of a court in the face of an established rule of law which would discourage such a result. We think the adoption of the more significant relationship theory would be a major change with respect to the rights of litigants. As such, therefore, it falls within the peculiar province of the General Assembly. It is the lawmaking body of this State-not the courts.'

For illuminative comments on both sides of the question, see Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 Colum.L.Rev. 1212 (1963); Note, The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of Laws, 52 Va.L.Rev. 302 (1966); Note, Wilcox v. Wilcox: The Beginning of a New Approach to Conflict of Laws in Tort Cases, 1966 Wis.L.Rev. 913; Note, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 355 (1963); and authorities therein cited.

The doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life. ¹ While it is important, in our legal system that persons should know the probable consequences of their acts, that consideration has little bearing on the commission of unintentional torts. These general principles, however, do not constrain us to find that lex loci delicti should be overruled.

In several of the jurisdictions which have discarded lex loci delicti, the rule which is to take its place seems still in the process of development. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965) and Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966) and the dissents therein. Draft No. 9 of the Restatement on Conflicts is still tentative. It is characteristic of our legal system that the emergence of a new doctrine depends for its clarification on case-to-case decisions, as its application to different factual situations presents new difficulties to be resolved and new factors to be weighed. As this Court said in Cole v. State, 212 Md. 55, 58, 128 A.2d 437 (1957), in connection with a proposal to change the M'Naghten insanity rule in criminal cases, unless and until what we deem a sound, practical alternative is evolved, we believe that any change should be made by the Legislature rather than by the courts.

In what we have said, we do not intend any implication that lex loci delicti is, in general, in our opinion, an unjust rule. Hardship may result in a particular case, but that, unfortunately, is true under any general legal principle. Certainty in the law is not so common that, where it exists, it is to be lightly discarded. We recognize the force of the countervailing arguments, but in the present state of the law, we leave any change...