White v. Legodais
| Decision Date | 23 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 38743,38743 |
| Parties | Frank M. WHITE, Jr. v. Thomas LEGODAIS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
A. Quillian Baldwin, Jr., Mattox & Baldwin, LaGrange, for Frank M. white, jr.
H. J. Thomas, LaGrange, for Thomas Legodais.
This is an appeal from the issuance of a permanent injunction which prevents appellant from placing a dwelling which he describes as a "modular home" on his property in the Indian Bend Subdivision because of Covenants and Restrictions against "mobile homes" in that subdivision. Because we believe that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the injunction, we affirm.
1. The first question is whether the restrictive covenant at issue here is too vague and indefinite to be enforced. The trial court found that the covenant was sufficiently specific to be enforced, and we agree.
Section A-8 of the subdivision's restrictions reads as follows: "No mobile home or structure of a temporary character, trailer, basement, tent, shack, barn, or garage, or other outbuilding shall be used on any lot at any time as a residence either temporarily or permanently."
Appellant argues that this language is too vague and indefinite to be enforced, based on our case of the City of Woodstock v. Boddy, et al., 240 Ga. 477, 241 S.E.2d 236 (1978). In that case, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that the definition of "mobile home" in a new comprehensive zoning ordinance was vague, indefinite, uncertain and unenforceable. The ordinance at issue defined a mobile home simply as a "vehicle or portable structure used for dwelling or sleeping purposes." This included definition rendered the ordinance too vague and indefinite to be enforceable.
Here we are dealing with a restrictive covenant for a subdivision, a private agreement between contracting parties as opposed to the city ordinance in City of Woodstock. It uses the term "mobile home" but does not attempt to define it. We will not strike this restrictive covenant as being too vague and indefinite simply because the phrase "mobile home" is not therein defined. Instead, we will examine those words in light of our rules regarding construction of covenants to determine if any meaning can be attached to them.
"Covenants are to be so construed as to carry into effect the intention of the parties, which is to be collected from the whole instrument, and the circumstances surrounding its execution." Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 357, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945); Atlanta, Knoxville & C. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929(3), 53 S.E. 701 (1905). When the subdivider's intent in drafting a restriction on the use of property conveyed clearly appears, such intent will be followed. Bales v. Duncan, 231 Ga. 813, 204 S.E.2d 104 (1974); Reid v. Standard Oil Co., 107 Ga.App. 497, 130 S.E.2d 777 (1963).
The instrument and the circumstances in this case show what the developer who drafted the restrictive covenants intended the words "mobile home" to mean. The trial judge was authorized to find that the developer used the words "mobile home" in their common everyday sense and specifically intended to include those dwellings which are frequently referred to as "double-wide trailers." In the context of this restrictive covenant, the words "mobile home" are not so vague or indefinite as to render the covenant unenforceable.
2. Next, we must consider whether the trial court erred in holding that appellant's dwelling was a mobile home rather than a "modular home." This determination involved both questions of law and fact and can only be overturned in the event of manifest abuse of discretion. Lawrence v. Harding, 225 Ga. 148(2), 166 S.E.2d 336 (1969). We find no such abuse here.
The dwelling at issue here was a Darlington Debonair Model 302, purchased from American Discount Mobile Homes, Inc. The purchase agreement between White and American Discount, the manufacturer's Warranty and Owner's Manual, and the accompanying...
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