White v. De Martini

Decision Date11 August 1960
Docket NumberNo. 19154,19154
Citation183 Cal.App.2d 665,6 Cal.Rptr. 782
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesSylvester WHITE, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Frank A. DE MARTINI, President of the City of Oakland Civil Service Board, Raymond C. L'Heureux, Harold G. Lorentzen, Harvey H. Bechtel and George E. Jacopetti, Members of the City of Oakland Civil Service Board, et al., Respondents.

Smith, Parrish, Paduck & Clancy, Robert H. Laws, Jr., Oakland, for appellant.

John W. Collier, City Atty., Mark B. Shragge, Deputy City Atty., Oakland, for respondents.

BRAY, Presiding Justice.

Appeal by petitioner from a judgment denying his application for writ of mandate to compel the Civil Service Board of the city of Oakland to hear his appeal from his discharge as an employee of the street department.

Question Presented. Was petitioner's appeal timely?

Record.

From December, 1953, to April, 1959, petitioner was an employee of the city of Oakland, subject to the provisions of the city charter, the city Civil Service Board, and the rules promulgated by that board pursuant to the authority granted to it by charter. On April 24, 1959, notice of discharge was mailed petitioner. He received it April 25. On April 30, the fifth day after receipt of the notice and the sixth day after it was mailed him, petitioner filed an appeal in the office of the Civil Service Board. That board refused to hear the appeal on the ground that it was filed too late.

Time for Appeal.

Rule 101 of the Civil Service Board provides: 'Whenever a person who has been suspended, fined, or discharged, desires to sppeal therefrom to the Board, the following order of procedure shall govern:

'(a) The appeal must be filed in the office of the Board within five days from the date that notice of suspension, fine, discharge, or removal was served upon the affected employee.' (Emphasis added.)

Rule 106 provides: 'Any written notice required by the provisions of these rules, may be given either by personal service or by mail. In case of service by mail, the notice must be deposited in the United States Post Office with postage prepaid and addressed to the person on whom it is to be served at his last address, as the same appears on the records of the Board. Such service shall be deemed completed at the time of the deposit in the Post Office.' (Emphasis added.)

If rule 106 is applicable, then there can be no question but that the notice of appeal was filed too late, as the notice of discharge was deposited in the post office six days before the appeal was filed. Petitioner contends, however, that because of rule 99, the time when the notice of discharge was served upon him is determined, not by rule 106, but by section 1013, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in part: 'In case of service by mail, * * * The service is complete at the time of the deposit, but if, within a given number of days after such service, a right may be exercised or an act is to be done by the adverse party, the time within which such right may be exercised or act be done, is extended one day, together with one day additional for every full 100 miles distance between the place of deposit and the place of address, if served by different post offices, but such extension shall not exceed thirty days in all.' This section, if applicable, would give petitioner an additional day in which to file his appeal. Rule 99 provides: 'Rules 100, 101, and 102 are designed to carry out the provisions of Charter Sec. 81 and 82 which provide for Suspension, Fine, Discharge, Removal, and Appeals * * *'

Section 81 of the Oakland City Charter provides the removal of civil service employees. Section 82 provides for appeal by the removed employee. Stats.1931, p. 2665.

Petitioner contends that because rule 99 fails to mention rule 106 the latter is not applicable to an appeal from a discharge, and in order to determine when an employee is served under section 101, he must turn to section 1013, Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner further contends that even if rule 106 applies, section 1013, Code of Civil Procedure, extends the time for appeal one more day than that provided by rule 101. We are of the opinion that in neither event would section 1013 apply.

In Pesce v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 51 Cal.2d 310, 333 P.2d 15, the court held section 1013 extended the time provided by section 23081, Business and Professions Code, for the taking of an appeal to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board from a decision of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. Section 25760 Business and Professions Code, provided that if notice of any act of the department was given by mail, service was complete upon deposit in the post office (just as rule 106 does here). That section also provided that if service were made by mail 'service shall be made in the manner prescribed by Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' The court said (51 Cal.2d at pages 312, 313, 333 P.2d at pages 17-18): 'The Business and Professions Code and the Code of Civil Procedure are to be read and construed together under the 'well-recognized rule that for purposes of statutory construction the codes are to be regarded as blending into each other and constituting but a single statute.' * * *' 'Sections 23081 and 25760 of the Business and Professions Code reasonably permit a construction which would include the application of section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety to the filing of a notice of appeal from a decision of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. That construction is consistent with the policy of the law which favors the preservation of the right of appeal and the hearing of appeals on their merits.'

Thus, the court was construing two statutes together. Here, however, we are not dealing with two statutes but with administrative rules adopted under a charter provision, and are being asked to supersede those rules by section 1013, Code of Civil Procedure, which in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Listle, 55 Cal.App.2d 300, 130 P.2d 251, was held 'relates only to the subject matter of the chapter of the code in which it appears and which deals with notices and filing and service of papers; it does not apply to notices generally which are required to be given under Civil Code sections, independently of pending actions. (Colyear v. Tobriner, 1936, 7 Cal.2d 735, 62 P.2d 741, 109 A.L.R. 191.)' 55 Cal.App.2d at page 306, 130 P.2d at page 254. Section 82 of the Oakland City Charter provides: 'Any person suspended, fined or discharged * * * may within five days from the making * * * of the order suspending, finding [sic] or discharging him * * * appeal * * *.' (Emphasis added.) Actually rule 101 extends the time given in this charter provision, by providing that the discharged employee may appeal 'within five days from the date that notice' of his discharge was served upon him. To hold that section 1013, Code of Civil Procedure, can extend a charter provision and the administrative rules of a city would deny the latter the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Highland Plastics, Inc. v. Enders
    • United States
    • California Superior Court
    • 24 June 1980
    ...to the situations where notice is required to be given, under the Civil Code, independent of any action. (See White v. De Martini (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 665, 668, 6 Cal.Rptr. 782.) We believe that this rule is still applicable for notices required as condition precedent to an unlawful detain......
  • Janetsky v. Avis
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 January 1986
    ...to private extensions of time after the statutory period has lapsed within which to respond to discovery. (See White v. De Martini (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 665, 668, 6 Cal.Rptr. 782; Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Listle (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 300, 306, 130 P.2d In this case defendants' counsel in hi......
  • Csea v. Livingston Union School Dist.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 4 April 2007
    ...employment, the notice "should be clear, concise and easily understandable, and not ambiguous or confusing." (White v. De Martini (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 665, 669, 6 Cal.Rptr. 782.) In the present case, the board policy is not clear and understandable; it is, instead, ambiguous and confusing.......
  • Richardson v. Ceja, F053954 (Cal. App. 10/7/2008)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 7 October 2008
    ...Authority (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 819, 827; Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Listle (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 300, 306; and White v. De Martini (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 665, 668.) "In other situations, section 1013, subdivision (a), has been found to apply only if the language of the statute requiring the n......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT