White v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.

• Citation: 139 Conn.App. 39,54 A.3d 643
• Decision Date: 06 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 33757.,33757.
• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Roland Todd WHITE v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al.

139 Conn.App. 39
54 A.3d 643

Roland Todd WHITE
v.
MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al.

No. 33757.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 17, 2012.
Decided Nov. 6, 2012.

[54 A.3d 644]

Frank J. McCoy, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Alexander J. Sarris, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Paul D. Williams, with whom was James E. Hennessey, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEAR and WEST, Js.

BEAR, J.

[139 Conn.App. 40]The plaintiff, Roland Todd White, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (Mazda), and Cartwright Auto, LLC (dealership), in this product liability action stemming from a fire in his 2007 Mazda3 automobile (vehicle), which allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that his case should not proceed to a trial on the merits because he had failed to present sufficient evidence in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following. The plaintiff filed a two count amended complaint against the defendants seeking damages under the Connecticut Product Liability

[54 A.3d 645]

Act, General Statutes § 52–572m ¹ et seq. (act), alleging that the vehicle was “defective and unreasonably [139 Conn.App. 41]dangerous.” The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that on October 16, 2006, he purchased the vehicle from the dealership.² The plaintiff utilized the vehicle “for the purpose for which it had been designed, produced, manufactured, tested and sold; and [it] was used in a manner intended and foreseeable to [the defendants].” On November 15, 2006, approximately one month after the plaintiff had purchased the vehicle, he “lifted up the hood of the [vehicle] and flames erupted from [it], causing the [p]laintiff to sustain [injuries].”

On the basis of these alleged facts, the plaintiff claimed that the vehicle was defective and unreasonably dangerous in the following ways: (1) the fuel lines on the fuel rail of the vehicle were pressed onto the fitting at the fuel rail in such a way that a fuel leak occurred and caused a fire; (2) the fuel lines were installed or secured with clamps improperly, which caused damage to the lines, resulting in a fuel leak and a fire; (3) the defendants negligently installed the fuel lines on the vehicle in an incorrect manner, causing a fuel leak and a fire; (4) the defendants negligently failed to design the vehicle and its component parts so that it would not be a hazard to a consumer purchaser; (5) the defendants negligently failed to test or inspect the vehicle and its component parts; (6) the defendants manufactured or sold the vehicle with defective component parts or a defective engine, thereby causing a hazard to users of the vehicle; (7) the defendants failed to warn the plaintiff of the aforesaid conditions; (8) the defendants breached their statutory warranty of merchantability in that the vehicle was not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was sold; and (9) the [139 Conn.App. 42]defendants sold the vehicle in a defective, unsafe and dangerous condition, thereby subjecting the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury.

On December 1, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff, “among other things, [had] adduced no evidence, expert or otherwise, to establish that [1] the vehicle at issue was defectively designed or manufactured, or [2] that the alleged defect [in the vehicle] caused [the plaintiff's] injuries.” In their supporting memorandum, the defendants argued that the plaintiff “failed to elicit any evidence in discovery that the [v]ehicle was defective in that it was unreasonably dangerous, that any alleged defect caused [the plaintiff's] injury, that any alleged defect existed at the time of sale, or that the [v]ehicle reached [the] [p]laintiff without substantial change in condition.” They also argued that the plaintiff failed to set forth any evidence

[54 A.3d 646]

regarding a failure to warn. Attached to the defendants' motion and supporting memorandum were multiple documents, including portions of the plaintiff's deposition testimony, portions of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Richard E. Morris, a certified fire investigator, and copies of two reports written by Morris. The defendants conceded, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment only, the truth of the following deposition testimony of the plaintiff: On or about October 16, 2006, the plaintiff purchased the vehicle from the dealership. The plaintiff utilized the vehicle for his commute to and from his place of employment, which was approximately sixty miles each way, and he made the trip approximately forty times in the vehicle before the incident on November 15, 2006. The plaintiff put approximately 2800 miles on the vehicle traveling to and from work.³ Prior to the fire, the plaintiff had no problems [139 Conn.App. 43]with the vehicle and never made any complaints about it. Before the fire, the plaintiff was satisfied with the operation of the vehicle.

The defendants also attached portions of Morris' deposition at which he testified that he was “not offering an opinion that the [vehicle] was defective....” He also agreed that he was not an expert in automobile electronics, design or manufacture, and that he was not an expert in fuel line component manufacture or design. Morris also testified that his research did not reveal any history of similar fires in other Mazda3s. The defendants also attached two reports written by Morris in which he opined, after examining another Mazda3, referred to by him as an exemplar vehicle, that the “fire [in the plaintiff's vehicle] was most likely caused by a fuel leak in the fuel rail system.” Morris further opined that “either the clip was improperly installed on the gas line which allowed it to loosen or that a gasket was improperly installed allowing gasoline to seep through and drop onto the engine manifold.” He further stated: “[T]his fire is still a result of the gas lines, the plastic and rubber fittings and gas lines associated with the fuel rail of this vehicle and ... the fire appears to be from the cause of a mechanical failure and ... is the direct result of gasoline leaking on a hot surface causing the vehicle to catch fire.”

On January 3, 2011, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had “provided sufficient evidence that the vehicle ... harbored a defective design and/ or improper installation of automotive parts that ultimately caused a car fire and, subsequently, the [p]laintiff's injuries. Therefore, the [p]laintiff has set forth a prima facie case for his claim under the [act].” He [139 Conn.App. 44]argued in his supporting memorandum that the court should deny the defendants' motion because he did submit, by means of Morris' testimony, reports and affidavit, sufficient evidence that the vehicle was defectively designed or manufactured. Specifically, the plaintiff cited Morris' testimony that “Morris came to the conclusion that the plastic release tab clips on the gas line and fuel lines and/or gaskets were defective in that they were flimsy, did not function correctly and ultimately failed, thereby serving as the most likely cause of the car fire.” The plaintiff also cited Morris' testimony that he was “pretty amazed that the clip to the

[54 A.3d 647]

fuel line was flimsy and, by a simple touch, sprung off the fuel line.” ⁴

Additionally, the plaintiff provided Morris' affidavit in which Morris attested that he is familiar with external and internal components of automobiles, that he is a private fire investigator who regularly inspects automobiles in an effort to identify the origin and cause of fires, that he conducted an origin and cause of fire investigation on the plaintiff's vehicle, that it was his professional opinion that “the release tab clip on the gas line and/or gasket did not function correctly and failed, thereby being the most likely cause of the [vehicle's] fire [and that] [t]his situation would allow gasoline to escape and seep through then drop onto the engine manifold.” He further averred that the cause of the vehicle's fire “was a mechanical failure related to the plastic and rubber fillings and/or gas lines associated with the fuel rail of [the] vehicle.... As a result of [this] mechanical failure, gasoline proceeded to leak onto a hot surface, thereby causing the vehicle to catch fire.” The plaintiff argued that Morris' expert testimony, reports and affidavit, all of which were attached as [139 Conn.App. 45]exhibits to the plaintiff's objection and supporting memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment,⁵ provided sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie claim under the act.⁶ He further argued that, even if Morris did not qualify as an expert for all aspects of this case, “there still exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defective condition of the vehicle was the proximate cause of the [p]laintiff's harm.”

On February 16, 2011, the defendants filed a reply brief in further support of their motion for summary judgment. In their reply, the defendants asserted that Morris, the plaintiff's “sole expert witness ... has not—and cannot—provide an opinion concerning whether the vehicle's fuel system was defectively designed or manufactured.” The defendants specifically cited to Morris' deposition testimony where he stated that he was not offering an opinion that the vehicle was defective and that he was not an expert in “[1] automobile mechanics, [2] automobile electronics, [3] the design or manufacture of any automobile components related to fuel lines ... [4] the design of automobiles ... or [5] the manufacture of automobiles....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) They also...