White v. Padgett

• Decision Date: 03 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1597.,72-1597.
• Citation: 475 F.2d 79
• Parties: Earl WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Glen E. PADGETT et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

475 F.2d 79 (1973)

Earl WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dr. Glen E. PADGETT et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 72-1597.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 2, 1973.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1973.

Edwin A. Green, II, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

W. Robert Olive, Jr., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., Ben F. Barnes, Thomas C. Wilkinson, Marianna, Fla., J. Ben Watkins, Steve M. Watkins, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Before RIVES, THORNBERRY and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

RIVES, Circuit Judge:

Predicating jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),¹ plaintiff White brought this action for deprivation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² Defendants claimed that the complaint failed to state any specific acts which would make them liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, quoted in the preceding note, and for that reason moved to dismiss the complaint.³ The district court granted defendants' motion without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint more specifically, albeit succinctly, stating his claim as follows:

"That the Defendants * * * are sued in their official and individual capacities as members of the Inquisition of Incompetency Committee.

"At all times mentioned herein, the Defendants were acting under the color of state statute * * *.

"That on the 21st day of August, 1965, Plaintiff was adjudged incompetent based on a petition filed in Jackson County Florida and was confined to Escambia General Hospital in Escambia County, Pensacola, Florida.

"That Florida Statutes 394.22(6) F.S.A. require the appointment of a committee and the Defendants herein were appointed to that committee; that said statute further requires each member of the committee to examine the person to be committed; that the Defendants herein did not comply with said statute, that is to say, that they did not within a reasonable time after notice of their appointment proceed to make such examination of said person as will enable them to ascertain thoroughly his mental and physical condition as of the time of the examination; that each of the Defendants signed their names to a report specifically stating that they had examined the Plaintiff as required by statute when in fact they had not.

"That the Plaintiff * * * was not appointed a guardian and therefore could not bring a civil action against any person or persons until after the year 1970 at which time his competency was restored; that the Statute of Limitations did not start running until after 1970.

"That the Defendants, through the above action, have caused the Plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America, particularly the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."

(Emphasis added.)⁴ Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as amended, again insisting that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,⁵ but this time claiming (1) that the plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) that the defendants acted in a quasi-judicial capacity and hence are immune from liability for damages. The district court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the amended complaint, this time with prejudice. In its order the district court stated that:

"this Court is of the view that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that the amended complaint must be dismissed. Mills v. Small, 446 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1971); Bartlett v. Weimer, 268 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1959).

"Recognizing that the bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense ordinarily raised and considered once defensive pleadings have been disposed of, this Court nonetheless further finds at this juncture that the statute of limitations would be a bar to maintenance of this action. Mills v. Small, supra." (R. 94.)

This appeal ensued.

Two issues are briefed and argued by the parties, viz.: (1) whether plaintiff's claim is barred by a statute of limitations, and (2) whether the defendants are immune from liability for damages. We hold with the defendants on limitations and do not reach the question of immunity vel non.⁶

Plaintiff's Claim Is Barred by Limitations

As the district judge observed, "* * * the bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense * * *." R. 94. See Rule 8(c), F.R. Civ.P. However, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P., for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the complaint.⁷

The present action was commenced by the filing of the original complaint on June 23, 1971 (R. 4). The complaint affirmatively alleged the date of August 21, 1965, as the time at which plaintiff was adjudged incompetent and confined to Escambia General Hospital. The time intervening between the two dates last mentioned is five years, ten months and two days. Apparently in an effort to justify such a long delay, the plaintiff averred in his amended complaint that no guardian was appointed for the plaintiff and he "* * * therefore could not bring a civil action against any person or persons until after the year 1970 at which time his competency was judicially restored; that the Statute of Limitations did not start running until after 1970." For reasons presently to be stated we conclude that, in taking that position, the plaintiff misapprehended the controlling principles of law.

Neither the plaintiff nor the defendants dispute the law as stated in plaintiff's brief at page 25:

"There is no federal statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 thus the applicable Florida statute is to be borrowed. O\'Sullivan v. Felix, 1914, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980; Beard v. Stephens (5th Cir., 1967) 372 F.2d 685. Cf. McGuire v. Baker (5th Cir., 1970) 421 F.2d 895."

The parties are also in agreement, and necessarily so, that the applicable Florida statute is not one providing limitations for the recovery of real property, but is either subsection (4), as claimed by the plaintiff, or subsection (5)(a), as claimed by the defendants, of Florida Statutes Annotated § 95.11. In pertinent part that statutes provides:

"Actions other than those for the recovery of real property can only be commenced as follows:

"* * *

"(4) Within four years.—Any action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter.

"(5) Within three years.—

"(a) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture."

Section 95.11 contains no provision suspending or tolling the limitation period because of disability arising from insanity or from any other cause. In Florida the only limitation statute suspended or tolled by insanity or other disability is that applicable to the recovery of real property. The pertinent part of that statute is quoted in the margin.⁸ That difference in the Florida limitation statutes resulted in a holding by the Supreme Court of Florida, that a plaintiff's disability by reason of insanity existing when his right of action for slander of title accrued could not toll the running of the statute of limitations, the court reasoning as follows:

"It is clear that his action was barred unless his insanity tolled the statute.

"The general rule is that unless a statute of limitations contains a saving clause, relief from its provisions on account of disability will not be granted. The statute in question contains an exception relative to recovery of real property but it does not help appellant who claims damages for slander of title. When the legislature refuses to write exceptions into the act the courts have consistently refused to do so. 34 American Jurisprudence, page 162, Section 201; Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, Fla., 56 So.2d 341. See also Faulk & Coleman v. Harper, Fla., 62 So.2d 62. In this holding we do not overlook appellant\'s contention that Section 95.20, F.S.A., authorizes this action. This statute has to do with actions for recovery of real property while the action here is based on tort and is not covered by the last-cited statute."

Carey v. Beyer, Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 217, 218.

The strictness with which limitation statutes are construed in Florida is illustrated by a recent case, Gasparro v. Horner, Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 4th Dist., 1971, 245 So.2d 901, in which, over a vigorous dissent, a Florida court held that the cause of action of a minor, who had been orphaned in an accident occurring more than four years prior to commencement of the action but who had been adopted approximately 21 months after the accident, accrued on the date of the accident rather than the date of the minor's adoption, and the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. On rehearing the majority said:

"As to whether the plaintiff\'s disability of infancy operated to toll or suspend the running of the Statute of Limitations 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions § 138 (1970) states:

"`While most courts give recognition to certain implied exceptions arising from necessity, it is now conceded that they will not, as a general rule, read into statutes of limitation an exception which has not been embodied therein, however reasonable such exception may seem and even though the exception would be an equitable one. The modern rule of construction in this respect is that unless some ground can be found in the statute for restraining or enlarging the meaning of its general words, it must receive a general construction, and the courts cannot arbitrarily subtract therefrom or add thereto. Undoubtedly a hardship will result in many cases under this rule, but the court may construe only the clear words of the statute, and if its scope is to be enlarged, the remedy should be legislative rather than judicial * * *.\'

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