White v. Raleigh Wyoming Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1933
• Docket Number: 7050.
• Citation: 168 S.E. 798,113 W.Va. 522
• Parties: WHITE v. RALEIGH WYOMING MIN. CO.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

168 S.E. 798

113 W.Va. 522

WHITE v. RALEIGH WYOMING MIN. CO.

No. 7050.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

March 28, 1933

Submitted February 7, 1933.

Syllabus by the Court.

Neither merits nor demerits of legislative scheme determine constitutionality of statute.

Assignment of contract may be prohibited by contracting parties.

Statute authorizing employer to issue nontransferable scrip redeemable in merchandise only by employee to whom issued but requiring employer on demand to pay employee cash for scrip, held not unconstitutional as curtailing rights of contract, limiting use of property, or coercing employees to purchase employer's merchandise (Acts 1927 c. 37).

1. "Neither the excellence nor the defects of a legislative scheme may be permitted to determine the constitutionality of a state statute." Chicago, etc., R. Co. v McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 31 S.Ct. 259, 55 L.Ed. 328.

2. The assignment of a contract may be prohibited by the contracting parties.

3. A legislative scheme (Acts 1927, c. 37) is lawful which authorizes an employer, upon the request of an employee, to issue nontransferable scrip redeemable in merchandise only by the employee to whom issued, but which requires the employer, upon demand, to pay the employee cash for the scrip or any unused portion thereof, at the succeeding pay day.

Error to Circuit Court, Wyoming County.

Action by C. L. White against the Raleigh Wyoming Mining Company. To review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the declaration, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Grover C. Worrell, of Charleston, for plaintiff in error.

Bailey & Shannon, of Pineville, for defendant in error.

Rummel, Blagg & Stone, of Charleston, for West Virginia Coal Ass'n as amicus curiæ.

HATCHER Judge.

This action was brought by the assignee of scrip stamped, "Not transferable," to recover of the obligor in money. The scrip was issued in 1930 under Acts 1927, c. 37, by an employer to his employees, in payment for labor performed. The circuit court sustained a demurrer to the declaration.

The act of 1927 provided that nontransferable scrip should be issued "upon the request of any employee"; that it should be "redeemable in merchandise only by the employee to whom issued"; and should be taken as a promise by the obligor to pay "to the employee to whom issued, in lawful money *** upon demand and surrender by said employee of such scrip or any unused portion thereof" at the regular pay day, etc.

The plaintiff contends that the statute is unconstitutional because (1) it coerces employees to purchase merchandise from their employer, and (2) it is a limitation on the use of property.

1. Since the scrip is issued only upon the request of the employee and the statute requires the employer to take up the scrip in cash at the regular pay day, we do not observe any coercion.

2. In support of plaintiff's second proposition, he submitted the following cases which held against limitation on the right to assign: Bewick Co. v. Hall, 94 Ga. 539, 21 S.E. 154; Thomassen v. De Goey, 133 Iowa 278, 110 N.W. 581, 119 Am.St.Rep. 605; Leader Co. v. Little Rock Co., 120 Ark. 221, 179 S.W. 358; Pond Creek Co. v. Lester, 171 Ky. 811, 188 S.W. 907; click here and State v. Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179, 10 S.E. 285, 287, 6 L.R.A. 621, 25 Am.St.Rep. 863. The Georgia and Iowa decisions were based squarely on statutes unlike ours, which opposed such limitation. The contract in the Arkansas case had "two repugnant provisions," one of which gave the right to assign, and the court adopted it. In the Kentucky case, the court simply did not approve of the statute. See page 817 of 171 Ky. 188 S.W. 907, 910. We have adopted the view that the policy of a statute is not our concern. State Road Com. v. County Court (W. Va.) 163 S.E. 815. We are not its apologist nor its critic. It is immaterial whether or not it meets with our approval provided it is a legitimate exercise of legislative power. "Neither the excellence nor the defects of a legislative scheme may be permitted to determine the constitutionality of a state statute." Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 31 S.Ct. 259, 55 L.Ed. 328. We are therefore impressed that plaintiff's cita tions from other courts are not relevant here.

In State v. Goodwill, this court did stress "the most sacred and inviolable" right of an individual to do as he pleased with his property (labor). That case was decided in 1889, and since then the growing complexity of our civilization has caused the courts generally to moderate their views on the detachment of the individual. In 1910, the Supreme Court of the United States said in Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. McGuire, supra: "There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." In Atkins v. Coal Co., 76 W.Va. 27, 29, 84 S.E. 906, 907, decided in 1915, this court abandoned definitely the attitude taken in State v. Goodwill, and approved the argument of Judge Lucas in State v. Peel Splint Co., 36 W.Va. 802, 15 S.E. 1000, 17 L.R.A. 385, saying: "The argument so well sustained by him need not now be restated or amplified. The trend of it is that the freedom of individual contract must yield to due legislative restraint whenever necessary to conserve the public health, safety, and morals and to promote the general welfare and peace of the community." In The Spirit of the Common Law, published in 1921, Dean Pound pointed out certain "noteworthy changes in the law in the present generation" which he said were "in the spirit of recent ethics, recent philosophy and recent political thought." One of the changes was "limitations upon freedom of contract." See pages 185, 186.

The Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law is one of our most reliable reference books though published nearly forty years ago. It states unequivocally, volume 2, p. 1035, "The parties to a contract may in terms prohibit its assignment, so that neither their personal representatives nor assignees can succeed to any rights in virtue of it." The same rule is recognized in such later authorities as Annotation (1903) 88 Am.St.Rep. 201; Annotation (1912) Ann.Cas. 1912A, ...