White v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.

• Citation: 114 Ind.App. 383,52 N.E.2d 500
• Decision Date: 19 January 1944
• Docket Number: No. 17204.,17204.
• Parties: WHITE v. REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

114 Ind.App. 383

52 N.E.2d 500

WHITE

v.REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION et al.

No. 17204.

Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc.

January 19, 1944.

Appeal from Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division.

Proceeding for unemployment compensation under the Employment Security Act by Franklin L. White, claimant, opposed by the Old Hickory Furniture Company, Martinsville, Ind., employer. From a decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division affirming the decision of a referee, who had affirmed a deputy's finding imposing the penalty provided by the act, Burns' Ann.St. § 52-1507(f) (1, 2), where an employee leaves work voluntarily without good cause, claimant appeals.

Affirmed.

Walter C. Reese, of Shelbyville, for appellant.

James A. Emmert, Atty. Gen., Frank Hamilton, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen., and Fred R. Bechdolt, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

ROYSE, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division imposing the penalty provided by § 7-(f), (1), (2), Indiana Employment Security Act, § 52-1507(f), (1), (2), Burns' 1933 (Supp.), which provides as follows:

“(f) Disqualification for Benefits. An individual shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights:

“(1) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause or has been discharged for misconduct in connection with his work, and for the three (3) next following weeks, in addition to the waiting period; Provided, however, That if such individual receives dismissal wages covering a period of time subsequent to such week the disqualification shall become effective at the end of such period.

“(2) If the division finds that being totally, partially or part-totally unemployed, and otherwise eligible for benefits, he has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the director or the deputy, or to accept suitable work when found for and offered to him by the director or the deputy or by an employing unit, or to return to his customary self-employment (if any) when so directed by the director or the deputy. Such ineligibility shall continue for the week in which such failure occurred and for the three (3) next following weeks in addition to the waiting period.

“In determining whether or not any such work is suitable for an individual, the division shall consider the degree of risk involved to such individual's health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training and experience, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence.

“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this act, no work shall be deemed suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this act to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (a) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute; (b) If the remuneration, hours or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (c) If as a condition of being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining a bona fide labor organization.

“In addition to the disqualifications set forth and provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this subsection, the total amount of benefits otherwise payable to any such individual so disqualified shall be reduced by an amount equal to six (6) times the weekly benefit amount of such individual.”

Appellant was employed as a band saw operator by appellee, The Old Hickory Furniture Company, Martinsville, Indiana, hereinafter referred to as “employer”, and quit said employment on June 11, 1942. Subsequently, on June 24, 1942, he filed his claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Pursuant to § 52-1508(b), Burns 1933 (Supp.), his claim was examined by a deputy who found that appellant left his work voluntarily without good cause and was subject to the penalty provided for in § 52-1507(f), (1), (2), supra. Within the time allowed, appellant requested in writing a hearing of his claim by a referee. In the application signed by appellant is the following statement of his contention: “Employer docked me a half hour for being one minute late. Docked me fifteen minutes on another occasion for being one minute late. Docked me fifteen minutes for forgetting to punch time clock. Took (9) nine hours overtime for being off sick. I am willing to return to work if said employer will pay me what he owes me”. The employer, in response to this application, filed the following answer: “Mr. White operated a band saw while he was here. We have no band sawer at the present time and can use one to good advantage. We know of no reason why Mr. White should refuse to work. Our records give his address as R. R. #1, Edinburg, Indiana”.

The referee, after hearing the evidence, affirmed the penalty provided in § 7(f), supra, imposed by the deputy. Within the time provided by § 8(k), § 52-1508(k), Burns' 1933 (Supp.), appellant appealed to the Review Board, which Board, at his request, heard additional evidence and thereafter affirmed the decision of the referee. Pursuant to § 8( l), § 52-1508( l), Burns' 1933 (Supp.), appellant appealed to this court and assigns as error here that the decision of the Review Board is contrary to law.

Appellant contends that the decision of the Review Board is...