White v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. B073248,B073248
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert A. WHITE, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 431

30 Cal.Rptr.2d 431

25 Cal.App.4th 442

Robert A. WHITE, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B073248.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

May 31, 1994.

Review Denied Aug. 18, 1994.

Swanson & Gieser and Robert G. Williamson, Jr., Santa Ana, for plaintiff and appellant.

Trecartin, Hines, Redd, Gonzales & Garmon and Kingsley Hines, Rosemead, for defendant and respondent.

GRIGNON, Acting Presiding Justice.

Plaintiff and appellant Robert A. White appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Southern California Edison Company (SCE). ¹ Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision which occurred at night in an intersection near an inoperative streetlight owned and maintained by SCE. We conclude SCE owed no duty to plaintiff to maintain the streetlight and affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Allegations of the Complaint

At approximately 8:40 p.m. on February 20, 1987, plaintiff was driving a moped westbound on Torrance Boulevard through the intersection of Torrance Boulevard and Main Street in the City of Carson. At the same time, Dennis MacLean was driving a van eastbound on Torrance Boulevard. At the intersection of Torrance Boulevard and Main Street, Maclean turned left in front of plaintiff and the two vehicles collided. As a result of the collision, plaintiff sustained severe personal injuries.

The intersection in which the collision occurred was in a dangerous condition because all the streetlights were not functioning adequately and did not sufficiently illuminate the intersection. As a result of the poor lighting, the ability of a vehicle entering the intersection to observe a vehicle in the intersection was diminished. The collision was proximately caused by the inadequate lighting. SCE was employed as an independent contractor by a public entity to maintain and repair the streetlights at the intersection in which the collision occurred. SCE was negligent in the maintenance and repair of the streetlights at the intersection.

Motion for Summary Judgment

SCE moved for summary judgment. The evidence in support of the motion indicated one streetlight on Torrance Boulevard approximately 132 feet east of the intersection of Torrance Boulevard and Main Street was inoperative at the time of the collision. The streetlight was owned and maintained by SCE pursuant to a master lighting agreement with the County of Los Angeles. SCE had received no report that the streetlight was inoperative prior to the collision.

SCE argued that it owed no contractual or common law duty as an electric utility to the motoring public to maintain the streetlight. SCE also argued that since the County of Los Angeles owed no duty to plaintiff to light the streets, SCE also owed no duty to plaintiff to maintain the lights.

Opposition to the Motion

Plaintiff opposed the motion. The evidence submitted in opposition indicated the single inoperable streetlight was located 132 feet east and 15 feet north of the intersection. ² It had been inoperable for at least several weeks before the collision. This streetlight was quite often inoperable and usually remained inoperable for a week to several weeks at a time.

The Judgment

The trial court found that SCE owed no duty to plaintiff to maintain the streetlight in an operable condition and granted the motion for summary judgment. A judgment was entered in favor of SCE from which plaintiff appeals.

DISCUSSION

The only issue presented in this case is whether SCE owed a duty to plaintiff to maintain the streetlight in an operable condition. The precise issue to be decided is: Does an electric utility company owe a duty to motorists injured in motor vehicle collisions caused in part by an inoperative streetlight which the utility has contracted to maintain? Plaintiff contends SCE owes a duty under Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a) to manage its property with ordinary care. Plaintiff argues no special exception exists for public utilities. Plaintiff also contends SCE owes a duty to maintain the streetlight under Public Utilities Code section 2106 and Streets and Highways Code sections 27, 941 and 1806.

"An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty...." (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207.) "Whether a 'duty' exists in a particular case is a question of law. 'Duty' is merely a conclusory expression used when the sum total of policy considerations lead a court to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387, 392-393, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 124.) Duty is an allocation of risk determined by balancing the foreseeability of harm, in light of all of the circumstances, against the burden to be imposed. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, at pp. 678-679, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207.) In determining the existence of duty, "the major [considerations] are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561.)

A public utility has a general duty to exercise reasonable care in the management of its personal and real property. (Civ.Code, § 1714; Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 655, 660-661, 262 P.2d 846.) A public utility may be liable to those persons injured as a result of its breach of this duty. (Ibid.) The following are examples of situations in which a public utility may be liable to injured persons. A public utility, which negligently places a power pole too close to the road, may be liable to the occupants of a motor vehicle injured when their vehicle collides with the pole. (Gerberich v. Southern Calif. Edison Co. (1935) 5 Cal.2d 46, 53 P.2d 948; George v. CityofLosAngeles(1938)11Cal.2d303,79P.2d723; Norton v. City of Pomona and Southern California Edison Co. (1935) 5 Cal.2d 54, 53 P.2d 952.) A public utility may also be liable to the heirs of a deceased construction worker electrocuted when a power pole, allowed to deteriorate to the breaking point, causes high voltage wires to come into contact with telephone wires. (Jackson v. Utica Light & Power Co. (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 885, 149 P.2d 748.) In addition, a public utility may be liable to the heirs of a deceased individual electrocuted while attempting to unscrew a lightbulb of a streetlight, which shone in his bedroom disturbing his sleep; the utility knew the deceased had been unscrewing the lightbulb and failed to take reasonable precautions. (Mark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 170, 101 Cal.Rptr. 908, 496 P.2d 1276.) Moreover, a public utility may be liable to an individual injured by a falling light standard. (Cf. Erde v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 565, 254 P.2d 110.) Further, a public utility may be liable to a plaintiff for failing to use due care in the installation of electric transformation facilities, where the plaintiff suffers injuries from electric shock while working near the facilities. (Monroe v. San Joaquin L. & P. Corp. (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 641, 109 P.2d 720.) Finally, an electric utility company owes a duty of care to anyone who may come into contact with its high power lines. (Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-396, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 124; Perrine v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 442, 448-449, 9 Cal.Rptr. 45; Pascoe v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 254, 257, 227 P.2d 555; Lozano v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 415, 420, 424, 161 P.2d 74; Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 232, 282 P.2d 69.)

An exception to the general duty rule applicable to a public utility exists, however, in the case of an interruption of service or a failure to provide service. In the absence of a contract between the utility and the consumer expressly providing for the furnishing of a service for a specific purpose, a public utility owes no duty to a person injured as a result of an interruption of service or a failure to provide service. (Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Water Co. (1911) 159 Cal. 305, 312-316, 113 P. 375; cf. Langley v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 41 Cal.2d 655, 262 P.2d 846.) The mere fact that the utility has contracted with the consumer to provide a service for general purposes, e.g., water or electricity, is not sufficient to create a duty. (Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Etc. Co., supra, 159 Cal. at p. 316, 113 P. 375; cf. Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Etc. Co. (1906) 150 Cal. 51, 87 P. 1093.) Nor does a duty arise where a public entity contracts with a public utility to furnish water to public hydrants for general fire purposes. (Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Imp. Co. (1904) 142 Cal. 173, 178, 75 P. 773.) The consumer is not a third party beneficiary of the contract between the public entity and the public utility. (Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 433, 441, 22 Cal.Rptr. 389.) For example, a water company generally owes no duty to a person, whose property is destroyed by fire, to supply water for the extinguishment of the fire. (Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra Costa Etc. Co., supra, 159 Cal. 305, 113 P. 375; Ukiah v. Ukiah Water and Imp. Co., supra, 142 Cal. 173, 75 P. 773; Luis v. Orcutt Town Water Co., supra, 204 Cal.App.2d at p. 440, 22 Cal.Rptr. 389; Stuart v....