White v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Company
| Citation | 103 N.W. 735,95 Minn. 77 |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,267 - (102) |
| Parties | HENRIETTA N. WHITE v. STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
June 16, 1905
Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $2,000 and interest upon an accident insurance policy issued to Lewis E Pixley, with loss, in case of his death, payable to plaintiff. The case was tried before Jaggard, J., who directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the sum demanded, upon the close of the testimony. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, defendant appealed. On rehearing, reversed and new trial granted.
Accident Insurance.
An accident insurance policy provided that the insurer should be liable for injuries or death caused solely by accidental means, and expressly exempted the insurer from liability if death resulted wholly or in part, directly or indirectly from any bodily disease or infirmity of the insured.
Disease Concurrent Cause.
The evidence in this case shows that at the time the policy was issued, and at the time of the insured's death, which was claimed to have been the proximate result of an accidental injury, he was affected with diabetes, and the evidence is conclusive that such disease directly co-operated with the injury in causing death. Held, that the insurer was not liable.
E. A. Prendergast and Cobb & Wheelwright, for appellant.
Henry W. Williams and Walter A. Shumaker, for respondent.
[2]
Action to recover upon an accident insurance policy, in which plaintiff had a verdict in the court below, and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial.
The facts are as follows: Lewis E. Pixley on December 6, 1900, made written application to defendant for an accident insurance policy, in which he appears to have represented to the company that he was not then suffering from any bodily disease or infirmity. He was in fact afflicted with diabetes, and so expressly informed the agent of defendant who solicited, and to whom the application was delivered. The agent stated to Pixley at the time the application was made that the fact that he was suffering from diabetes was unimportant, and he (the agent) failed to record the fact in the application. A policy was subsequently issued by the company upon the application so made, for which Pixley paid the premium demanded. Thereafter, on December 6, 1901, at the expiration of the period covered by the policy, defendant renewed the same, but without requiring a new application; the renewal policy being issued at the instance of Pixley and plaintiff, who was then the local agent of defendant, upon the daily report of the agent to whom the original application had been made. On October 26, 1902, during the life of the renewal policy, Pixley received an injury to one of his thumbs, as the result of an accident, and died within ten days thereafter. This action was brought by plaintiff, beneficiary in the policy, on the claim and contention that the injury to Pixley was the direct and proximate cause of his death, and that the policy covered a death so caused. At the trial in the court below, both parties requested an instructed verdict. Plaintiff's request was granted upon the theory that there were no issues for the jury to pass upon.
It is contended by defendant on this appeal that, on the undisputed evidence shown in the record, plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and that the court below should have directed a verdict in its favor. This contention is based upon two grounds: (1) False representations and statements alleged to have been made by Pixley in his application for insurance; and (2) that defendant is not liable under the policy because it appears conclusively that the death of Pixley was due in part to diabetes, a bodily infirmity existing when the policy was issued, and at the time of the accident and injury -- a condition from which the policy exempts defendant from liability.
The first point was decided adversely to defendant in the case of Whitney v. National Masonic Accident Assn., 57 Minn. 472, 59 N.W. 943. It appears in this case, as it appeared in that one, that, though the insured was afflicted with a bodily infirmity and disease at the time his application was made, he expressly informed the agent of the insurance company of the fact, and there is no intimation in the record of any fraud or attempted concealment of the information from the insurance company on the part of the insured. The company is therefore liable if the death of Pixley comes within the terms and conditions of the policy, and we pass to that question without further remark on the subject of alleged false or fraudulent statements.
The policy, among other things, provided as follows:
The Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co. * * * hereby insures Lewis E. Pixley * * * against loss of time resulting from bodily injuries caused solely * * * by external, violent and accidental means * * * (5) If death results solely from such injuries as the proximate cause thereof within ninety days, the said company will pay the principal sum of two thousand dollars to Henrietta N. White, his sister, if living * * * (8) This insurance does not cover disappearance * * * nor in event of accident or death * * * resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity, or disorder, or disease in any form.
While the rule is thoroughly settled that policies of this and like character are to be construed liberally, and that ambiguous provisions or those capable of two constructions should be construed favorably to the insured and most strongly against the insurer, plain, explicit language cannot be disregarded, nor an interpretation given the policy at variance with the clearly disclosed intent of the parties. Taking the policy in the case at bar by its four corners, it will admit of but one construction. It provides, in language quite plain, that the company insures against injury or death from accidental causes, except where death results "wholly or partly, directly or indirectly," from some bodily disease or infirmity. Similar policies have been before both the state and federal courts, and the consensus of judicial opinion is that, subject to the exceptions contained in the policy, if the injury be the proximate cause of death, the company is liable, but, if an injury and an existing bodily disease or infirmity concur and co-operate to that end, no liability exists. If, however, the injury be the cause of the infirmity or disease -- if the disease results and springs from the injury -- the company is liable, though both co-operate in causing death. The distinction made in this particular is found in that class of cases where the infirmity or disease existed in the insured at the time of the injury, and, on the other hand, that class of cases where the disease was caused and brought about by the injury. And even in cases where the insured is afflicted at the time of the accident with some bodily disease, if the accidental injury be of such a nature as to cause death solely and independently of the disease, liability exists. The rule of proximate cause, as applied to actions of negligence, cannot be applied in its full scope to contracts of this nature. 1 Cyc. 273.
But for the express reservation contained in this policy, the injury here complained of would, applying the ordinary rule of proximate cause, very properly be held the direct and...
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