White v. State

• Decision Date: 17 March 1894
• Citation: 25 S.W. 784
• Parties: WHITE v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

25 S.W. 784

WHITE v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 17, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Jefferson county; Stephen P. West, Judge.

Jim White was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

Douglass & Jackson, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was indicted for, and convicted of, the murder of Bob Ford. The killing occurred in the town of Beaumont. The punishment assessed was life imprisonment. Application for continuance was made for several witnesses, all of whom appeared at the trial except Becky Cole. By her it was expected to be proved "that one Pap Smith was in the town of Beaumont when Ford was injured." The diligence was wholly insufficient. The fact that Smith may or may not have been in the town of Beaumont on the night of the homicide is wholly immaterial, unless it was expected to connect him, directly or indirectly, with the homicide. The fact that he was in Beaumont, as stated, did not tend to exculpate defendant or inculpate Smith. Again, the statement that he was in the town of Beaumont on the particular night in question is too general and vague. "General statements will not suffice, nor will mere inferences or indefinite allegations. The facts expected to be proved should be stated definitely." Miller v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 609, 21 S. W. 925. If Smith was in the town of Beaumont, and that fact was known, he was certainly at some particular place. The witness knows something of his movements if she was cognizant of his presence. The application was properly overruled.

Defendant was indicted under the name of Jin White, whereas the copy of the indictment served upon him recited his name as Jim White. When arraigned, and after pleading to the indictment, he requested that he have two days' service of a "true certified copy of the indictment" as returned into court, the reason assigned being the variance in the name, as above stated. This came too late, after his arraignment and plea, and, besides, the variance was immaterial. Johnson v. State, 4 Tex. App. 268.

A bill of exceptions recites that defendant "offered to prove by Walter Delaney, the little son of William Delaney, whether he and his father, William Delaney, had ever talked to one another about threats testified to have been made in the ice house by Jim White to William Delaney in his (Walter Delaney's) presence, about one week before Bob Ford was hurt." Objections interposed by the state were sustained. The bill is too indefinite to be considered. It should have stated the evidence expected to be elicited from the witness, as well as the object or purpose of seeking it. Davis v. State, 14 Tex. App. 645; May v. State, 25 Tex. App. 115, 7 S. W. 588; Walker v. State, 19 Tex. App. 176; Counts v. State, Id. 450; Willson's Cr. St. §§ 2368, 2516.

About a week before the homicide, the witness Bender said to defendant, "I heard Bob Ford hollering at you," and defendant replied, "Yes; I will fix him yet." This evidence was objected to because immaterial and irrelevant. The objections were not well taken. The remark or reply of defendant was relevant to the questions of malice and motive.

Objections were sustained to certain questions asked defendant by his counsel while testifying in his own behalf, because the questions were leading. Whether this was or was not error is not necessary for us to consider, because, when put in another form, the questions were answered, and the matter of inquiry fully testified to by the witness. There was no error in this matter.

The contention that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury in regard to the law applicable to circumstantial evidence is without merit. The proof of the confessions of defendant relieved the court of the duty of so charging. Willson's Cr. St. § 2342; Wampler v. State, 28 Tex. App. 352, 13 S. W. 144. The exceptions reserved to isolated and detached excerpts from the court's charge are without merit, and any discussion thereof we deem wholly unnecessary.

Upon the trial, the state adduced evidence of defendant's confessions, made upon two different occasions. The defendant introduced proof to the effect that he was intoxicated when the second confession was made, and he himself stated that, if he made such confession, he had no recollection of it. His memory was rather distinct as to the circumstances...