White v. State
| Decision Date | 01 January 1854 |
| Citation | 11 Tex. 769 |
| Parties | WHITE v. THE STATE. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Where a person borrows a chattel, with the intention to convert and appropriate it to his own use, and afterwards converts it to his own use, the crime is larceny, not swindling, under the statute.
Where the prisoner's counsel asked the Judge, after he had given the charge, that if they had a reasonable doubt, they must acquit the prisoner, which the Judge refused, this Court said, This is, no doubt, the law, and it had been substantially given in the charge they, the jury, had received, when they were told that they must find according to the facts of the case; and the Judge could not be called upon to repeat the charge.
Where the defendant is charged with the larceny of a gun, which he had borrowed, on pretense of going a-hunting next day, and had not returned, it was held that evidence that he hired a horse next morning to go to a place near by, but went off in another direction, and sold the horse, was admissible to show the intention with which he had borrowed the gun.
To warrant a conviction on an indictment for larceny, where the prisoner borrowed the article charged to have been stolen, the conversion of the article to his own use, by the prisoner, must be proved; that he failed to return it, though supported by proof of a fraudulent intent, at the time of the borrowing, is not sufficient.
Appeal from Brazoria. There was proof that the defendant never returned the gun; that he sold the horse; and other circumstances showing an evil state of mind at the time. The defendant excepted to the admissibility of the evidence of these circumstances. The charge, asked by the defendant, respecting a reasonable doubt, was as follows:
A. P. Thompson, for appellant.
Attorney General, for appellee.
The appellant was indicted in Brazoria county for stealing a rifle gun, of the value of fifty dollars, the property of Davis; he was convicted of the offense charged, and sentenced to two years' hard labor in the penitentiary. There was a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and an appeal to this Court.
There are several grounds assigned for error, but the only material points to be considered, are, error in the charge of the Court upon the law, and the refusal to grant a new trial. The gun had been obtained by the prisoner, under the following circumstances, viz.: The prisoner applied to the prosecutor for the loan of his rifle gun to go a-hunting; the prosecutor supposed, the next day. Prisoner had frequently before borrowed it for the same purpose. Prosecutor delivered the gun to prisoner. On the next morning, prisoner procured a horse from a person in the same village, as he said, to ride down to Brazoria, to be returned the evening of the same day, or the next, if, as he said, he should get into a spree. He did not go to Brazoria, but went in an opposite direction, sold the horse and did not return at all, until he was brought back as a prisoner. The statement of facts does not show what was done with the gun; there is no proof that the prisoner had converted it to his own use. The Judge charged the jury, that if they believed from the evidence, that at the time the prisoner obtained possession of the gun, under the pretense of borrowing it, he intended to convert it to his own use, it was a felony, and they must find him guilty. But if such was not his intention, at the time he obtained the possession, the subsequent conversion did not make it felony.
In this kind of cases, the distinction between larceny and trespass has been in many cases so refined as to have led to much confusion, if not conflict of decision in England; and the leading cases have been commented on by Mr. East, in his Pleas of the Crown, and, more recently, the same cases have been reviewed, and the principles upon which the distinction is founded, more distinctly and clearly defined by Mr. Roscoe, in his Criminal Evidence. (Roscoe, Crim. Ev., p. 479 to 498, inclusive.) In England they have a statute, in its provisions not unlike our own, making it a misdemeanor to obtain goods by false tokens, or false pretenses. Our own statute is in the following words: “That whoever shall falsely and deceitfully obtain, or get into his possession, any money, goods, chattels, notes, or bank bills, by color and means of some false token, or under any false pretense whatever, on conviction thereof, shall be fined a sum not exceeding one thousand...
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Lewis v. State
...the statutes in regard to swindling and theft, and has been recognized by all the decisions in an unbroken line, commencing with White v. State, 11 Tex. 769. See, also, State v. Vickery, 19 Tex. 326; Cline v. State, 43 Tex. 494; Pitts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 122; Hudson v. State, 10 Tex. App.......
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King v. State
...has sufficiently instructed the jury as to the reasonable doubt, it is proper to refuse a special charge on the same subject (White v. State, 11 Tex. 769; Countee v. State, 33 S. W. 127). We think, the court having charged the language of the statute clearly and explicitly, it was not only ......
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Bink v. State
...the statutes in regard to swindling and theft, and has been recognized by all the decisions in an unbroken line, commencing with White v. State, 11 Tex. 769. See, also, State v. Vickery, 19 Tex. 326; Cline v. State, 43 Tex. 494; Pitts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 122; Hudson v. State, 10 Tex. App.......
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Brigham v. State
...possession and custody and not the title to his property, the offense is not swindling, but may be theft." Branch's P. C., § 2626; White v. State, 11 Tex. 769; Lewis v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 512, 171 S. W. 217, where authorities are collated. See, also, 26 C. J. And further, venue of such a......