White v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1887
• Citation: 5 S.W. 857
• Parties: WHITE v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

5 S.W. 857

WHITE v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

November 9, 1887.

Appeal from county court, Rains county; W. M. LAMB, Judge.

The opinion sufficiently discloses the case. The penalty assessed was a fine of $25, and 48 hours in jail.

E. W. Terhune, for appellant. Asst. Atty. Gen. Davidson, for the State.

WHITE, P. J.

Appellant was convicted upon an information based upon a complaint charging him and one Martin, jointly, with the theft of 150 pounds of stone coal of the value of 67½ cents. In the complaint it is alleged that the coal was the "property of the Mo. P. Rway Company," and that it was taken "from the possession of Burt Temple, who was holding the same for the said Mo. P. Ry. Company," "without the consent of the said Burt Temple and the said Mo. P. Ry. Company, or either of them, and with the intent to deprive the said Mo. P. Ry. Company of the value thereof," etc.

In the information the alleged owner is styled "the Mo. P. Ry. Company," and this is the name used throughout to designate the owner; a motion to quash, which was overruled, raised two objections to the information, in substance, (1) that there was a fatal variance between the allegations in the complaint and information, as to the name of the owner; and (2) that neither the complaint nor information describes the owner sufficiently, and that, if the letters used be sufficient to designate the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, as seems to have been intended, then the allegation is further defective and insufficient, in that it does not allege that said railway is a corporation duly incorporated.

As to the complaint, we think that its allegations are inconsistent, and repugnant in themselves. It alleges the ownership to be in "the Mo. P. Rway Company," but that the property was taken from, without the consent of, and with intent to deprive "the Mo. P. Ry. Company" of the value of the same. Now, do the letters, "Mo. P. Rway" and "Mo. P. Ry." designate the same company? It is extremely uncertain whether they do or not. If they do not, then the ownership is in a company whose want of consent to the taking is not alleged, and the want of consent, and intent to deprive, are made to apply to a party, or company, which did not own the property. To say the least of it, the pleading is vague and indefinite; and few better illustrations, perhaps, could be given of the importance and necessity of stating in full, without abbreviation, unless explained in connection therewith, the name of the company or corporation intended to be designated. If initials can be held sufficient, then, which of the two forms of initials set forth in the complaint shall we take as the true one? If we select "Mo. P. Rway" as the owner, then it is apparent that it does not correspond, and that there is a variance in letters between it and the "Mo. P. Ry.," alleged as owner in the information.

The matter may be solved by determining whether, in a criminal prosecution, the name of a company or corporation should be set out in full, and if a corporation, whether it be further essential that it be alleged that it was incorporated. We have no special criminal statute upon the subject. Our statute as to the allegation of the name of the defendant, or of any other person necessary to be stated in the indictment, evidently refers to individuals, and does not embrace companies or corporations. Code Crim. Proc. art. 425. In short, our Code of Procedure is silent, and having failed to supply us a rule, we are relegated to the common law, (Code Crim. Proc. art. 27,) and approved precedents.

Mr. Bishop says: "An indictment against a corporation properly describes it by its corporate name." And again: "The...