White v. State
| Decision Date | 18 September 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 30549,30549 |
| Parties | Alvin Luther WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Lewis Davis, Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Atty. Gen., Edwin K. Steers, Former Atty. Gen., David S. Wedding, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of inflicting physical injury while in the commission of robbery, pursuant to Burns' Indiana Statutes, Anno., § 10--4101, (1956 Repl.), which is, in part, as follows:
'* * * Whoever inflicts any wound or other physical injury upon any person with any firearm, dirk, stiletto, bludgeon, billy, club, blackjack, or any other deadly or dangerous weapon or instrument while engaged in the commission of a robbery, or while attempting to commit a robbery, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned in the state prison for life.'
He was tried by jury and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for life.
Appellant assigns as error the overruling of motion for new trial. Particular specifications raised in the motion for new trial are substantially as follows: (1) That the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law; (2) That the Court erred in permitting the State to impeach its own witness and to introduce into evidence an extrajudicial statement made by such witness; (3) That the Court erred in denying appellant the right to conduct an experiment with reference to certain wearing apparel during trial.
Appellant was accompanied by a confederate and entered the premises of an Indianapolis wholesale tobacco company. He was armed with a shotgun. The tobacco company was under the management of a man and his wife, both of whom were present when appellant and his confederate entered. The man attempted to resist and was struck on the head by either appellant or his confederate. The wife was then struck on the head. Her injuries were sufficiently serious that extensive brain surgery was necessary. Appellant and his confederate did not take any of the money from the business establishment, and both fled from there immediately after the attack. The two victims positively identified the appellant as one of their assailants. Further evidence indicated at the time the appellant and his confederate entered the offices of the tobacco company, the owners were in the process of counting their cash receipts, and had a stack of bills banded and wrapped which totalled about $3,000.00. Either the appellant or his confederate announced as they entered, in substance, 'This is a holdup.' Here we have complete proof of the corpus delicti of the crime of physical injury inflicted while in the commission of robbery. We also have two witnesses who positively identified the appellant as one of the individuals who participated in the robbery and the assault.
'* * * Under this assignment of error an appellate court will not weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence, if believed by the jury, to prove every material element of the crime, the verdict will not be disturbed on appeal.' Carlin v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 644, 184 N.E. 543. See also, Flowers v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185.
'* * * Although on appeal we will examine the evidence to see if it sustains the verdict, we cannot weigh the evidence, and after a conviction only the evidence most favorable to the state, and all reasonable and logical inferences that may be drawn therefrom, will be considered in determining whether the jury was warranted in returning a verdict of guilty.' Gilmore v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 359, 98 N.E.2d 677.
Under the doctrine announced in Carlin v. State, supra, and Flowers v. State, supra, there was evidence of probative value from which the jury might reasonably find a verdict of guilty and the jury was so warranted in returning such verdict in this case.
During the course of the trial, the appellant's confederate, one Robert Oscar Carter, was called to testify by the State. The prosecuting attorney propounded a question, asking Carter whether or not appellant was his partner in the crime covered by the affidavit. Carter answered that appellant was not, and said that he had previously lied when he made a signed statement given to the police. The State of Indiana then expressed to the Court its surprise by the testimony of Carter and asked for permission to proceed with Carter as a hostile witness. Appellant, by c...
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