White v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 24 June 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 15635,15635 |
| Citation | 281 S.W.2d 237 |
| Parties | Beulah Ratcliffe WHITE et al., Appellants, v. James O. TAYLOR, Independent Executor, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Bryce Swartfager, Santa Rosa, Cal., Coy U. Spawn, Jr., and Kelley & Ryan and C. O. Ryan, Houston, for appellant.
Benjamin L. Bird, Fort Worth, for appellee Executors, James O. Taylor and W. B. Todd.
Crowley, Wright, Miller & Garrett, Fort Worth, for appellees May Taylor Todd et vir, W. B. Todd (individually) and James O. Taylor (individually).
Tilley, Hyder & Law and Thos. H. Law, Fort Worth, for appellees Lonnie French Walker et vir, W. B. Todd, Jr., and minors Lucy Mildred Taylor, Evelyn May Taylor and Anna Mary Borglum.
Suit was brought in the district court by the executors of the wills of Edna Ratcliffe Taylor and Nearle Taylor Follett, mother and daughter, for a construction of the wills.
The question before this court is whether the estate of the daughter passed to the mother or whether it passed to certain contingent beneficiaries in the daughter's will. The trial court held that Mrs. Follett's property passed to the contingent beneficiaries named in her will, and appeal was taken by some of those persons who would take under Mrs. Taylor's will.
Paragraph four of Mrs. Follett's will read as follows: 'In the event that I die before the death of my mother, Mrs. Edna Ratcliffe Taylor, the balance of all of my property of every kind and character, both real and personal, of which I die possessed, remaining after the payment of my just debts, I hereby give and bequeath to my mother, Mrs Edna Ratcliffic Taylor, without limitation of any kind.'
Paragraph five provided: 'In the event that my mother, Mrs Edna Ratcliffe Taylor, dies before I die, or we die simultaneously, or we die under circumstances making it difficult to determine which of us died first, I make the following disposition of my property: * * *.'
On March 30, 1954, Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Follett were victims of an automobile accident. Mrs. Follett was pronounced dead upon arrival at a hospital at 3:45 P. M. Mrs. Taylor died at 4:56 P. M. She never regained consciousness from time of injury to time of death.
The trial court found that Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Follett died simultaneously within the meaning of the fifth section of Mrs. Follett's will.
It is the position of appellants that paragraph four of Mrs. Follett's will is clear, unambiguous and applicable to the undisputed facts, since the testatrix did die before the death of her mother; and that the testatrix and her mother did not die 'simultaneously' within the meaning of paragraph five.
The beneficiaries named in Mrs. Taylor's will who are appellants herein are not mentioned in Mrs. Follett's will. Beneficiaries named in Mrs. Follett's will, appellees herein, are a lifelong friend, two nieces and a nephew. The relationship between Mrs. Follett and those named in her will had always been unusually close. She was a widow with no children of her own. It is fair to say from the record she lavished her affection on her mother, her closest friend, the nieces and nephew.
If Mrs. Follett used the word 'simultaneously' in its strict sense in paragraph five, then her mother, although unconscious from the same accident and living not more than seventy-one minutes thereafter, acquired the entire estate of Mrs. Follett, and appellants acquired all of Mrs. Follett's estate through Mrs. Taylor's will.
We find no authority in point. Supporting, to some extent, the contention of the appellants are Rogers v. Mosier, 121 Okl. 213, 245 P. 36; American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N.E. 843; and Shippee v. Shippee, 122 N.J.Eq. 570, 195. A. 728. The cases of Hackensack Trust Co. v. Hackensack Hospital Association, 120 N.J.Eq. 14, 183 A. 723, and Cowley v. Knapp, 42 N.J.L. 297, lend some support to appellees' position. Because of the different fact situations and the questions involved in the above cases, we can consider them as persuasive only.
The word 'simultaneously' used in a strict sense means at precisely the same instant; but when used in a broader sense it means not at the same instant but at substantially the same time. 80 C.J.S., p. 1306.
In construing a will all of its provisions must be looked to for the purpose of ascertaining the real intention of the testator and if this can be ascertained from the language of the instrument, then any particular paragraph, which if considered alone might indicate a contrary intent, must yield to the intention manifested by the whole instrument. Darragh v. Barmore, Tex.Com.App., 242 S.W. 714; McMurray v. Stanley, 69 Tex. 227, 6 S.W. 412; McDow v. Lund, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 247, writ refused; Blocker v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 698, writ refused, n.r.e.
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White v. Taylor
...Follett passed as specified in Section Fifth of her will.' Judgment was rendered accordingly. The Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed. 281 S.W.2d 237. The question for this Court to determine is: Do the facts show that the mother and daughter died simultaneously, or under circumstances maki......
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From book covers to domain names: searching for the true meaning of the Cliffs Notes temporal test for parody.
...v. Middlebury Elec. Co., 80 Vt. 109, 119 (1907). See also Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Mosher, 48 Ariz. 552, 564 (1936); White v. Taylor, 281 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), rev'd 286 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1956). But cf. Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 375-77 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950......