White v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 08 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:21-cv-00581
• Parties: GLENDA WHITE, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY THOMPSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

GLENDA WHITE, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY THOMPSON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-00581

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

November 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 34]. For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff, Glenda White, filed a Complaint relating to injuries she sustained during an encounter with Jackson County police officers. [ECF No. 1].

Specifically, Ms. White alleges that on October 29, 2019, Deputy Roberts of the Jackson County Sheriff's Department responded to an emergency call at a residence in Jackson County, at which time he found Ms. White “in a distressed medical and/or psychiatric condition” and informed Ms. White's “friends/relatives that they could get a mental hygiene petition for [her].” Id. ¶ 6. Thirty minutes later, Deputy Roberts

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returned to the residence, arrested Ms. White for assaulting her boyfriend, and transported her to the Jackson County Sherriff's Office for processing. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. White contends that after she was processed, either Deputy Thompson or Deputy Williams attempted to move her from her chair to a holding cell and in the process “threw her to the floor and stomped [on] her clavicle,” thereby breaking her clavicle bone. Id. ¶ 8.

Initially, Ms. White's Complaint asserted a total of five claims against four defendants. On April 28, 2022, I dismissed all claims against Sheriff Boggs and the Jackson County Commission. [ECF No. 27, at 8]. I also dismissed Ms. White's Negligence and Monell and Supervisory Liability claims against Deputies Thompson and Williams. Id. at 9. Accordingly, only Ms. White's claims of Battery (Count II), Outrageous Conduct/Intentional Infliction (Count III), and Excessive Force and Illegal Seizure (Count IV) remain pending against Deputies Thompson and Williams. Id.

On September 12, 2022, Deputies Thompson and Williams filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on the remaining claims. [ECF No. 34]. Ms. White filed a Response on September 26, 2022, [ECF No. 36],^[1] and Defendants replied on October 3, 2022, [ECF No. 37]. The motion is now ripe for decision.

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II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where the “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews all the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). The court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the necessary showing, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-52. Likewise, conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the

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granting of a summary judgment motion. See Dashv. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013); Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1997).

III. Discussion

A. Federal Law Claims

Count IV appears to assert several federal constitutional claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including excessive force, illegal arrest, and deprivation of medical treatment. I will address each claim individually.

1. Excessive Force

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The determination of whether a state official receives the benefit of qualified immunity is a two-step process. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court must decide (1) whether there was a constitutional violation, and (2) whether the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. at 232. Whether a right is clearly established is a question of law, while a genuine question of material fact regarding whether the conduct actually occurred “must be reserved for trial.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). A right is clearly established if “every ‘reasonable official would [understand] that what he is

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doing violates that right.'” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

“It is clearly established that the Fourth Amendment confers upon individuals a constitutional right to be free from excessive force during the course of an arrest.” Weigle v. Pifer, 139 F.Supp.3d 760, 769 (S.D. W.Va. 2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). Excessive force occurs when an officer uses more force than is objectively reasonable in the situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. To determine whether a use of force was objectively reasonable, the court must balance “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)). The inquiry is a fact specific one, analyzing factors including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. The seriousness of a plaintiff's injuries is also relevant. See Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). In this case, whether or not qualified immunity shields Deputies Williams and Thompson from § 1983 liability depends upon whether or not the force employed against Ms. White was excessive.

a. Deputy Williams

Here, the parties agree that Deputy Williams did not use excessive force against Ms. White. Indeed, Ms. White admitted in her deposition that she did not

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“think [Deputy] Williams had anything to do with [the incident]” and that she did not know why he was a party to this lawsuit. [ECF No. 34-1 (“White Dep.”) 55:1-2, 1420].^[2] Because no constitutional violation for use of excessive force occurred, Deputy Williams is entitled to qualified immunity. His Motion for Summary Judgment as to Ms. White's excessive force claim is GRANTED.

b. Deputy Thompson

With respect to Deputy Thompson's conduct, the parties offer materially different accounts of the incident resulting in Ms. White's injuries. Deputy Thompson states that after Ms. White had been processed, Deputy Williams attempted to lead her to a holding cell, at which time Ms. White became combative. [ECF No. 34-3, ¶¶ 7-9]. Deputy Thompson alleges that after Ms. White scratched Deputy Williams's face, he approached Ms. White from behind and grabbed her around the shoulder area to separate her from Deputy Williams. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Deputy Thompson states that his attempt to pull Ms. White away from Deputy Williams caused himself, Ms. White, and Deputy Williams to fall to the ground. Id. ¶ 11. He states that Ms. White fell on her shoulder and that he fell on top of her. Id. Deputy Thompson further asserts that “[a]t no[] time did [he] throw, trip, or stomp on Ms. White's person” and that he “was not intending to engage in a use of force against Ms. White.” Id. ¶ 12. Deputy Williams offers a similar version of events, stating that “[w]hile [he] was attempting to restrain Ms. White, Deputy Thompson came from behind, grabbed both

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[Deputy Williams] and Ms. White,” and caused them to “all [fall] to the ground.” [ECF No. 34-2, ¶ 11].

In Ms. White's deposition, she affirmatively states that “[she] remember[s] [Deputy Thompson] tripping [her] or throwing [her] down on the ground and [her] head bouncing off the floor.” White Dep. 55:3-5, 56:1-3 (“I remember my head bouncing off the floor and then his foot being there and him having a hold of my arm.”). Ms. White also states that once she was on the ground Deputy Thompson was standing over her with his foot on her injured shoulder. White Dep. 62:2-12 (“Q. [Deputy] Thompson had his foot on your right shoulder - your injured shoulder? A. Yes.”); 63:2-15. Yet, at other points in the same deposition, Ms. White speculates as to the events leading to her injuries. E.g., White Dep. 59:6-11 (“[Deputy Thompson] either tripped me or threw me down. I don't really know. Because I was on the floor, and his foot was in my shoulder right there. And he had a hold of my hand somehow or another . . . stretched up.”); 89:8-14, 18-19 (Q. “Did he stomp your shoulder, or did he just push up against it until you had the injury? A. You know, I don't know. I thought that I was stomped. But it seems like I remember him having a hold of my arm stretched out, but I don't know.... I don't know. It's just like bits and pieces.”); 93:12-15 (“Q. Do you have a specific memory of him grabbing you? A. I...