White v. Towers

• Decision Date: 04 September 1951
• Citation: 28 A.L.R.2d 636,37 Cal.2d 727,235 P.2d 209
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 28 A.L.R.2d 636 WHITE v. TOWERS. L. A. 21804.

Page 209

235 P.2d 209

37 Cal.2d 727, 28 A.L.R.2d 636

WHITE v. TOWERS.

L. A. 21804.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Sept. 4, 1951.

Joseph K. Coady, Bellflower, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Bayard Rhone and Norman Sokolow, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

SPENCE, Justice.

In this action for damages for alleged malicious prosecution, plaintiff has appealed from the judgment entered in favor of defendant following an order sustaining defendant's demurrer without leave to amend.

According to the allegations of the complaint, defendant maliciously and without probable cause procured the institution of two criminal proceedings against plaintiff. In both proceedings the charges were based upon events which allegedly occurred on October 3, 1948. The first proceeding, filed in the Municipal Court of the City of Long Beach on October 5, 1948, charged plaintiff with having violated section 481 of the Fish and Game Code, in that he had deposited certain petroleum matter, deleterious to fish and plant life, in the waters of the state of California. On October 28, 1948, that proceeding was dismissed. On April 29, 1949, defendant, by sworn affidavit, caused a second proceeding to be instituted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, charging plaintiff with violation of section 407 of 33 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (pollution of navigable waters). On July 19, 1949, plaintiff was acquitted in the second proceeding.

In the present action, it appears that the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer without leave to amend because it affirmatively appeared in an affidavit, attached to and incorporated by reference in the complaint, that defendant was an investigator for the State Fish and Game Commission. It was not alleged that defendant had acted without the scope of his authority; and the trial court concluded that as such investigator acting within the scope of his authority, defendant was immune from civil liability for alleged malicious prosecution. Thus, the main issue presented is whether defendant Towers, as an investigator for the State Fish and Game Commission, is immune from civil liability for the alleged malicious prosecution of said criminal proceedings.

Plaintiff contends first, that the doctrine of immunity from civil liability is not available to defendant with respect to either prosecution because defendant is at best a peace officer; and second, that in any event said doctrine has no application to the proceeding in the federal court as defendant was acting without the scope of his authority in instituting a proceeding in that court. We have concluded, however, that plaintiff's contentions cannot be sustained.

In support of his first contention, plaintiff cites and relies upon certain language found in Prentice v. Bertken 50 Cal.App.2d 344, 349, 123 P.2d 96, but, as hereinafter indicated, we believe that sound reasons of public policy require that a peace officer, or other comparable official, be shielded by the cloak of immunity from civil liability for alleged malicious prosecution. At the outset, we are faced with an apparent conflict between the public policy of protecting individual citizens from oppressive official action and the equally well established policy of promoting the fearless and effective administration of the law for the whole people by protecting public officers from vindictive and retaliatory damage suits. However, we feel that both policies may at once be subserved by refusing to permit civil actions against the officer for alleged malicious prosecution and remanding the offended individual to his remedy under the penal statutes. E. g. Pen.Code, § 170.

When the duty to investigate crime and to institute criminal proceedings is lodged with any public officer, it is for the best interests of the community as a whole that he be protected from harassment in the performance of that duty. The efficient functioning of our system of law enforcement is dependent largely upon the investigation of crime and the accusation of offenders by properly trained officers. A breakdown of this system at the investigative or accusatory level would wreak untold harm. 'Criminal law does not enforce itself. It demands the assistance of valid evidence and fearless officials to put it in execution. Because of their tendency to obstruct the administration of justice, it is the policy of the law to discourage actions for malicious prosecution.' Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 641, 669, 222 P. 318, 228 P. 135, 141, 34 A.L.R. 1489. It is patent that defendant Towers is a law enforcement officer, charged with the duty of enforcing laws for the protection of fish and game. As such officer he is entitled to the immunity from civil liability with which the law surrounds officials directly connected with the judicial processes. To rule otherwise would place every honest law enforcement officer under an unbearable handicap and would redound to the detriment of the body politic. 'The public welfare requires that this choice (whether or not to institute proceedings) shall be free of all fear of personal liability. To assure this freedom of action it is deemed best to make that assurance positive and definite by securing him against even actions based upon a malicious abuse of his official power.' Phelps v. Dawson, 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 339, 340, 116 A.L.R. 1343.

We are not impressed with the argument that to extend such immunity to peace officers is a major step toward 'statism.' Such argument erroneously assumes that our law enforcement agencies are rife with persons who will abuse their powers, and that the imposition upon law enforcement officers of civil liability for alleged malicious prosecution is necessary to curb such abuse. But as has been said with respect to public prosecutors: 'There is no great danger that abuse of power will be fostered by this exemption from civil liability, for the (peace officer) is at all times under the wholesome restraint imposed by the risk of being called to account criminally for official misconduct, or of being ousted from office on that account.' Smith v. Parman, 101 Kan. 115, 117, 165 P. 663, L.R.A.1917F, 698.

We are aware of the fact that in thus surrounding peace officers with immunity in cases of this sort, hardship may result to some individuals. However, experience has shown that the common good is best served by permitting law enforcement officers to perform their assigned tasks without fear of being called to account in a civil action for alleged malicious prosecution. The doctrine of immunity from liability for allegedly malicious acts has long been established with respect to numerous public officers. In the early case of Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646, the doctrine was applied to judges of courts of record. 'This rule finds its genesis in the necessary protection of courts in the impartial, uninfluenced discharge of judicial duties.' Phelps v. Dawson, supra, 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 339, 340, 116 A.L.R. 1343. Since that time it has been recognized that the orderly administration of the affairs of government necessitates the inclusion of many officials within the cloak of immunity. Executive heads of administrative departments have been included, Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 16 S.Ct. 631, 40 L.Ed. 780; Gibson v. Reynolds, 8 Cir., 172 F.2d 95; Adams v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 8 Cir., 107 F.2d 139; Lang v. Wood, 67 App.D.C. 287, 92 F.2d 211; Brown v. Rudolph, 58 App.D.C., 116, 25 F.2d 540, certiorari denied 277 U.S. 605, 48 S.Ct. 601, 72 L.Ed. 1011; Mellon v. Brewer, 57 App.D.C. 126, 18 F.2d 168, 53 A.L.R. 1519, cetiorari denied 275 U.S. 530, 48 S.Ct. 28, 72 L.Ed. 409; U. S. to the Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 63 App.D.C. 65, 68, 69 F.2d 383; Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413; Thibodaux v. Town of Thibodaux, 46 La.Ann. 1528, 16 So. 450, as well as their deputies, who act in their stead. Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 63 App.D.C. 339, 72 F.2d 557, certiorari denied 293 U.S. 605, 55 S.Ct. 124, 79 L.Ed. 696; De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App.D.C. 167, 5 L.R.A., N.S., 163; U.S. to the Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, supra, 63 App.D.C. 65, 68, 69 F.2d 383.

The last cited cases, however indicative of the trend of judicial decision, do not furnish the persuasive reason for holding that the doctrine extends to peace officers. Rather, it is the lien of cases which directly concerns the application of the doctrine to those connected with the judicial processes which is determinative herein. Thus, it has been held almost universally that public prosecutors are entitled to immunity. Norton v. Hoffmann, 34 Cal.App.2d 189, 93 P.2d 250; White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.App.2d 307, 313, 73 P.2d 254; Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 44 P.2d 592; Laughlin v. Rosenman, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 164, 163 F.2d 838; Laughlin v. Garnett, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 194, 138 F.2d 931; Cooper v. O'Connor, 69 App.D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135, 118 A.L.R. 1440; Yaselli v. Goff, 2 Cir., 12 F.2d 396, 56 A.L.R. 1239; Anderson v. Rohrer, D.C., 3 F.Supp. 367; Smith v. Parman, supra, 101 Kan. 115, 165 P. 663; Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001. But see Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Hawaii 362. Similarly, grand jurors were early held to be protected against civil actions for alleged malicious prosecution. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65. A review of the cases which have concerned the application of the doctrine to law enforcement officers shows that the great majority of the courts have ruled in favor of the officers. Thus, in White v. Brinkman, supra, 23 Cal.App.2d 307, 73 P.2d 254, it was said that a building inspector, charged with the investigation of purported violations of building ordinances, was immune from civil liability for alleged malicious prosecution. Similarly, in Phelps v. Dawson, supra, 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 339, it was held that a deputy fire marshal, charged with investigating fires, was immune; and in Springfield v. Carter, 8 Cir., ...