White v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2007-5126.,2007-5126.
• Citation: 543 F.3d 1330
• Parties: Eva P. WHITE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Christine H. Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

543 F.3d 1330

Eva P. WHITE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Christine H. Roberts, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2007-5126.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

October 1, 2008.

Rachel M. Pierce, Phelps Dunbar LLP, of Tupelo, MS, argued for plaintiff-appellee. With her on the brief was William M. Beasley.

Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant. With her on the brief were Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson, Director; Stephen J. Gillingham, Assistant Director; and Allison Kidd-Miller, Trial Attorney. Of counsel on the brief were Rafael A. Madan, General Counsel; and Jason P. Cooley, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Office of Justice Programs, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.

Before NEWMAN, PROST, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PROST.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

The United States appeals the final judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims holding that the subsequent death of an otherwise eligible beneficiary before the government issues payment does not relieve the government of its obligation to pay benefits under the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act (PSOBA), 42 U.S.C. § 3796, et seq. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Harold Ray Presley, a sheriff of Lee County, Mississippi, was fatally shot by a suspect during a police chase in July 2001. At the time of his death, Sheriff Presley was survived by his three adult children and his mother, Christine H. Roberts.¹ Ms. Roberts filed a claim for death benefits under PSOBA with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (Bureau), but passed away a few months later in September 2001.

In December 2002, the PSOB Office issued its initial determination denying death benefits to Ms. Roberts' estate upon the grounds that (1) Ms. Roberts had not successfully filed a claim before she died, and (2) even if she had filed a claim, Ms. Roberts' death precluded payment of the benefit. This initial determination was affirmed by the Bureau hearing officer on appeal.

In response to the estate's subsequent request for review by the Director of the Bureau, the Bureau issued its final decision in February 2005 denying the estate's claim for a death benefit. The Bureau determined that Ms. Roberts had not filed a claim for benefits, construing 28 C.F.R. § 32.19(a) as precluding an estate of a beneficiary from executing a claim. It additionally observed that, even if Ms. Roberts had properly filed a claim during her lifetime, benefits were not payable to her estate based on the unambiguous statutory language of § 3796. The Bureau concluded that issuing death benefit payments to Ms. Roberts' estate would not further the purpose of the statute, which it argued is "to provide a measure of economic security for beneficiaries." Final Agency Decision, PSOB Claim No.2001-192 at 7 (Feb. 17, 2005) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 32.22(g)).

Ms. Roberts' estate appealed to the Court of Federal Claims. On motion for judgment on the administrative record, the trial court reversed the Bureau's final determination and awarded the statutory amount of $250,000 under the PSOBA. The trial court first determined that Ms. Roberts had met all the relevant requirements and filed a timely claim for benefits during her lifetime. The trial court next determined that when a beneficiary is otherwise eligible at the time of the public safety officer's death, the beneficiary's subsequent death does not terminate her eligibility for benefits. The trial court reasoned that the implementing regulations contained in 28 C.F.R. § 32 do not terminate eligibility upon death and concluded that the only possible reading of "surviving parent" contained in 28 C.F.R. § 32.10 is that the parent must survive the officer's death, not some future time in the application process. In other words, eligibility is determined at the time of the public safety officer's death, and not at some arbitrary time years later when the agency has reviewed the claim, determined eligibility, issued payment, and the beneficiary has actually received payment.

The government appeals, and we have jurisdiction to review the final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

I.

The PSOBA provides for a one-time payment of cash benefits to certain classes of survivors of public safety officers who die in the line of duty. 42 U.S.C. § 3796. In reviewing an administrative denial of a benefit under the PSOBA, the court is limited to deciding: (1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory requirements and provisions of implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action by the government officials involved; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508, 511 (Fed.Cir.1995). On appeal, we review the judgment of the court de novo, applying the same deferential standards anew. Greeley v. United States, 50 F.3d 1009, 1010-11 (Fed.Cir.1995).

When the court is "confronted with a challenge to an agency's interpretation of a term of a statute it has been charged with administering, th[e] court engages in the familiar two-step analytical process articulated in Chevron." Hawkins v. United States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). According to Chevron:

When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.

467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. We are mindful that, in our role as a reviewing court, we must defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute if the statute is ambiguous or contains a gap that Congress has left for the agency to fill through regulation. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1154, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) ("[W]hen an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations."). However, if we determine that the statute is unambiguous on the precise question at issue, we do not defer to the agency's interpretation, regardless of whether that interpretation is grounded in a reasonable policy choice. Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1275, 1277 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986, 125 S.Ct. 2688, 162 L.Ed.2d 820 (2005)).

As for regulatory interpretation, an agency's interpretation of its own rule or regulation is entitled to "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). If, however, an agency regulation is beyond the scope of ambiguity in the statute, it is not entitled to deference. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 284, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778).

We also acknowledge that this court has previously found that the Bureau's interpretations of the PSOBA have the force of law and are thus entitled to deference under the rubric of Chevron. Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir.2007).

II.

The PSOBA subsection at issue in this case, 42 U.S.C. § 3796(a), lists the order of precedence for issuing PSOBA death benefits and reads as follows:

(a) Amount; recipients

In any case in which the Bureau of Justice Assistance (hereinafter in this subchapter referred to as the "Bureau") determines, under regulations issued pursuant to this subchapter, that a public safety officer has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty, the Bureau shall pay a benefit of $100,000,² adjusted in accordance with subsection (h) of this section, as follows:

(1) if there is no surviving child of such officer, to the surviving spouse of such officer;

(2) if there is a surviving child or children and a surviving spouse, one-half to the surviving child or children of such officer in equal shares and one-half to the surviving spouse;

(3) if there is no surviving spouse, to the child or children of such officer in equal shares; or

(4) if none of the above, to the parent or parents of such officer in equal shares.

The issue that we must decide is whether the statutory language of the PSOBA allows the Bureau to require a beneficiary to remain alive until payment is made in order to be eligible for benefits. Section 3796(a) uses the word "surviving" seven separate times when referencing the potentially eligible beneficiaries.³ We note, however, that the portion of § 3796(a) which pertains to the parent or parents is not preceded by the word "surviving." The pertinent agency regulation, which nearly parrots the statute, adds the word "surviving" before "parent" and "parents":

(a) When the Bureau had determined that a death benefit may be paid according to the provisions of this subpart, a...