Greeley v. U.S., 94-5121

• Citation: 50 F.3d 1009
• Decision Date: 15 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-5121,94-5121
• Parties: Alma E. GREELEY, Executrix of the Estate of Plaintiff, Lawrence E. Greeley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Page 1009

50 F.3d 1009

Alma E. GREELEY, Executrix of the Estate of Plaintiff Lawrence E. Greeley, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-5121.

United States Court of Appeals Federal Circuit.

March 15, 1995.

Peter W. Dicce, Beatty, Young, Otis & Lincke, Media, PA, argued for plaintiff-appellee.

Thomas Parker McLish, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Asst. Atty. Gen., David M. Cohen, Director and Anthony H. Anikeeff, Asst. Director.

Before ARCHER, Chief Judge, LOURIE, and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.

ARCHER, Chief Judge.

The United States appeals the March 30, 1994 judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims, as set forth in the May 17, 1994 opinion in Greeley v. United States, 30 Fed.Cl. 721 (1994), reversing the denial by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) of the claim of Alma E. Greeley (Greeley), Executrix of the Estate of Fire Chief Lawrence E. Greeley (Chief Greeley), for $100,000 in survivor benefits pursuant to the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act (PSOBA or Act). We reverse.

I.

Chief Greeley and another fire fighter had just extinguished a fire in the basement of a building when Chief Greeley complained of chest pains. After being taken to a nearby hospital, he died in the emergency room. An autopsy showed that the cause of death was "cardiac arrhythmia and/or arrest."

Greeley applied to the BJA for survivor benefits pursuant to the PSOBA. In denying the claim, the BJA claims officer found that Chief Greeley's "death was caused by a cardiac arrhythmia due to atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease." The claims officer further stated: "[A] public safety officer's death which results from a chronic, congenital, or progressive disease or other condition of the body is not covered by the Act, unless a traumatic injury was a substantial factor in the death."

Greeley requested reconsideration. After reviewing additional written documentation from both parties, a BJA hearing officer again determined that Greeley was not entitled to survivor benefits because of lack of evidence of a traumatic injury. The hearing officer explained:

The only argument to be made on this [question of a traumatic injury] would seem to be the possibility that oxygen provided during resuscitation efforts [by pure oxygen therapy] would have displaced carbon monoxide in Captain Greeley's blood if it were present. This argument cannot be proven, is entirely speculative, and thus does not constitute a reasonable doubt in the opinion of this Hearing Officer.

Greeley then filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, asserting that the BJA failed to demonstrate that Chief Greeley died as a result of heart disease as opposed to some traumatic injury related to the fire. She also argued that the BJA erroneously determined that Chief Greeley had worn a breathing apparatus when he entered the smoke-filled building. Based on the reports of Greeley's medical experts, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the record did not support the BJA's finding that Chief Greeley had died as a result of heart disease. In the absence of a discernable cause of death, the court determined that he must have died as a result of the environmental conditions encountered at the fire. The court found: "Chief Greeley's death was caused by climatic conditions which resulted from the smoky fire he was helping to extinguish." As for the lack of evidence of smoke inhalation in the autopsy report, the court determined that "the absence of carbon monoxide in Chief Greeley's blood gas drawn at the hospital was the result of any such traces having been flushed ... by the pure oxygen therapy."

II.

The Court of Federal Claims has limited authority to review the administrative decision of the BJA. Chacon v. United States, 48 F.3d 508 (Fed.Cir.1995). Such review is limited to determining "(1) whether there has been substantial compliance with statutory and implementing regulations; (2) whether there has been any arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the Government officials involved; and (3) whether there was substantial evidence supporting the decision." Morrow v. United States, 227 Ct.Cl. 290, 296, 647 F.2d 1099, 1102, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct. 475, 70 L.Ed.2d 247 (1981). In reviewing the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, which we do de novo, we apply this deferential standard anew. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1991); cf. Hines v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1524 (Fed.Cir.1991).

The PSOBA, Pub.L. No. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3796 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), provides for the payment of a $100,000 benefit to a public safety officer who has died as the "direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3796(a). The government does not contest that Chief Greeley was a public safety officer or that his death occurred in the line of duty.

The BJA by regulation has defined a "personal injury" to mean "any traumatic injury, as well as diseases which are caused by or result from such an injury, but not occupational diseases." 28 C.F.R. Sec. 32.2(e) (1994). "Traumatic injury," in turn, is defined as follows:

Traumatic injury means a wound or a condition of the body caused by external force, including injuries inflicted by bullets, explosives, sharp instruments, blunt objects or other physical blows, chemicals, electricity, climatic conditions, infectious diseases, radiation, and bacteria, but excluding stress and strain.

Id. Sec. 32.2(g).

The government argues that the resolution of this appeal depends on whether the claimant has shown that Chief Greeley died of a traumatic injury. By contrast, Greeley contends that the issue on appeal is whether the BJA has proven that Chief Greeley died as a result of heart disease.

III.

A claimant has the burden of showing a traumatic injury for entitlement to survivor benefits under the Act. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 32.21(b) ("The claimant's failure to submit evidence on a material issue or fact as requested by the Bureau...