White v. United States

Decision Date31 October 2022
Docket Number5:20-cv-00141-KDB,5:19-cr-00033-KDB-DCK-1
PartiesANTONIO CARNELL WHITE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
ORDER

Kenneth D. Bell, United States District Judge

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(B)(1), (3) (4), and (6). [CV Doc. 15].[1]

I. BACKGROUND

On August 2, 2018, a search warrant was executed at Petitioner Antonio Carnell White's home in Hickory, North Carolina. [CR Doc. 18 at ¶ 14: Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)]. Petitioner was in the driver's seat of a car on the property when the warrant was executed. The officers found several controlled substances in the seat beside Petitioner, including crystal methamphetamine, cocaine base cocaine, and suspected Xanax pills, and a stolen firearm under the driver's seat. [Id. at ¶¶ 15-17]. Officers also found a total of 19 firearms in the house, which Petitioner shared with his father. [Id. at ¶ 18]. Petitioner admitted to possessing more than eight (8), but fewer than 24, firearms; to possessing a firearm in connection with a felony controlled substance offense; that the firearms were manufactured outside the State of North Carolina and both traveled in or affected interstate commerce before being seized on August 2, 2018; and that Petitioner was previously convicted of a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year and prohibited from possessing any firearms. [Id. at ¶¶ 17, 20; CR Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 2-5: Factual Basis].

Between the ages of 16 and 28, Petitioner received numerous convictions in North Carolina state court. [CR Doc. 18 at ¶¶ 39-57; see also, id. at ¶¶ 62-76]. For many of these convictions, Petitioner received suspended prison sentences. For some, Petitioner received a suspended sentence that was later activated after a probation violation. For instance, in 2015, Petitioner was convicted of felony cocaine possession and possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and sentenced to six (6) to 17 months' imprisonment, suspended, with 24 months supervised probation. [Id. at ¶¶ 51]. In 2017, this sentence was activated when Petitioner's probation was revoked on additional drug charges, including possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana and felony possession of schedule II controlled substances. [Id. at ¶¶ 51-52]. These charges were consolidated for judgment and Petitioner was sentenced to a term of eight (8) to 19 months' imprisonment. [Id. at ¶ 52].

On April 17, 2019, a grand jury indicted Petitioner and charged him with one count of being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count One); one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count Two); and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Three). [CR Doc. 1: Bill of Indictment].

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Count One, being a felon-in-possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the Government agreed to dismiss Counts Two and Three. [CR Doc. 10 at ¶¶ 1-2: Plea Agreement]. In the plea agreement, Petitioner stipulated to the factual basis. [Id. at ¶ 11]. It provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

1. On August 2, 2018, in Catawba County in the Western District of North Carolina, [Petitioner] knowingly and intentionally possessed a Smith & Wesson Bodyguard .380 semiautomatic pistol bearing serial number KBH5163 and a BRNO Model 52 7.62 caliber semi-automatic pistol bearing serial number E17228 (“FIREARMS”).
2. In total, [Petitioner] possessed more than eight, but less than twenty-four, firearms on August 2, 2018.
3. The FIREARMS were manufactured outside the State of North Carolina and both traveled in or affected interstate or foreign commerce before being seized from [Petitioner] by law enforcement on August 2, 2018.
4. On August 2, 2018, [Petitioner] was prohibited by federal law from possessing any firearms. [Petitioner] was previously convicted of a felony criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
5. On August 2, 2018, [Petitioner] possessed the FIREARMS in connection with a felony controlled substance offense.

[CR Doc. 11 at 1-2]. At the Rule 11 plea colloquy, Petitioner testified under oath that he was guilty of the § 922(g) charge, that he understood and agreed to be bound by the terms of his plea agreement, and that he had read, understood, and agreed with the factual basis. [CR Doc. 13 at ¶¶ 24, 26, 30-31: Acceptance and Entry of Guilty Plea]. The Magistrate Judge accepted Petitioner's guilty plea, finding that it was knowingly and voluntarily made. [Id. at p. 4].

On June 21, 2019, the day after Petitioner's guilty plea was accepted, the United States Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). In Rehaif the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Prior to Petitioner's sentencing, a probation officer prepared a PSR. [CR Doc. 18]. The probation officer recommended a Total Offense Level (TOL) of 31 and a criminal history category of VI, which yielded a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. [Id. at ¶¶ 36, 59, 94]. The statutory maximum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) was, however, 10 years. [Id. at ¶ 93]. Because the statutorily authorized maximum sentence was less than the applicable guidelines range, the guidelines term of imprisonment was 120 months.[2] [Id. at ¶ 94 (citing U.S.S.G. §5G1.1(a))]. As noted, Petitioner's criminal history was substantial, including multiple felonies. [See id. at ¶¶ 39-57; see also id. at ¶¶ 62-76].

On October 4, 2019, before sentencing, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Waiver and Stipulation regarding Rehaif “in anticipation of”' and “to facilitate the sentencing” in this matter. [CR Doc. 20 at 1-2: Joint Notice of Waiver and Stipulation (“Rehaif Notice”)]. It was executed by Petitioner, his attorney,[3] and the Government. [Id. at 2]. Therein, the parties noted that [Petitioner] has discussed the Rehaif decision with his attorney and elects to stand by the guilty plea he previously entered and proceed to sentencing in this matter.” [Id. at 1]. Petitioner admitted that, at the time he committed the § 922(g) offense, he knew he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Petitioner also admitted that he was, in fact, guilty of the § 922(g) offense and that he entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Petitioner affirmed that he did not wish to withdraw his guilty plea.

Finally, Petitioner waived any right to contest his conviction on grounds related to Rehaif. [Id. at 1-2].

Petitioner was sentenced on October 8, 2019. At the sentencing hearing, the Court discussed with Petitioner the Rehaif Notice and the impact of Rehaif on Petitioner's guilty plea, as follows:

THE COURT: ... in an abundance of caution, Mr. White, I'm going to go through a couple of elements in here just to make sure that you understand.
The indictment against you was appropriate as matter of law at the time it was brought. But since your indictment, the Supreme Court has ruled that there is an additional element that the Government must prove in order for you to be guilty, that is the additional element that was not recited to you when we went through your guilty plea was that you must have known at the time of your possession of the weapon that you had been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year.
Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And your indictment did not charge you that way. So you would have the right, because this would be a fair and just reason, if you wanted, to withdraw your guilty plea. You would have a right to do so and Court could grant that motion. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And notwithstanding that, do you still want to go forward with the guilty plea in your sentencing today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[CR Doc. 29 at 2-3: Sentencing Tr.]. The Court then affirmed that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and proceeded with sentencing. [CR Doc. 29 at 3]. Adopting the PSR, the Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 120 months on Count One. [CR Doc. 21 at 2: Judgment; CR Doc. 22 at 1: Statement of Reasons]. Judgment on Petitioner's conviction was entered the same day. [CR Doc. 21]. Petitioner did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence.

Petitioner timely filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct sentence. [CV Doc. 1]. In this motion, he asserted a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, stating counsel failed to inform Mr. White of all the elements of the crime charged (922g).” [Id. at 4]. Petitioner also claimed that “the Federal Government lacked subject-matter to convict him under 922(g).” [Id. at 5]. Petitioner made no other claims or allegations and failed to state what relief he sought. [See CV Doc. 1]. On initial screening of Plaintiff's motion to vacate, the Court noted Petitioner's failure to submit his motion under penalty of perjury and ordered him to file an amended motion under penalty of perjury. [CV Doc. 2]. Petitioner complied. [CV Doc. 3]. The amended motion to vacate was also timely. [See Id. at 12].

In his amended motion, Petitioner again asserted a claim of...

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