White v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 21 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013–569,2013–569 |
| Citation | 106 A.3d 1159,167 N.H. 153 |
| Parties | Susan R. WHITE & a. v. VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Nixon, Vogelman, Barry, Slawsky & Simoneau, P.A., of Manchester (Leslie C. Nixon on the brief and orally), for the petitioners.
Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, of Manchester (Gary M. Burt on the brief and orally), for the respondent, Vermont Mutual Insurance Company.
Law Office of V. Richards Ward, Jr., PLLC, of Wolfeboro (V. Richards Ward, Jr. on the memorandum of law), for the respondent, Charles Matthews.
The petitioners, Susan and Peter White, appeal an order of the Superior Court (Tucker , J.) denying their petition for a declaratory judgment that respondent Charles Matthews (Matthews) was covered under a homeowner's insurance policy issued to his mother by respondent Vermont Mutual Insurance Company (Vermont Mutual). We affirm.
The following facts were found by the trial court or are supported by the record. This case arose when a dog owned by Matthews caused an accident that injured Susan White on July 3, 2011. The incident occurred while Matthews was staying with friends at a home owned by his mother in Moultonborough. The Moultonborough home was covered by an insurance policy issued to Matthews's mother by Vermont Mutual. The policy defined an "insured" to include "residents of your household who are ... your relatives." Matthews's mother also owns a home in Naples, Florida, where she lives for approximately half of the year, and where Matthews usually visits only at Christmas. The petitioners and Matthews claim that the Florida residence is Matthews's mother's primary residence, but they do not claim that Matthews is a resident of the Florida home.
Matthews was born in Boston and lived in Massachusetts until he moved to Moultonborough when he was thirteen years old. As a teenager, he lived at the Moultonborough residence and attended Moultonborough Academy. In 2000, after graduating from Boston University, he began working and living in Massachusetts full–time. In 2005, he bought a building in Somerville, Massachusetts, which he converted into condominium units. He sold several units and retained three: one for his own use, and two for rentals. Since 2005, Matthews has served as the head of the condominium association for that building.
Matthews has been unemployed since 2009 and receives financial assistance from his mother. He uses his Somerville address on his resume. Matthews testified that since graduating from college, if asked, he tells people that he lives in Massachusetts. The last time Matthews filed tax returns prior to the 2011 incident leading to this case, he used his Somerville address. His only telephone has a Massachusetts area code.
Matthews testified that he resides in Massachusetts for 80% or more of the year. However, he has not changed his voting registration since he first registered to vote when he was eighteen, and he is still registered to vote in Moultonborough. He voted in Moultonborough in the 2012 election, a month before the hearing in this case. Matthews also has a New Hampshire driver's license and his vehicle is registered in New Hampshire. However, his decision to register his car in New Hampshire was motivated by his desire to avoid buying automobile insurance, which is required in Massachusetts.
Matthews refers to the Moultonborough house as his mother's home, not his home. He goes to Moultonborough occasionally for vacations, long weekends, and to visit his family. He typically notifies his mother in advance to obtain her permission to stay at the house, especially if he is bringing friends. However, he does not refer to the Moultonborough home as his vacation home either. When at the Moultonborough home, Matthews uses the room he occupied while growing up, and he keeps some of his personal belongings at the house. Matthews has a key to the Moultonborough home and a decal on his mother's old car, which he is now using, that allows him to enter the development in which the house is located. His boating license was issued in New Hampshire and he used to own a boat, which was formerly his mother's, that was registered to the Moultonborough address as well.
Following the 2011 incident involving Matthews's dog, the petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that Vermont Mutual is responsible for any damages they may recover from Matthews. After a bench trial, the trial court denied the petition, as well as the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
The interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law for us to decide. Belanger v. MMG Ins. Co., 153 N.H. 584, 587, 899 A.2d 985 (2006). However, we review the trial court's factual findings deferentially, our task not being to determine "whether we would have found differently but to determine whether a reasonable person could find as did the trial judge." U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 153, 461 A.2d 85 (1983). Pursuant to RSA 491:22–a (2010), Vermont Mutual bears the burden of proving that its policy does not provide coverage.
Although Matthews is one of the respondents in this action, his arguments are in line with the petitioners' because he is seeking coverage under the Vermont Mutual policy at issue. The petitioners and Matthews assert that Matthews is a "resident relative" within the meaning of his mother's insurance policy. In furtherance of this argument, the petitioners contend that: (1) the trial court erred in ruling that a reasonable person in the position of the insured, when interpreting the policy, would not consider Matthews a resident of his mother's Moultonborough household on the date of Susan's injury; (2) the trial court erred in basing its ruling almost solely on Matthews's testimony that he subjectively considered Massachusetts to be his "primary" residence; (3) under the terms of a homeowner's insurance policy, an individual can have more than one residence when one residence is a vacation home; and (4) the trial court erred by not considering whether a reasonable person in the position of the insured would believe that a homeowner's insurance policy purchased to insure a vacation home would cover all family members who use the home for vacation purposes. Matthews argues that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and that the Vermont Mutual policy is ambiguous. Because Matthews's arguments overlap with the petitioners' arguments, we will consider them together. In contrast, Vermont Mutual asserts that Matthews is a resident of Massachusetts and did not qualify as a resident of his mother's household, and, consequently, was not entitled to coverage under the policy insuring the Moultonborough home. We agree with Vermont Mutual.
The Vermont Mutual policy at issue defines an "insured" to include "residents of your household who are ... your relatives," but does not define the term "resident." However, we have considered the meaning of this term in the insurance context on multiple occasions, and have defined "residence" as "the place where an individual physically dwells, while regarding it as his principal place of abode." Belanger, 153 N.H. at 587, 899 A.2d 985 (quotation omitted). This definition considers two factors that must occur simultaneously: "(1) the person must physically dwell at the claimed residence; and (2) the person must regard the claimed residence as his principal place of abode." Id. Additionally, the term "household" is understood to be a group of people dwelling as a family under one head and under one roof. Metropolitan Prop. & Liabil. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 132 N.H. 593, 596, 574 A.2d 931 (1989). "Whether or not individuals are members of the same household is determined by the facts of each case." Limoges v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 474, 475, 596 A.2d 125 (1991). Likewise, although an interpretation of insurance policy language is a question of law, a "determination of residency is largely based upon the facts of each case." Belanger, 153 N.H. at 587, 899 A.2d 985.
In interpreting policy language, we look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy's words in context. We construe the terms of the policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based upon more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole. Policy terms are construed objectively, and where the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous, we accord the language its natural and ordinary meaning. We need not examine the parties' reasonable expectations of coverage when a policy is clear and unambiguous; absent ambiguity, our search for the parties' intent is limited to the words of the policy.
Bates v. Phenix Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 156 N.H. 719, 722, 943 A.2d 750 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted). "Ambiguity exists if reasonable disagreement between contracting parties leads to at least two interpretations of the language." Colony Ins. Co. v. Dover Indoor Climbing Gym, 158 N.H. 628, 630, 974 A.2d 399 (2009) (quotation omitted). As we have already defined the term "resident" on multiple occasions in this context, however, there can be no disagreement as to its meaning and, therefore, there is no ambiguity. Thus, absent policy language containing a definition of the term "resident" that differs from our case law—which is not present here—we rely upon our settled definition of the term. Additionally, due to the lack of ambiguity, we need not examine whether a reasonable person in the position of the insured would expect that a homeowner's insurance policy for a vacation home would cover all family members who use it for vacation purposes. Consequently, our analysis is limited to the words of the Vermont Mutual policy. See Bates, 156 N.H. at 722, 943 A.2d 750.
The facts found by the trial court are similar to those in Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. v. Carr, 130 N.H. 698, 546 A.2d 1070 (1988). In that...
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