White v. Vilsack

• Decision Date: 29 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1763(BJR).
• Citation: 888 F.Supp.2d 93
• Parties: Pamela WHITE, Plaintiff, v. Thomas J. VILSACK, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

888 F.Supp.2d 93

Pamela WHITE, Plaintiff,

v.Thomas J. VILSACK, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–1763(BJR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Aug. 29, 2012.

Gary T. Brown, Gary T. Brown & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Alexander Daniel Shoaibi, Elizabeth Genevieve White, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; Denying Without Prejudice Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on [Dkt. # 10] the motion to dismiss and alternative motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Food Safety and Inspection Service (“FSIS”) of the United States Department of Agriculture. Plaintiff, an African American, alleges that her employer, FSIS, discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), see42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiff claims that the Secretary discriminated against her on the basis of her race by failing to (1) detail ¹ her to a GS–9 level position ² (“failure to detail claim”) (2) promote her to the Administrative Officer position (“failure to promote claim”). See generally Compl. Defendant Thomas Vilsack, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (“the Secretary”), moves to dismiss both of Plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's “failure to promote” claim. Upon review of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record in this case, the court concludes that the Secretary's motion to dismiss must be denied as to the Plaintiff's failure to detail claim, and the Secretary's motion for summary judgment must be denied without prejudice as to the Plaintiff's failure to promote claim.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a GS–7 Management Assistant at the Resource Management and Planning Staff Division of FSIS. Compl. ¶ 4. In 2005, a GS–11 Administrative Officer position became available in Plaintiff's office. Id. ¶ 7. From August to October 2005, FSIS detailed Plaintiff into the Administrative Officer position but compensated her at the GS–9 level, a pay grade less than GS–11. Id.

After her detail ended, Plaintiff returned to her position as a GS–7 Management Assistant and continued to perform some Administrative Officer duties while the Administrative Officer position remained vacant. Id. ¶ 7, 9. Given her additional duties, she requested that her supervisor, Robert Cooke, provide her with another GS–9 level detail position or other opportunities to advance her career. Id. ¶ 12. She claims that, although there were positions available for career advancement in two other branches in FSIS, her supervisor took no action to place her in the positions. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff alleges that she lost opportunities for career advancement, training and future compensation as a result of this inaction. Id. ¶ 5, 12.

Throughout this period, Plaintiff also asked to be promoted to the vacant Administrative Officer position or at least be allowed to compete for it. Id. ¶ 6. According to Plaintiff, in September 2009, Gaye Gerard, a Caucasian woman compensated at the GS–12 level, assumed the Administrative Officer post in Plaintiff's office, a position that Plaintiff says was never advertised. Id. ¶¶ 6, 16.

In January 2010, Plaintiff filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “the Commission”) issued a Final Agency Decision the following year denying her claims. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff now alleges disparate treatment on the basis of race in violation of Title VII. More specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Secretary discriminated against her on the basis of her race by failing to detail her to a GS–9 level position (“failure to detail claim”) and failing to promote her to the Administrative Officer position (“failure to promote claim”). See generally Compl. The Secretary moves to dismiss the failure to detail claim, asserting that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, or, in the alternative, failed to allege an adverse employment action. The Secretary also moves to dismiss or, in the alternative, moves for summary judgment as to the failure to promote claim. With the motion ripe for consideration, the court turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Court Denies the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss the Failure to Detail

1. Legal Standard—Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a motion to dismiss to test “the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” In re Interbank Fund. Corp. Sec. Litig., 668 F.Supp.2d 44, 47–48 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, giving her the benefit of every reasonable inference drawn from the well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. See In re Interbank Fund. Corp. Sec. Litig., 668 F.Supp.2d at 47–48.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must plead sufficient facts that, taken as true, provide “plausible grounds” that discovery will reveal evidence to support the allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Moreover, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted).

2. Plaintiff Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies

The Secretary labels Plaintiff's failure to detail claim as a failure to promote to a GS–9 claim, and then goes on to argue that Plaintiff did not include such a failure to promote to a GS–9 claim in her EEO complaint. Def.'s Mot. at 12. Therefore, the Secretary concludes, Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. Plaintiff counters that her failure to detail claim was included in her administrative complaint. Pl's Opp'n at 16. Plaintiff's argument is well taken.

A plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies with the EEOC beforefiling a Title VII claim in federal court. Ahuja v. Detica Inc., 873 F.Supp.2d 221, 226–27, No. 09–02246, 2012 WL 1268301, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2012) (citing Lewis v. City of Chicago, Ill., –––U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 2196–97, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). This requirement “serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and ‘narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication and decision.’ ” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995) (citing Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472 (D.C.Cir.1976)). A court “has authority over ... claims like or reasonably related to the allegations of the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegations.” Hudson v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 645 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Park, 71 F.3d at 907).

In describing the claims made by Plaintiff in her administrative complaint, the EEOC's Final Agency Decision states that Plaintiff “asked [her] supervisor if [her] position[ ] could be upgraded to [a] GS–9[ ]” or that she be given “the opportunity to detail to another branch in a GS–9 position so she could eventually qualify for the GS–11 [Administrative Officer] position.” Def.'s Ex. 5 at 2, 4. The Commission found that Plaintiff had made “verbal requests to be placed on detail.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff alleges not only that she lost potential career opportunities, but also that she lost the potential compensation that she would have earned in a GS–9 detail position. See generally Compl.

Although Plaintiff did not explicitly mention a potential increase in compensation in her administrative complaint, the denial of a detail from a GS–7 to a GS–9 position necessarily signifies that Plaintiff was denied a salary increase. As such, Plaintiff's failure to detail claim is “reasonably related” to, and “grow[s] out of” her EEOC allegations. Hudson, 645 F.Supp.2d at 3;see also, Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151 (D.C.Cir.2007) (finding that the reduction in airtime of a radio broadcaster could have reasonably been expected to grow out of administrative complaints that Plaintiff was denied career advancement and promotional opportunities). The court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies available for her failure to detail claim and that the Secretary's motion to dismiss her claim on this basis must be denied.

3. Plaintiff Has Stated an Adverse Employment Action for Her Failure to Detail Claim

The Secretary argues that the failure to detail claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff's allegations that “unspecified detail assignment ... resulted in a ‘loss of compensation’ are merely speculative and thus do not constitute adverse actions.” Def.'s Mot. at 8. Plaintiff responds that the denial of a detail position deprived her of higher pay, a tangible harm that elevates the Secretary's failure to detail the Plaintiff to the level of an adverse employment action. Pl.'s Opp'n at 12–13. The court agrees with Plaintiff.³

Title VII bars discrimination “because of ... [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Ponce v. Billington, 679 F.3d 840, 844 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)...