White v. White
| Decision Date | 02 May 1994 |
| Citation | 876 S.W.2d 837 |
| Parties | Debra K. WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert D. WHITE, et al., Defendants, Including First American National Bank, Defendant-Appellant, and Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
R. Thomas Stinnett, Eric J. Morrison, Stone & Hinds, P.C., Knoxville, for defendant-appellant.
Robert M. Bailey, Michael W. Ewell, Frantz, McConnell & Seymour, Knoxville, for defendant-appellee.
This case presents for review the dismissal on motion for summary judgment of a suit for death benefits under a life insurance policy. The trial court sustained the insurer's pleas of limitation of action and res judicata. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the plea of res judicata, and pretermitted consideration of the limitation of action defense. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed, though on a different ground.
On January 14, 1983, the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable) issued a term life insurance policy on the life of Robert D. White in the face amount of $250,000. The policy subsequently was assigned to First American National Bank's (First American's) predecessor in interest as security for a loan.
On March 9, 1984, Debra K. White, the wife of the insured, gave Equitable written notice that the insured had disappeared.
On May 8, 1984, Debra K. White filed a suit seeking a declaratory judgment and the appointment of a receiver. Equitable, First American, and other entities that Debra White and the insured were indebted to, were named as defendants. That complaint alleged that the insured disappeared on January 27, 1984, while on a business trip to Louisiana; the vehicle that he was driving was found in a bayou in water 30 feet deep; the bayou was inhabited by alligators; the insured could not swim; and the temperature on the night he disappeared reached 28? Fahrenheit. The plaintiff prayed for an adjudication that the insured was dead, and for certification of his death to the Probate Court for the administration of his estate. The complaint also alleged that the insured was the owner of certain personal and real property, he owed various debts and obligations, and his wife did not have sufficient resources for the support of herself and her minor children. The suit sought the appointment of a receiver for the administration of the insured's affairs pursuant to The Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property Law Act (Uniform Absence Act), T.C.A. § 30-1801 et seq. (1977) (now T.C.A. §§ 30-3-101, -114 (1984 & Supp.1993)).
The case was submitted to a jury on the special interrogatory, "Is Robert D. White dead?", to which the jury responded, "The evidence does not establish by a preponderance that Robert D. White is dead." Judgment was entered for "the defendants," however, the receiver who had been appointed was retained pursuant to "the provisions of T.C.A. § 30-3-101 et seq. until further order of the court." There was no appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
On November 20, 1990, Debra K. White filed the present suit against the same parties who had been defendants in the first suit requesting essentially the same relief. The allegations relied upon to establish the right to recover in the present case are almost identical to those set forth in the former suit. The complaint in this case repeats the circumstances of the insured's disappearance, refers to the previous suit in which the jury found "the evidence does not establish by a preponderance that Robert D. White is dead," and states further,
In the five (5) years which have elapsed since the jury's findings there has been no change of facts or circumstances, other than the passage of time, respecting [Robert] Dillon White.
There was no allegation in the complaint, which was filed six years, nine months, and twenty-four days after the insured's alleged disappearance, asserting the insured's absence for seven years as a basis for relief, nor was the complaint amended prior to dismissal by the trial court. The pleadings show that the policy lapsed on January 4, 1986.
On January 18, 1991, which, according to the allegations of the complaint, was nine days before the insured had been absent for seven years, Equitable filed its response to the complaint, asserting the defenses of limitation of action, res judicata and failure to state a cause of action.
First American filed a cross-claim against Equitable adopting the allegations of the complaint regarding the alleged death of the insured, and claiming the proceeds of the policy for payment on the secured debt, to which Equitable responded with the same defenses. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court sustained Equitable's affirmative defenses of limitation of action and res judicata and dismissed the suit.
The Court of Appeals found that the essentials of the plea of res judicata had been established and affirmed the dismissal of the suit on that ground alone. The plaintiff is not a party on the appeal; First American has assumed the role of plaintiff-appellant.
The appellant's position with regard to the holding that the issues presented in this suit are res judicata is not entirely clear. The Court of Appeals stated First American's position to be that:
It is entitled to rely on a common law presumption that after seven years absence the insured is presumed to be dead and that for this reason res judicata is not a bar to the subsequent action which could only utilize this presumption after a lapse of seven years from the disappearance.
This Court joins the Court of Appeals in rejecting the argument that the claimed "presumption of death" precludes the plea of res judicata.
In affirming the plea of res judicata, the Court of Appeals relied upon the statement of the rule in Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990), which is as follows:
In order to be successful, a party asserting a res judicata defense must demonstrate: (1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that the same parties were involved in both suits; (3) that the same cause of action was involved in both suits; and (4) that the underlying judgment was on the merits.
Id. at 294. This statement is consistent with prior decisions; however, a more complete statement of the rule includes the following: A judgment or decree is res judicata only as to the matters in issue; the adjudication, to be conclusive, should be upon the very point brought directly in issue by the pleadings; and a party will not be prejudiced by a judgment as to rights not then accrued. 22 Tennessee Jurisprudence, Res Judicata, p 28 (1985). A further definition of the applicable legal principles is:
"The estoppel of a judgment extends only to the facts in issue as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and does not prevent a re-examination of the same question between the same parties where in the interval the facts have changed or new facts have occurred which may alter the legal rights or relations of the litigants."
Banks v. Banks, 18 Tenn.App. 347, 77 S.W.2d 74, 76 (1934) (quoting 34 C.J. 905, § 1313).
The issue litigated at the first trial and the issue alleged in the present suit are not the same. The issue litigated in the first case was that set forth in the special interrogatory submitted to and answered by the jury--the evidence did not establish the death of the insured prior to the trial of the case on August 7, 1985. However, in the present case, the proof necessary for recovery is that the insured died prior to January 4, 1986, the date on which the...
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