White v. White
| Decision Date | 25 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S01A1378.,S01A1378. |
| Citation | 274 Ga. 884,561 S.E.2d 801 |
| Parties | WHITE v. WHITE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
George M. Hubbard, III, Blake M. Whisnant, George M. Hubbard, P.C., Savannah, for appellant.
James C. Metts, III. Savannah, for appellee.
The Whites were divorced in January 1998, but in March 1999, Ms. White filed a motion to set aside, alleging that Mr. White had fraudulently hidden assets during the divorce. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order finding that Mr. White had hidden assets as alleged, and setting aside the alimony and equitable division portions of the divorce decree. This Court granted Mr. White's petition for interlocutory appeal.
1. Mr. White asserted in his response to Ms. White's motion to set aside that Ms. White was barred from seeking to set aside the divorce decree because she has retained the benefits awarded to her by that decree. He enumerates as error the trial court's failure to rule in his favor on that issue.
The law of this state is well-settled on this issue: one who has accepted benefits such as alimony under a divorce decree is estopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits. Vickery v. Vickery, 237 Ga. 702, 229 S.E.2d 453 (1976); Booker v. Booker, 217 Ga. 342, 122 S.E.2d 86 (1961); Thompson v. Thompson, 203 Ga. 128(2)(b), 45 S.E.2d 632 (1947). However, Collins v. Grafton, Inc., 263 Ga. 441(2), 435 S.E.2d 37 (1993). In light of the trial court's express finding that Mr. White was guilty of fraud in hiding assets during the divorce, he is not entitled to assert an estoppel against Ms. White. That being so, no error appears in the trial court's failure to rule that Ms. White was estopped from seeking to set aside a portion of the divorce decree.
2. In her motion to set aside, Ms. White relied on a non-disclosure provision in the agreement on which the divorce decree was based, and on the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-60. Mr. White asserts that the trial court could not ground its decision on the settlement agreement because the rights of the parties after a divorce is granted are based not on the settlement agreement, but on the judgment itself. Mehdikarimi v. Emaddazfuli, 268 Ga. 428(2), 490 S.E.2d 368 (1997). While Mr. White's legal argument is sound, the record discloses that the trial court relied specifically on OCGA § 9-11-60(d)(2), which provides fraud as a ground for setting aside a judgment. The trial court found that Mr. White had fraudulently hidden assets to prevent their equitable division in the divorce, and the trial court based the order setting aside the alimony and equitable division portion of the divorce decree on that fraud. Thus, as a matter of fact, the argument that the trial court erroneously relied on the settlement agreement fails.
3. Relying on Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.7, which forbids the grant of a divorce...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Lloyd's Syndicate No. 5820 v. AGCO Corp.
...occurred); see also Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith Mechanical Contractors, 285 Ga. 807, 810, 683 S.E.2d 599 (2009).19 White v. White, 274 Ga. 884, 885(1), 561 S.E.2d 801 (2002).20 Lumber Transport v. Int. Indemnity Co., 203 Ga.App. 588, 590(2)(c), 417 S.E.2d 365 (1992).21 Smithloff v. Benson, 173......
-
Thompson v. Thompson, S10F1231.
...under a divorce decree is estopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits.” White v. White, 274 Ga. 884, 885(1), 561 S.E.2d 801 (2002). See also Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 207(2), n. 11, 636 S.E.2d 519 (2006); Curtis v. Curtis, 255 Ga. 288, 336 S.E.2d 7......
- Peterson v. Beasley, S01A1232.
-
McKean v. GGNSC Atlanta, LLC
...agreement and his mother later granted him power of attorney. But in general, estoppels are not favored by the law. White v. White, 274 Ga. 884, 885(1), 561 S.E.2d 801 (2002). And the party asserting the benefit of estoppel “must have acted in good faith, and must have exercised reasonable ......