White v. White

• Decision Date: 19 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 7428DC1064,7428DC1064
• Citation: 25 N.C.App. 150,212 S.E.2d 511
• Parties: Aida T. WHITE v. Carl L. WHITE.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 511

212 S.E.2d 511

25 N.C.App. 150

Aida T. WHITE v. Carl L. WHITE.

No. 7428DC1064.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 19, 1975.

Certiorari Allowed by Supreme Court May 6, 1975.

Riddle & Shackelford, P.A., by Robert E. Riddle, Asheville, for plaintiff appellant.

McGuire, Wood, Erwin & Crow by William F. Wolcott, III, Asheville, for defendant appellee.

MORRIS, Judge.

Plaintiff earnestly contends that the court erred in refusing to enforce the consent order of 10 September 1970, with respect to educational expenses of Marco White. On the other hand, defendant contends that the court properly applied Shoaf v. Shoaf, supra, in holding that, as a matter of law, defendant was relieved from any further obligation of support of any kind for his son after his son attained age 18.

The question presented here was not before the Court in Shoaf. There the question was, as stated by Justice Higgins: 'Since the effective date of G.S. 48A, does a father's legal liability for the support of his son born on January 13, 1953, continue until the son becomes twenty-one years of age, by reason of a consent judgment dated June 11, 1970, providing that 'payments for child support shall continue until such time as said minor child reaches his majority or is otherwise emancipated? " (Emphasis supplied.) At the time the Shoaf judgment was entered, an infant became emancipated at age 21. However, the 1971 General Assembly made minors adults at age 18 effective 5 July 1971, by enactment of G.S. § 48A--1 providing: 'The common-law definition of minor insofar as it pertains to the age of the minor is hereby repealed and abrogated.', and G.S. § 48A--2 providing that 'A minor is any person who has not reached the age of 18 years.' The minor in Shoaf reached 18 years of age prior to the effective date of the legislation. Subsequent to the effective date, defendant in Shoaf made two payments and then refused to make any more. Plaintiff in Shoaf obtained an order citing defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The district court ordered defendant to make payments until the child became 21. We affirmed, with one dissent, holding that it was obviously the intent of the parties that the father support his son until he reached age 21, since it was presumed that both parties knew that the boy 'would reach his majority' at age 21, the age of majority at the time the consent order was entered. The Supreme Court, however, held that when parents invoke the jurisdiction of the court in custody and support of children, the minor becomes a ward of the court, and '(t)he court thereafter has authority to force the parent to discharge the legal obligation to support a minor child until he reaches legal age', and during minority changed conditions always justify the court entering an order changing the obligations of parents with respect to children. The court held that the clear wording of the judgment did not require or permit an interpretation that the father intended the support to continue despite any change in the law. The General Assembly alone has the authority to determine the age of majority. It did so and made the effective date 5 July 1971, beyond which time the defendant Shoaf had no obligation to support his son. When the legal duty of support ended at age 18, the father's obligation under the consent order ended, the General Assembly having changed the conditions by fixing a different date upon which liability to support a child terminated. The Shoaf order by its own provisions carried no obligation to furnish support beyond the date the child reached his majority. In this situation, the Washington Court (see Waymire v. Waymire, 10 Wash.App. 262, 517 P.2d 219) has held that the Legislature was 'without power to set aside, annul, or change the liability upon a judgment affecting solely the rights of private parties by the enactment of a general law,' and, therefore, the statute changing majority from 21 to 18 could not have retrospective application to a judgment providing for support of minors 'until such time as she shall reach age of twenty-one years, becomes self-supporting or married, whichever shall first occur, . . .' Waymire v. Waymire, 10 Wash.App. 262, 517 P.2d 219 (1973), reh. denied 8 February 1974, rev. denied 18 March 1974.

The Florida Legislature in changing the age of majority to 18 specifically provided that it should have only prospective application and should not affect existing rights and obligations. In holding a father subject to contempt for refusing to furnish support beyond age 18 where the consent order provided for support to 'majority', the Florida Supreme Court said that to apply the statute retroactively would cause review of innumerable cases, disrupt family budgets, education and other plans. The Court said further: 'It is hardly conceivable that husband-petitioner herein could have anticipated the age reduction by the Legislature and intended support only to the reduced age of 18 . . . 27' Daughterty v. Daugherty, Fla., 308 So.2d 24 (1975).

The order before us is entirely different than the order in Shoaf and that in Waymire and Daugherty. By the terms of the order, to the entry of which defendant consented, defendant was obligated to pay $35 per week for the child's support to 11 September 1972. The child would have attained age 18 on 8 May 1972. The order then provided for the payment of $2,000 per year on college expenses for each year the child remained in...