Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 19695,19695
• Citation: 801 P.2d 920
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,658 Stephen WHITEHEAD and Deborah Whitehead, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION and Jeep Corporation, Larry Anderson, Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 920

801 P.2d 920

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,658

Stephen WHITEHEAD and Deborah Whitehead, Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. AMERICAN MOTORS SALES CORPORATION and Jeep Corporation Larry Anderson, Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 19695.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 19, 1990.

Rehearing Granted Nov. 19, 1990.

C. Keith Rooker, Patricia W. Christensen, and Thomas B. Green, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.

Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for plaintiffs and appellees.

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:

Defendants American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep) appeal a judgment awarded plaintiff Stephen Whitehead on a products liability claim.

On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead was driving south on I-15 near Orem, Utah, in a 1972 Jeep Commando that she had borrowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen, was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant Larry Anderson was returning home from work, in his automobile, a short distance behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsmobile station wagon he was driving was traveling approximately fifteen miles per hour faster than the Commando. The Oldsmobile struck the Commando on the left rear corner; the Commando went out of control and rolled. Stephen Whitehead suffered a spinal injury and was rendered a paraplegic.

Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead filed their original complaint on November 21, 1979, naming Anderson as defendant. The complaint was later amended, adding Anderson's employer, Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, ¹ and AMC and Jeep as defendants.

During the nearly four years between the filing of the original complaint and the beginning of trial, the parties engaged in extensive discovery. Plaintiffs propounded three sets of interrogatories to AMC/Jeep. Their failure to timely answer the interrogatories brought motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery. AMC/Jeep's answers, when received, prompted a motion to strike as unresponsive and additional motions to compel discovery by plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions was held on October 29, 1982, where Judge Sorensen ² went through the interrogatories and answers. He modified some of the questions, gave orders for supplemental answers to be given, and stated that if the answers stood as given, he would sustain objections to evidence not conforming with the answers. Plaintiffs orally asked for sanctions against AMC/Jeep for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no formal motion was made and no order for sanctions was ever issued, plaintiffs did file a motion in limine after the supplemental answers were filed seeking to prohibit AMC/Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to the subjects of certain interrogatories. The court reserved ruling on the motion until the evidence was offered.

Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on October 7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of a film produced by Dynamic Science that showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling over in staged tests. Upon a prescreening of the film and over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled that the film was admissible. Plaintiffs also moved to exclude all evidence as to the availability and their nonuse of seat belts. After reviewing memoranda of the parties and proffers of proof, the court barred references to the availability or nonuse of seat belts.

American Motors Sales Corporation filed its answer to the complaint in September 1983, over three years after being named in the amended complaint and just one month prior to the trial. It raised Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1987) as a defense. This statute bars the bringing of a products liability action "more than six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption." Jeep Corporation moved to amend its answer to also include this defense; the motion was denied.

Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and continued for three weeks. The jury determined that AMC and Jeep were negligent in the design of the vehicle and awarded damages to Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal, raising several issues which we will separately consider.

I.

Defendants contend that they should have been allowed to interpose a defense based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1987), which provides that product liability actions are barred if brought "more than six years after the initial purchase." In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we held that statute to be unconstitutional; therefore, defendants' point is moot.

II.

Defendants contend that the court erred in admitting plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be overturned "unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in error." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); see also Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.1985); see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.1977).

The criteria for establishing the admissibility of crash test films, such as those in issue here, are that the data be relevant, that the tests be conducted under conditions substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and that its presentation not consume undue amounts of time, not confuse the issues, and not mislead the jury. Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal.App.3d 917, 141 Cal.Rptr. 95 (1977); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal.App.3d 510, 109 Cal.Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir.1981); Renfro Hosiery Mills Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 552 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir.1977); see Weaver v. Ford Motor Co., 382 F.Supp. 1068 (E.D.Pa.1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir.1975) (without published opinion); see also Collins v. B.F. Goodrich, 558 F.2d at 910.

Defendants objected to admission of tests of CJ-5s on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20-inch shorter wheelbase, giving it different steering and handling characteristics than the Commando. Defendant also objected on grounds that the tests were not substantially similar to the accident conditions. The tests were "J turns" where 588 degrees of steering were suddenly input while a constant vehicle speed was maintained. The test vehicles had also been "specially prepared" to accentuate the rollovers depicted in the films. The requirements of "substantial similarity of conditions" does not require absolute identity; however, they must "be so nearly the same in substantial particulars as to afford a fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to which the test is directed." Illinois Central Gulf R.R. v. Ishee, 317 So.2d 923, 926 (Miss.1975) (emphasis added). The films here were offered to show the handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs' experts testified at length that the handling characteristics of the CJ-5s shown in the tests and the Commando were substantially similar. Defendants by cross-examination and presentation of their own evidence endeavored to bring out the differences between the test and the accident and between the vehicle tested and the vehicle in question.

Given our standard of review of the admissibility of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly say that the trial court was in error in admitting plaintiffs' films in light of the foundation laid by their experts. As the trial court stated in admitting the films, any differences between the tests and the accident here would go to the weight the jury would give the evidence. Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Okla.1981); see Lopez v. Allen, 96 Idaho 866, 871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1975).

III.

Defendants next contend that the trial court erred in limiting their cross-examination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. While unduly harsh limitation of a key expert witness can amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse. State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972); State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 987 (1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir.1978). In Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo.1978), the Wyoming court held that it was prejudicial error to refuse to allow cross-examination regarding a critical aspect of the plaintiff's proof. There the court stated:

Having offered his expert opinion, the witness exposes himself to interrogation which ordinarily would have no place in the cross-examination of a factual witness, but the expert exposes himself to the most searching kind of investigation into his qualifications, the extent of his knowledge and the reasons for his opinion, including the facts and other matters upon which it is based.

Id. at 1133.

Defendants contend that there were several instances where the trial court's limiting of cross-examination prevented them from examining the basis of opinions offered by plaintiffs' experts. In his direct testimony, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that the Jeep Commando was defective because its track width was narrow and its center of gravity high, making it easily susceptible to rollovers. He also testified concerning the handling characteristics of Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s. On cross-examination, he was asked:

Q: Are there other vehicles that have the same track width?

Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]: Object. Repetitious and irrelevant.

Court: Sustained on the grounds it's irrelevant.

Q: Are there other vehicles that have about the same center of gravity?

Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.

Court: Sustained.

....

Q: If you drive a three-quarter-ton pickup, is it the same as driving a Honda Accord; handling, steering?

Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.

Court: Sustained.

....

Q: ... [T]ake another vehicle that...