Whitehead v. Dillard
| Decision Date | 11 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | 9834. |
| Citation | 174 S.E. 244,178 Ga. 714 |
| Parties | WHITEHEAD et al. v. DILLARD. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The petition stated a cause of action for specific performance of an oral agreement to convey described land in consideration of personal services; and the findings of the jury upon certain questions submitted had the legal effect of a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.
2. The findings of the jury in answer to all the questions were supported by the evidence, and there was no error in refusing to grant a new trial on the general grounds of the defendants' motion.
3. Nor was there any merit in the special grounds, complaining of omissions to charge.
Error from Superior Court, Oconee County; Blanton Fortson, Judge.
Suit by Wilda Butler Whitehead Dillard against Richard H. Whitehead and others. Judgment for plaintiff, defendants' motion for a new trial was overruled, and defendants bring error.
Affirmed.
Jas. W Arnold and Rupert A. Brown, both of Athens, for plaintiffs in error.
Jake B Joel, Fred A. Gillen, and Wolver M. Smith, all of Athens, for defendant in error.
Wilda Butler Whitehead Dillard brought a suit against Richard H Whitehead for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to convey to the plaintiff a described tract of land in consideration of services to be rendered by her as a nurse and a housekeeper. The petition alleged that the wife of the defendant was "an invalid, bedridden and helpless," and that the defendant agreed with petitioner "that if she would come to the home of said Richard H Whitehead, nurse his said wife, look after the home, do the cooking, and do generally the things necessary in and about said home, that he would at the death of his said wife" convey to petitioner 40 acres of land off the east side of a described tract, as compensation for the plaintiff's services. It was further alleged that the plaintiff agreed to render and perform the services required, and did perform the same from the date of the agreement until the death of the defendant's wife, which occurred within a few months. After the death of the defendant's wife he executed certain voluntary deeds to members of his family, which were in conflict with the agreement made with the plaintiff as to the 40 acres in question; and the grantees in some of these conveyances were made parties defendant, with prayers for cancellation. By an amendment it was alleged that the value of the land was $700, and that the plaintiff's services were of the value of $600. There was no demurrer to the petition, but each defendant who was served filed an answer denying the material allegations of the petition and especially denying that the defendant Richard H. Whitehead ever made any such agreement as was alleged by the plaintiff.
Without objection on the part of counsel, the case was submitted to the jury upon certain questions, which, with the answers thereto, were as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Upon the return of these findings, the defendants filed a motion for a judgment in their favor, upon the following grounds: The court denied this motion and entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff, to which ruling the defendants excepted pendente lite. The defendants also filed a motion for a new trial on the general grounds, and on two special grounds complaining of omissions in the charge to the jury. The motion was overruled, and the defendants excepted. Error was also assigned on the exceptions pendente lite.
1. The jury found that the value of the land was $600, but that the value of the services rendered by the plaintiff was only $400. It is contended that specific performance should have been refused, because of this difference in values, and because it appeared from the record that the plaintiff could be adequately compensated in damages. For each of these reasons, it is insisted that the court erred in refusing to enter a judgment in favor of the defendants. We cannot agree with either of these contentions. It is not true in this state that specific performance of a contract for the sale of land will be granted only when the plaintiff cannot be adequately compensated by an award of damages. In Clark v. Cagle, 141 Ga. 703, 82 S.E. 21, L.R.A. 1915A, 317, it was held that, "where a contract for the sale of land is in writing, signed by both parties, is certain and fair, is for an adequate consideration, and capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to decree the specific performance of it as it is for a court of law to give damages for a breach of contract." There are other decisions by this court to the same effect. Nor is the remedy of specific performance limited to cases in which the contracts are in writing. In Bird v. Trapnell, 149 Ga. 767, 102 S.E. 131, it was said: "Equity will specifically enforce a parol agreement entered into between two persons, by the terms of which one is to perform certain services during the lifetime of the other, and the latter is to convey certain land at or before his death in consideration of such services, if the contract be definite and specific, based upon a full or partial performance of consideration in the way of services performed on the one side and a failure or refusal to perform on the other, and the proof of such contract be clear, strong, and satisfactory." Also, in Gordon v. Spellman, 145 Ga. 682, 89 S.E. 749, Ann.Cas. 1918A, 852, it was held that "an oral contract by which one of the parties agrees to make a will with a devise of specific property to the other, as compensation for services rendered and to be rendered to the former during his life, is valid and enforceable." It is even provided in the Civil Code 1910, § 4634, that full payment alone, accepted by the vendor, will be sufficient to justify such a decree. The rule might perhaps have been otherwise before the enactment of this statement as a part of the statute law. See Nowell v. Mayor., etc., of Monroe, 177 Ga. 648, 652, 171 S.E. 136. If the plaintiff in the present case fully performed her part of the contract by the rendition of the services required, she is in the position of one who has paid the purchase money in full; and, if the contract is certain and fair, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of it, provided it is based upon an adequate consideration and is sufficiently proved. "Some courts have advanced the theory that a court of equity decrees performance of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the land, but because damages at law, which must be calculated upon the general money value of the land, may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land may have a peculiar and special value." Clark v. Cagle, supra.
There is no merit in the contention that the consideration was so inadequate as to demand a finding in the defendants' favor. It is true that specific performance is not a remedy which either party may claim as a matter of absolute right and that mere inadequacy of price, or any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, unjust, or against good conscience, may justify the refusal of this remedy. Kirkland v. Downing, 106 Ga. 530, 32 S.E. 632; Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566 (2), 104 S.E. 414; Huggins v. Meriweather, 177 Ga. 461, 170 S.E. 483. But a court of equity should not deny a decree for specific performance merely upon the ground of inadequacy of consideration, unless there is such a gross disparity as to shock the moral conscience and to amount in itself to evidence of fraud, the adequacy of consideration being generally a matter to be determined by the parties for...
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