Whitehead v. Entwhistle

• Decision Date: 01 January 1886
• Citation: 27 F. 778
• Parties: WHITEHEAD, Trustee, v. ENTWHISTLE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

27 F. 778

WHITEHEAD, Trustee, v. ENTWHISTLE.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Central Division.

June Term, 1886

John F Duncombe, for complainant.

C. A Clark, for defendant.

SHIRAS J.

By the bill filed in this cause, the complainant seeks to quiet the title to certain real estate situated in Humboldt county Iowa, averring that he is the owner in fee-simple thereof holding the legal title as trustee for the Des Moines & Fort Dodge Railroad Company; and further alleging that the defendant is in actual possession of the premises in question, claiming title thereto under a homestead entry made in the year 1867, and under a purchase from the Iowa Homestead Company, which latter company claims under the act of congress passed in 1855, granting lands to the state of Iowa in aid of the construction of certain lines of railway in said state. The bill charges that the claim and pretended title of defendant is without foundation, in law or equity; that the certificate of entry under the homestead act, and the conveyance from the Iowa Homestead Company, are fraudulent and void, procured without legal right, and in violation of law; but that the same are clouds upon complainant's title. Wherefore complainant prays that the certificate of entry under the homestead act, and the conveyance to defendant from the Iowa Homestead Company, be annulled and canceled, and the cloud upon complainant's title be removed, and that the title be quieted in complainant.

To this bill defendant demurs, upon the ground that this court as a court of equity has not jurisdiction, in that it appears that complainant has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.

From the averments of the bill it appears that complainant is not seeking equitable aid to perfect his own title or the evidences thereof. He avers that, as trustee, he holds the legal title to the land, and exhibits the chain of conveyance upon which he relies. The relief asked in the bill is wholly aimed at the clouds caused by the evidences of title under which defendant claims, and as to these it is averred that they have no foundation in law or equity. It is also averred that defendant is in actual possession of the land, holding the same openly and adversely to the claim of complainant.

Section 723 of the Revised Statutes provides that 'suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law. ' As is said by the supreme court in Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466, this provision of the statute is only declaratory of a principle which is as old as the earliest period of the recorded history of English equity jurisprudence. By express declaration of the constitution of the United States it is provided that 'in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. ' If, then, a plain and adequate remedy exists at law, a defendant cannot be called upon to submit his rights to the decision of a court of equity, because he has a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Lewis v. Cocks, 23 Wall. 466; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568; S.C. 4 S.Ct. 232; Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U.S. 550; S.C. 5 S.Ct. 631.

To sustain the jurisdiction in equity, it must be shown that there is no sufficient and speedy remedy at law. The bill in this cause not only fails in the particular, but, on the contrary, affirmatively shows that a plain and proper remedy can be had at law. It is averred that complainant holds the legal title to the lands, and that the defendant is in possession thereof, denying complainant's right. The bill, by its averments, shows clearly that complainant and defendant claim title from different sources, and through different chains of conveyances, and the real question to be determined is, which is the better legal title? The defendant being in possession, an action at law in the nature of ejectment affords a plain and speedy mode of settling the question of title, and that fact is fatal to the jurisdiction in equity.

On part of complainant it is urged, however, that the statute of Iowa confers the right to bring a bill to quiet title in cases of this character, and that thereby the jurisdiction of this court in equity has been enlarged. Section 3273 of the Code of Iowa enacts that 'an action to determine and quiet the title to real property may be brought by any one having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession of the same, against any person claiming title thereto, though not in possession. ' As construed by the supreme court of Iowa, it cannot be questioned that this section enlarges the powers of a court of equity, and that, in the state court, a bill in equity may be entertained in favor of a party in possession against one not in possession, and in favor of one not in possession against one in possession. Lewis v. Soule, 52 Iowa, 11; S.C. 2 N.W. 400; Lees v. Wetmore, 58 Iowa, 170; S.C. 12 N.W. 238.

On the part of complainant it is argued that under the rule announced in Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 196; In re Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503; and Reynolds v. National Bank, 112 U.S. 405; S.C. 5 S.Ct. 213,-- to the effect that 'the state legislatures certainly have no authority to prescribe the forms and proceedings in the courts of the United States, but, having created a right, and at the same time prescribed the remedy to enforce it, if the remedy prescribed is substantially consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding on the chancery side of the federal courts, no reason exists why it should not be pursued in the same form as in the state court. On the contrary, propriety and convenience suggest that the practice should not materially differ where titles to lands are the subjects of investigation,'-- the section of the Code of Iowa above cited creates a new right, enforceable in equity, and therefore this court has the right to entertain the present bill.

There can be no doubt, under the repeated decisions of the United States supreme court, that where a state statute creates a new right, and provides a...