Whitenton v. Whitenton, 45813
| Decision Date | 30 August 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 45813,45813 |
| Citation | 659 S.W.2d 542 |
| Parties | Janice S. WHITENTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Philip G. WHITENTON, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Patricia Riehl, Hollingsworth & Kramers, Hillsboro, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert H. Batts, Stephen G. Bell, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.
Appellant (hereinafter wife) appeals from a decree dissolving the marriage of wife and respondent (hereinafter husband). Wife appeals only the trial court's distribution of certain property and its denial of attorney fees.
This appeal concerns the dissolution decree of the parties' second marriage. Husband and wife were married for the first time on February 2, 1973. That marriage was dissolved on May 16, 1979 and is not at issue here. The separation agreement in the first divorce provided for payment of $49,500 by wife to husband for his interest in the marital home at 1576 Park Ridge, Arnold, Missouri. Wife received in exchange from husband a quitclaim deed. Wife borrowed $20,000 from Mark Twain Bank and $29,500 from Nu-Way Construction Co., wife's employer, to purchase husband's interest in the marital home. These debts, which were secured by the marital home, remained as debts of the wife at the time of the second marriage to husband on December 21, 1979.
In October of 1979 the parties here were considering remarriage. The parties opened a joint bank account with United Missouri Bank of Jefferson County at Arnold, Missouri on October 9, 1979. The account was opened with a $1,000 deposit, the source being unclear from the evidence. This account was the parties' only joint bank account.
In addition to considering remarriage, the parties in October, 1979, and thereafter had several discussions concerning a pre-nuptial agreement. The pre-nuptial agreement, both parties believed, would avoid a property dispute if the remarriage ended in divorce. Pursuant to these discussions, wife typed a letter to an attorney expressing both parties' intentions to make a pre-nuptial agreement, the terms of the agreement, and a list of the assets and liabilities of both husband and wife. The letter was dated October 10, 1979, and expressed both parties' intentions as of that date. The letter, however, was not signed by either husband or wife, and was never mailed to the attorney.
The morning of their remarriage, December 21, 1979, husband and wife went to the county office of the Recorder of Deeds to get a marriage license. While at the Recorder of Deeds office, the parties executed their pre-nuptial agreement and had Richard King, the Recorder of Deeds, sign as a witness. The agreement was then placed in an envelope and, unfortunately, has been lost. Both parties have searched for it in vain.
Both parties are in accord that there was a pre-nuptial agreement. The dispute at trial focused on the actual terms of the agreement. Wife testified that the agreement consisted of a Xeroxed copy of the personal property distribution from the parties' first divorce decree along with a handwritten notation "We agree that the above items will be returned to the owners in the case of divorce." Wife testified that the agreement had "nothing whatsoever" to do with money.
Husband testified that at the Recorder of Deeds office, wife asked Mr. King for a blank piece of paper upon which she wrote out the pre-nuptial agreement. The parties and Mr. King then signed it. Husband testified that the agreement stated:
"All monies brought forward by both parties shall always be theirs in the event of a future divorce, including the $49,000 Philip G. Whitenton paid on the residence at 1576 Park Ridge, with the condition that Mrs. Janice S. Whitenton always has the option to buy my interest out on the house there on Park Ridge."
Immediately after the execution of the pre-nuptial agreement, the parties were married. Wife then returned home and husband went to work. Sometime during the day two deposits were made to the parties' joint bank account in the amounts of $6,300 and $54,851.75. Husband testified that the $6,300 came from his personal checking account and the $54,851.75 consisted of the proceeds from the earlier sale of a house he owned prior to the parties' remarriage. Wife testified that she "didn't recall" if any part of the deposits were made from her funds.
Within a few days after the marriage, wife drew three checks on the parties' joint bank account to pay off all encumbrances on the Park Ridge house. These checks totalled $53,881.83 and were in the following amounts and payees: $29,500 payable to Nu-Way Construction Co., $4,450 payable to Clarence Clamert, and $19,931.83 payable to Mark Twain Bank.
Several days after the parties remarried, a $10,000 Certificate of Deposit from Lafayette Federal Savings and Loan Association was purchased. The C.D. was in the names of husband and wife "as trustees for Lori Mathews," wife's daughter. Husband testified that $4,450 of the investment came from a joint saving account with his son, Philip J. Whitenton, and that the remaining $5,550 came from the parties' joint bank account. Husband testified that the source of the $5,500 was solely from his deposits on December 21, 1979 of $6,300 and $54,851.75. Wife testified that the parties "have had C.D.'s ever since we were married the first time" and that this C.D. "has been in and out of the bank so many times I couldn't tell you" the source of the funds to make the investment.
The trial court entered its order of dissolution on April 6, 1982. In its decree, the court made the following findings: 1) that on December 21, 1979, and prior to the marriage, husband and wife executed a written, binding pre-nuptial agreement, essentially providing that funds to be advanced or payments to be made by husband in the discharge of certain of wife's indebtedness be repaid to husband in the event of a divorce between the parties; 2) that acting under the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement, the indebtedness of the wife was paid out of funds derived solely from husband in the amount of $53,881.83; and 3) that husband is entitled to the repayment thereof since wife's indebtedness was paid solely from husband's separate funds.
The trial court additionally found that the certificate of deposit at issue here is the separate property of the husband, or alternatively, the property of husband and his son, Philip J. Whitenton.
Our review of a court-tried dissolution case is governed by Rule 73.01 and Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). Accordingly, the decree of the trial court will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d at 32; B.S.H. v. J.J.H., 613 S.W.2d 453 (Mo.App.1981).
On appeal, wife attacks the trial court's decree concerning the pre-nuptial agreement in two ways. Initially wife contends that the pre-nuptial agreement was, as a matter of law, too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable or, in the alternative, evidence concerning the terms of the agreement was not sufficiently clear and convincing. We disagree.
Neither party disputes the fact that a pre-nuptial agreement was executed on the morning of their remarriage at the Recorder of Deeds office. Additionally, neither party disputes the fact that the agreement was subsequently lost. The controversy at trial, therefore, centered on each party's recollection of the terms of the agreement. Both parties testified as to their understanding of the agreement. The trial court determined the issue by accepting the husband's version of the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement. It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine the credibility of the parties and to accept or reject all, part or none of the testimony. Trunko v. Trunko, 642 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.App.1982). On review we must give due regard to the trial court in judging credibility. Rule 73.01(c)(2).
Husband testified at trial that the pre-nuptial agreement stated:
"All monies brought forward by both parties shall always be theirs in the event of a future divorce, including the $49,000 Philip G. Whitenton paid on the residence at 1576 Park Ridge, with the condition that Mrs. Janice S. Whitenton always has the option to buy my interest out on the house there on Park Ridge."
This testimony alone is clear and convincing evidence as to the contents of the agreement. It is also quite similar to the terms of the proposed agreement as set forth in the unsigned and unmailed letter to an attorney type-written by the wife. Moreover, this testimony demonstrates that the agreement is not too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable. The agreement simply states that all monies brought into the remarriage shall remain the separate property of each spouse including the money husband paid to remove the encumbrances on wife's house. We fail to see how this agreement is vague or ambiguous.
Wife's second attack on the decree concerning the pre-nuptial agreement is that the agreement was executed under duress, that it smacked of overreaching and unfairness and that it was unconscionable. Wife contends that the execution of the pre-nuptial agreement at the time of the purchase of the marriage license produced "a high pressure situation." Wife further contends that the agreement totally benefitted husband, that he was to receive his money back but "no similar provision was made for the wife," and that the agreement covered only one item--the eventual return to husband of the approximately $54,000 he used to pay off the encumbrances on wife's house. The evidence, however, simply belies these arguments.
Under husband's version of the agreement, which the trial court accepted as true, wife was the person who actually handwrote the pre-nuptial...
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