Whitfield v. Cates
| Decision Date | 31 December 1860 |
| Citation | 59 N.C. 136,6 Jones 136 |
| Parties | R. M. WHITFIELD AND WIFE AND OTHERS v. JAMES H. CATES. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Where there is no allegation of fraud, imposition, oppression, or mistake, the Court will not set up a parol agreement, and declare an absolute deed to be a mere security for money advanced.
Where a valuable consideration has been paid by the person, to whom an absolute deed for slaves is made, the allegation of a parol trust in favor of a third party, forms no exception to the rule in courts of equity, in respect to declaring such a deed a mere security for money loaned.
Although a plaintiff may fail as to the principal equity he seeks to establish, he may fall back on a secondary equity, provided it is not inconsistent with the principal equity, and the allegations, in the bill, are sufficient to raise it.
(The cases of Shelton v. Shelton, 5 Jones' Eq. 292, and Riggs v. Swann, 59 N.C. 118, commented on and distinguished from this case.)
CAUSE removed from the Court of Equity of Person county.
The bill is filed by R. M. Whitfield and his wife, Susan, and his children, alleging that the said R. M. Whitfield was improvident, and being desirous to provide for his wife and children, the said other plaintiffs, he made a conveyance, dated March, 1840, of seven slaves, (naming them) being all the slaves he owned, for the consideration, expressed in said conveyance, of $750, that said conveyance was made upon the express understanding and agreement, that the defendant was to hold the slaves for the benefit of, and in special trust and confidence for, the wife and children of the said R. M. Whitfield, and that they were to have the privilege of redeeming the same at any time, by paying him whatever amount he might advance of the $750 with interest; that the defendant paid, at the time, $330, in cash, and gave up a note he held on the said R. M. Whitfield for $70, making in all $400, and executed a bond for $350, the balance of the $750; that some some short time thereafter, in the absence of the plaintiff, R. M. Whitfield, the defendant prevailed on his wife, the plaintiff, Susan, to give him up the bond for $350, alleging as a reason for her so doing, the improvidence of her husband; that he being a relation and a professed friend, she had entire confidence that he would deal fairly with the plaintiffs, in respect to the said bond; that the said slaves were worth at least $1300 at the time; and that the said amount of $400, was all that defendant has ever paid towards said slaves; that the defendant did not take possession of the slaves at first, but a short time after the contract he came for them, and under a pretence, set up by him, that it was necessary, to keep off creditors, for him to take possession of the property, and believing in the sincerity of his purposes, the plaintiffs consented for him to take the slaves into his possession, except one, which remained in the possession of the plaintiffs; that afterwards, he sent them all back to plaintiffs, who kept possession of them for six or seven years; that some eight or ten years ago, under the like delusive promises and assurances, he again got possession of the slaves, except the same one, which had formerly remained with them; that by the same kind of delusive statements and professions of kindness and affection, he lulled the suspicions of the plaintiffs, and did, from time to time, put them off when they called upon him to redeliver the slaves to them, and otherwise perform the trust he had undertaken in behalf of the wife and children; that about a year before the filing of the bill, the defendant had the said conveyance registered, and has since then set up claim to the absolute right to the slaves. The bill, among other interrogatories, calls on the defendant to answer, as to the said bond, for $350, whether the same has ever been paid to plaintiffs, or either of them, or to any one else? and if so, when? and where? and to whom?
The prayer is, that the defendant may be declared a trustee in behalf of the wife and children, and that an account may be taken of the amounts paid and of the hires of...
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... ... a deed absolute on its face, was a mortgage, were fraud, ... accident, or mistake. Freeman v. Baldwin , ... 13 Ala. 246; Whitfield v. Coats , 59 N.C. 136, 6 ... Jones Eq. 136. But the doctrine of our own court, as first ... stated in Johnson v. Clark , 5 Ark. 321, ... puts ... ...
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...Davidson v. Burke, 143 Ill. 139, 32 N.E. 514, 36 Am. St. Rep. 367; Wilson v. Horr, 15 Iowa, 489; Nudd v. Powers, 136 Mass. 273; Whitfield v. Cates, 59 N.C. 136; Webster Harris, 16 Ohio, 490; Matthias v. Warrington, 89 Va. 533, 16 S.E. 662; Brown v. Sewell, 11 Hare, 49, 15 Eng. Ch. 49, 17 Ju......
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...it should be a mortgage, will not answer. Colvard v. Waugh, 56 N.C. 335, 337 (1857) (emphasis and citation omitted). But see Whitfield v. Cates, 59 N.C. 136 (1860) (no conversion of deed absolute into mortgage absent allegation of fraud, imposition, oppression or The gist of Newsome's argum......
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...a general prayer, except that now no general prayer need be expressed in the pleadings, but is always implied." The case of Whitfield v. Cates, 59 N.C. 136, furnishes an instance where a plaintiff, though he failed as to his principal equity, was allowed to avail himself of a secondary equi......