Whitfield v. State

• Decision Date: 15 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 54,54
• Citation: 411 A.2d 415,287 Md. 124
• Parties: Conrad WHITFIELD and Nigel Antonio Little v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 124

287 Md. 124

411 A.2d 415

Conrad WHITFIELD and Nigel Antonio Little v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 54.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 15, 1980.

Thomas J. Saunders, Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender and George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Stephen Rosenbaum, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH, ^* COLE and DAVIDSON, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

We granted certiorari in this case to address what has been described as "probably the most difficult and frequently raised question in the wake of Miranda what constitutes the 'in custody interrogation' or 'custodial questioning' which must be preceded by the Miranda warnings." ¹ Specifically, we are asked to decide: (1) whether, in the absence of Miranda admonitions, statements elicited from the petitioner, a prison inmate, during interrogations conducted by jail officials, in the circumstances present here, could properly be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution of the inmate? and (2) whether a belief by prison officials that a gun was hidden within the jail, creates an emergency which excuses a failure to give Miranda warnings and permits the use of statements obtained from the questioned inmate in a criminal prosecution against him? Because we conclude that the inquiry occurred in the type of custodial setting condemned by the Supreme Court in Miranda, and since we can find no exception to its requirements in emergencies such as the one that existed here, we vacate petitioner's conviction and grant him a new trial.

I

The events which give rise to this appeal took place in the early part of July 1976. At that time, Nigel Little, ² a cadet guard at the Baltimore City jail, surreptitiously delivered a handgun to petitioner Conrad Whitfield, who apparently intended to use the weapon to escape from the prison. The petitioner's plans were thwarted, however, when Thomas Brown, a fellow resident at the jail, revealed to his attorney, Marshall Stewart, Esquire, that he had information concerning the presence of a pistol in the Baltimore City jail and wished to speak with someone about it. The attorney, who incidentally also represented Whitfield on unrelated criminal matters, told the authorities about this conversation, and the police relayed the information to the warden of the jail.

Upon learning of the gun's presence within the jail walls and that Whitfield was somehow connected with it, ³ correctional officers Major Howard Parks, Captain Calvin Young and Lieutenant William Britton set out "to locate Mr. Whitfield (, who apparently was permitted to move unescorted around portions of the jail,) and confront him with the information." Shortly after beginning their search, the three officers located the petitioner as he was alighting from a prison elevator with some fellow inmates. Without explanation, Whitfield was directed to accompany Officers Young and Britton to the isolation wing of the jail. Once inside the secluded confines of this area, which at the time was unoccupied by others, the officers immediately confronted petitioner with the fact that they knew "that he was in possession of a weapon within the institution." Captain Young testified that no Miranda warnings were given to Whitfield prior to or during his interrogation. The captain justified this failure by stating that his "immediate objective" was "(t)o obtain the weapon and get it out of the institution"; consequently, the witness explained that he approached Whitfield in the following manner: "as if you emphatically know that they are guilty of a said situation . . . (so that) the shock of your presenting it to them immediately will get a positive response." When asked about the gun, Whitfield at first denied having any knowledge concerning it. Britton and Young persevered with "that line of questioning for a few minutes," but petitioner continued to insist that he did not know what they were talking about. Finally, Lt. Britton

told (Whitfield) that Cadet Little and some police officers from the Baltimore City Police Department were in the Deputy Warden's office and knew everything about the handgun being in the institution and it would be best for all concerned if he would turn the gun in and prevent anybody from getting hurt. ⁴

Whitfield responded to that statement by admitting knowledge of the weapon and told the officers "that he would have to retrieve the gun from a given area of the institution, and that he would have to go by himself to retrieve (it)." Permission was granted Whitfield to fetch the gun, and upon returning five to ten minutes later to the isolation wing he handed the weapon to Britton and Young.

With the pistol safely in hand, Lt. Britton escorted the petitioner to Major Park's office for further questioning. There, the lieutenant offered Whitfield a cup of coffee, and, even though the full Miranda warnings were again not given to him, petitioner was informed that "he could contact his attorney." The prisoner used the phone and apparently attempted to call Mr. Stewart, but was informed that at the time the attorney was not in his office. However, almost immediately after completing the phone call, and prior to any additional questioning, a Mr. Claus, Mr. Stewart's office assistant, arrived at Major Park's office. In Mr. Claus's presence, the officer questioned petitioner concerning both the already recovered gun and the alleged escape plan. During the ensuing five to ten minutes, Whitfield verbally "laid everything out, . . . what was supposed to have transpired." Subsequently he was indicted for a handgun violation, Md.Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B(b), and for conspiracy to escape, Id. at § 139(a).

A pretrial hearing was held in the Criminal Court of Baltimore where, among other things, petitioner moved to suppress both oral statements made because of the failure of the jail authorities to comply with the dictates of Miranda. The court (Allen, J.) did not determine whether the statements sought to be suppressed were improperly elicited during a "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, for in its view, "it would be stretching it a great deal if we required prison officials acting in a very dire emergency to accord to prisoners under their care the rights guaranteed by the Miranda case." When subsequently he was convicted of the handgun and conspiracy charges, Whitfield appealed this ruling to the Court of Special Appeals. That court affirmed the trial court's decision because it agreed that the emergency facing the prison officials here excused compliance with Miranda's dictates. Whitfield v. State, 42 Md.App. 107, 125-28, 400 A.2d 772, 783-85 (1979). In an attempt to accommodate its decision to the confines of Miranda, the court reasoned that:

The questioning of Whitfield Was not an interrogation, looking toward prosecution, but an on-the-scene investigation for a deadly weapon which presented a threat to the security of the jail. . . . (A) fair reading of the record discloses that the correctional officers were preoccupied more so with the recovery of the gun, whether there were other guns inside the jail, and the details of the escape attempt, than with the apprehension and punishment of Whitfield. (Id. at 128, 400 A.2d at 784 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).)

We disagree.

II

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held:

(W)hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. (Id. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630.)

These principles stemmed from the Supreme Court's basic concern that the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings" may endanger an individual's fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. at 1618-1619. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345-46, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615-1616, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 267, 363 A.2d 491, 494 (1976); Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534, 537, 240 A.2d 288, 291 (1968). See also Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.Car.L.Rev. 699, 700 (1974). While the warnings designed to overcome that danger are only "prophylactic rules" rather than constitutional dictates, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2361, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), the purpose underlying these rules should nevertheless be kept in mind when applying Miranda to any given set of circumstances. In this regard, we observe that statements which are obtained from a defendant during questioning conducted without the benefit of Miranda...