Whitfield v. Termplan, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-7249,80-7249 |
| Parties | Elijah & Shirley C. WHITFIELD, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross Appellants, v. TERMPLAN, INC., Bolton, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Appellee. . Unit B |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Richard V. Karlberg, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant-cross appellee.
Bowen, Derrickson, Goldberg & West, Ralph Goldberg, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees-cross appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before JONES, TJOFLAT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
On May 30, 1978, the appellant Termplan, Inc., Bolton (lender) and the appellees-cross appellants, Elijah and Shirley Whitfield (borrowers) entered into a consumer credit transaction. On September 30, 1978, the borrowers filed this action alleging that the loan contract violated various provisions of the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq. The lender answered, denied liability and counterclaimed for the balance due on the loan contract. The borrowers replied that the contract violated the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. Ga.Code Ann. Chap. 25-3, and was therefore void and unenforceable. The district court held that the inclusion of a provision for post-maturity interest was a default or delinquency charge which was required to be disclosed under the Truth-In-Lending Act and had not been disclosed. The court also held that the contract violated the Georgia Industrial Loan Act and dismissed the lender's counterclaim. The lender filed a notice of appeal. The borrowers, dissatisfied with their award of attorney's fees, filed a cross-appeal. We reverse and remand.
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) requires the disclosure of "(t)he amount, or method of computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments." The contract involved in this case contained the following provision under the heading, "State disclosures that are inconsistent with the federal Truth-In-Lending Act:"
For value received ... The undersigned agrees to pay interest after the scheduled or accelerated maturity hereof at the rate of 8 percent per annum....
The district court held that this provision constituted a charge similar to a default or a delinquency charge, and that it must be disclosed in the federal or Truth-In-Lending disclosures. The court based its conclusion on the fact that, had the contract been silent as to post-maturity interest, the lender would have been entitled to collect only seven percent under Georgia law. See Ga.Code Ann. § 57-101 (Supp.1981). The court reasoned that the contract effectively reserved to the lender an additional one percent of post-maturity interest, and that the one percent constituted the delinquency "charge."
We note, however, that the eight percent post-maturity interest rate was the same as the stated periodic rate under the contract itself, which the lender would have been lawfully entitled to collect in the absence of a default. This court has never faced the question of whether a post-maturity interest charge equal in amount to the interest rate of the loan constitutes a "default, delinquency, or similar charg(e)." Recently, the Supreme Court has defined the term "delinquency charge" as used in the Truth-In-Lending Act "as specific penalty sums," and as "the compensation a creditor receives ... for the debtor's delay in making timely installment payments." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 561, 100 S.Ct. 790, 795, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). We do not believe that a post-maturity interest rate on the outstanding balance constitutes a penalty or compensation for delay when that rate is the same as the interest rate of the loan itself. 1
Our conclusion finds support in a Federal Reserve Board Official Staff Interpretation of Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4):
You also ask whether a creditor must disclose that, after the maturity date of a simple interest loan contract, interest may or will accrue on any principal balance that remains unpaid.
It is the staff's opinion that as to simple interest loans, such continued accrual of interest need not be disclosed if the periodic rate applicable after maturity is the same as the stated periodic rate under the loan contract, or if the rate permitted by statute after the loan maturity rate is lower than the stated rate. Where the interest on the unpaid balance accrues at a higher rate after the maturity date, however, staff believes disclosure is required by § 226.8(b)(4).
FRB Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0083 (June 20, 1977), reprinted in CCH, Consumer Credit Guide, Transfer Binder P 31,611 (emphasis added).
Our conclusion also finds support by analogy from McDaniel v. Fulton National Bank of Atlanta, 571 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1978) clarified, 576 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) and Ford Motor Credit Corp. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 790, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980), both dealing with the issue of whether a creditor's practice concerning rebate of unearned interest in the event of acceleration pursuant to default constitutes a delinquency charge. In McDaniel, this court said:
Nor need an additional disclosure of rebate provisions of unearned interest in the event of default be made if these are the same as disclosed rebate provisions in the event of voluntary prepayment. But if the creditor possesses under his contract the right to retain more unearned interest in the event of accelerated payment pursuant to default than in that of voluntary prepayment ... then the existence of that right in him must be disclosed.
576 F.2d at 1157 (emphasis added). In Milhollin, the Supreme Court said:
But so long as the creditor's rebate practice under acceleration is identical to its policy with respect to voluntary prepayments, separate disclosure of the acceleration policy does not seem obligatory under a literal reading of the regulation.
444 U.S. at 562, 100 S.Ct. at 795.
As the Supreme Court declared, "(u)nless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation should be dispositive." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 565, 100 S.Ct. at 797. We believe that the staff's approach to this issue is eminently rational. Indeed, we believe it would be unreasonable to penalize the lender for failing to disclose the fact that he would charge the same interest rate for the use of his money after maturity as he did during the life of the loan. We hold that a lender is not required to disclose the fact that post-maturity interest will be charged where the rate is the same as the stated contract rate of interest. 2 We therefore reverse the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings. 3
By counterclaim, the lender sought to recover the outstanding balance due on the note. The borrowers filed a defense to the counterclaim alleging that the contract refinanced a prior contract which was void under Georgia's Industrial Loan Act ("ILA"), Ga.Code Ann. Chap. 25-3 (1981), and therefore was itself void. The contract at issue here was executed on May 30, 1978, but it included a refinancing of the balance of a prior loan transaction dated October 26, 1977. On appeal, the parties agree that the first loan contract was illegal, and thus void, as tested by the interpretation of the ILA in Consolidated Credit Corp. of Athens v. Peppers, 144 Ga.App. 401, 240 S.E.2d 922 (1977). 4 The parties also agreed that the second contract did not violate the ILA on its face. The borrowers argue, however, that the second loan which refinanced a prior tainted loan was itself void because of illegal consideration. We do not agree.
The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Peppers was rendered on December 5, 1977, more than one month after the first loan contract was executed. During the pendency of this appeal, the Georgia Court of...
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